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The Red Prussianism of the German Democratic Republic
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Sociology of Knowledge and Moral Philosophy: The Place of Traditional Problems in the Formation of Mannheim's Thought
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Thomas Hobbes on the Family and the State of Nature
GORDON J. SCHOCHET

Reviews

In Memoriam: Robert Livingston Schuyler

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Extend a Cordial Invitation to Attend a Conference on

MUNICIPAL INCOME TAXES

November 28, 29, and 30, 1967

George Bernard Shaw, in an address before The Academy of Political Science in 1933, charged that the ordinary man is an anarchist; "he loathes tax collectors." Whether Mr. Shaw was right in his broad generalization, he certainly was correct in saying that tax collectors and taxes are not popular. A new form of tax—the municipal income tax—which appeared more than twenty years ago, is spreading rapidly across the country. Two years ago, New York City adopted a progressive income tax following the lead of Philadelphia, Detroit, Cincinnati, Columbus, Toledo, and some one hundred smaller cities. Municipalities, hard-pressed for additional revenue sources in the years ahead, are likely to adopt similar taxes.

Very little attention has been given by public finance experts to this form of taxation. How effective are municipal income taxes in producing revenue? How economical are they to collect? What are other effects on the economic life of the municipality? These problems and others of similar nature will be explored at the Academy's conference on "Municipal Income Taxes" and alternative forms of raising revenue. This meeting is made possible by a grant from the Lincoln Foundation. Papers given then will be published in the PROCEEDINGS. Full details regarding time and place will be sent to all members of the Academy early in the fall.

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White on Black: A Critique of the McCone Commission Report on the Los Angeles Riots

ROBERT M. FOGELSON
Columbia University

The Los Angeles riots erupted on August 11, 1965, after a white California highway patrolman arrested a young Negro for drunken driving in the southcentral ghetto known as Watts. A scuffle involving the youth, his mother, and the patrolman ensued, attracting a large crowd which was further incited by the arrival of the Los Angeles police. From about eight that evening to one the next morning, mobs stoned passing automobiles, assaulted white motorists, and threatened a police command post. On August 12 after a tumultuous meeting called by the Los Angeles County Human Relations Commission, the rioting, accompanied by looting and arson, spread throughout the ghetto. At great personal risk many Negro leaders, some from Los Angeles and others of national renown, pleaded with the rioters to end the violence, but to little or no avail. The next day the disorder was so widespread that Los Angeles Police Chief William Parker asked California Lieutenant Governor Glenn Anderson (standing in for vacationing Governor Edmund Brown) to order in the National Guard. Guardsmen and rioters besieged Watts that evening, and after Anderson imposed a curfew the authorities slowly suppressed the nation's worst race riots in a generation. On August 15—with 34 persons dead, over 1,000 injured, and almost 4,000 arrested,

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600 buildings damaged and $20-40 million in property destroyed —the ghetto was pacified.[1]

Four days later Governor Brown (by then returned to California) appointed a commission consisting of six whites and two Negroes and headed by John A. McCone, a prominent industrialist and former director of the CIA, to make "an objective and dispassionate study of the Los Angeles riots." Brown instructed the commission to "prepare an accurate chronology and description of the riots . . . probe deeply the immediate and underlying causes of the riots . . . [and] develop recommendations for action designed to prevent a recurrence of these tragic disorders." The commission, which was allocated $250,000, hired 29 staff members, 16 clerks and secretaries, and 26 consultants, and then launched its investigation. It heard 79 witnesses, including Governor Brown and his advisers, local politicians, police administrators, civil libertarians, teachers, Negro spokesmen, and Watts residents, its staff interviewed several hundred persons, including 90 arrested during the riots, and its consultants questioned another 10,000 people. Working at an extremely, perhaps unduly, rapid pace, the commission completed its investigation in three months. And on December 2, 1965, it presented its interpretations of the riots and its recommendations for public policy in an eighty-six page report entitled "Violence in the City—an End or a Beginning?"[2]

Put bluntly, "Violence in the City" claimed that the rioters were marginal people and the riots meaningless outbursts. The rioters were marginal people, according to the McCone Commission, because they were a small and unrepresentative fraction of the Negro population, namely, the unemployed, ill-educated, juvenile, delinquent, and uprooted. What provoked them to riot were not conditions endemic to Negro ghettos (police harassment and consumer exploitation), but rather problems peculiar to immigrant groups (resentment of police, insufficient skills, and inferior education) and irresponsible agitation by Negro leaders. Also, the riots were

[1] Jerry Cohen and William S. Murphy, *Burn, Baby, Burn! The Los Angeles Race Riot, August, 1965* (New York, 1966), 78-222; Governor's Commission on the Los Angeles Riots, *Archives*, II, in the University of California Library, Los Angeles (hereafter referred to as *MCA*).

[2] *Violence in the City—An End or a Beginning? A Report by the Governor's Commission on the Los Angeles Riots* (Dec. 2, 1965), (hereafter referred to as *MCR*). For Governor Brown's charge, see *ibid.*, i-iii.

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meaningless outbursts, according to the McCone Commission, not simply because there was no connection between the Negroes' grievances and their violence, but also because the rioting was unwarranted. Watts, for all its inadequacies, is not, like Harlem, a slum—its streets are wide and clean, and its houses are detached one- and two-story dwellings; nor are its residents, like Southern Negroes, subject to racial discrimination—to the contrary, they enjoy full legal and political equality.[3] Thus, to prevent a repetition of rioting in southcentral Los Angeles, "Violence in the City" concluded, requires that police-civilian relations be improved, unemployment reduced, education upgraded, and civil rights protests suppressed.

Less than two months later the California Advisory Committee to the United States Civil Rights Commission challenged the McCone Commission's findings and recommendations. Shortly thereafter Bayard Rustin, the well-known civil rights spokesman, Robert Blauner, a Berkeley sociologist, and Harry Scoble, a U.C.L.A. political scientist, criticized the report, too.[4] Notwithstanding a few differences, these critics agreed on the following crucial points. First, that a much larger and more representative segment of the ghetto populace than the McCone Commission estimated joined the rioting and that many others who did not participate supported the rioters. Second, that the Negroes rioted because they could not passively accept conditions in the ghetto any longer and not because they were unprepared for urban life or because their leaders were contemptuous of law and order. Third, that the rioting, and especially the looting and burning, were articulate protests against genuine grievances and, as such, meaningful protests against the southcentral ghetto. Fourth, that the Watts vicinity is, by any physical or psychological criteria, a slum, in which Los Angeles' Negroes are rigorously and involuntarily segregated.

[3] *Ibid.*, 2-9 and *passim.*

[4] California Advisory Committee to the United States Commission on Civil Rights, "An Analysis of the McCone Commission Report" (Jan. 1966); Bayard Rustin, "The Watts 'Manifesto' and the McCone Report," *Commentary*, XLI (1966), 29-35; Robert Blauner, "Whitewash Over Watts," *Trans-action*, III (1966), 3 ff; Harry M. Scoble, "The McCone Commission and Social Science" (Aug. 1966), unpublished paper written for the U.S. Office of Economic Opportunity.

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Hence, to maintain public order in Los Angeles, these critics countered, demands fundamental changes not only in the Negro ghetto but in the white metropolis as well.

The controversy between the McCone Commission and its critics was resolved late in 1966 when the U.C.L.A. Institute of Government and Public Affairs completed a survey of the Los Angeles riots for the U.S. Office of Economic Opportunity, and I finished a report on the riots of the nineteen-sixties for the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice.[5] Together, these studies left little doubt that the McCone Commission completely misunderstood the character and implications of the Los Angeles riots. Yet, as the McCone Commission archives were inaccessible for several months after the investigation, none of the critics (nor, for other reasons, either of the studies) made it clear just why the commission failed. Accordingly, it was not until the summer of 1966, when these archives—which consist of the report, a chronology of the rioting, twelve volumes of formal hearings by the commission, two volumes of informal interviews by its staff, and two volumes of consultants' papers—were deposited in the California State Library in Sacramento and the University of California Library in Los Angeles, that it was possible to reconstruct the McCone Commission investigation and to discern where and why it went wrong.

The McCone Commission archives indicate that the investigation failed for more profound reasons than the critics presumed. To begin with, the most obvious explanation offered, that the commission was unduly hasty in its work, is true but hardly crucial. This is not to deny that the commission's schedule—which allowed only slightly more than three months for the investigation[6]—was exceedingly tight and its pace excessively rapid. Nor is it to deny that the commission presented an extremely sketchy report, a document much less impressive than the exhaustive study of the Chicago riots of 1919 and even the modest account of the

[5] Robert M. Fogelson, "The 1960's Riots: Interpretations and Recommendations," a report prepared for the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, December 1966. The Institute's study is presently being prepared for publication under the supervision of Professor Nat Cohen who kindly allowed me to read the preliminary findings.

[6] Blauner, 3.

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Harlem riots of 1935.[7] It is rather to claim that during the three months available, as a careful reading of the report, hearings, interviews, and consultants' papers reveals, the McCone Commission collected enough information for a satisfactory, though not definitive, explanation of the 1965 rioting. And so completely did the commissioners ignore or misinterpret this information that there is no reason to believe that if given three years rather than three months they would have prepared a better report.

The critics also contended that the McCone Commission was not inclined to probe deeply into the Los Angeles riots anyway.[8] There is much to support this assertion. Governor Brown, who was gravely concerned about his political future (with good cause, it turned out), well knew that the riots were an explosive issue. Hence he appointed an impeccably conservative commission. In addition to McCone, who, by virtue of his prestige, dominated the deliberations, it consisted of a prominent attorney, the chairman of the Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Company, the president of Loyola University, the dean of the U.C.L.A. Medical School, and a former president of the California League of Women Voters (the six whites) as well as a municipal judge and a Presbyterian pastor (the two Negroes). Except for the two Negroes, who were anything but militant and exerted little influence over the commission, the commissioners were representative of California's establishment. This was hardly auspicious because blue-ribbon commissions in the United States, unlike royal commissions in Great Britain, have as a rule sought political, as opposed to literal, truth.[9] And the McCone Commission was no exception.

There is, however, a more crucial explanation for the McCone Commission's failure. The commissioners were not altogether unsympathetic to the plight of Negroes in the southcentral ghetto, nor were they unintelligent or irresponsible. They were, to the con-

[7] Chicago Commission on Race Relations, *The Negro in Chicago: A Study of Race Relations and a Race Riot* (Chicago, 1922); Mayor's Commission on Conditions in Harlem, "The Negro in Harlem: A Report on Social and Economic Conditions Responsible for the Outbreak of March 19, 1935" (New York, 1936).

[8] Rustin, 33-34; Blauner, 2-3.

[9] Charles J. Hanser, *Guide to Decision: The Royal Commission* (Tottowa, N.J., 1965), especially Chap. 10.

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trary, representative of upper-middle-class whites in Los Angeles and other American cities. Accordingly, they brought to their task assorted preconceptions about violence, law enforcement, ghettos, and slums, preconceptions which they shared with others of their class and race. These preconceptions—they emerge clearly from the hearings and, less so, from the report—prevented the commission from perceptively analyzing the evidence and correctly interpreting the riots. For they filtered the testimony and other information received by the commissioners and enabled them to draw conclusions based on the flimsiest material while ignoring more substantial but less reassuring data. Hence, a reconsideration of the investigation is worthwhile not only because "Violence in the City" is the fullest official statement about any riots of the nineteen-sixties, but also because the McCone Commission's fiasco sharply illuminates why most white Americans have thus far failed to understand the Negro riots.

I

At the outset of the investigation the McCone Commission reached the conclusion that only 10,000, or approximately two per cent, of Los Angeles County's 650,000 Negroes joined the rioting. Moreover, it contended, the rioters were not representative of the Negro community; they were the unemployed, ill-educated, delinquent, juvenile, and uprooted—in short, the riffraff.[10] The overwhelming majority of Los Angeles' Negroes, the commission implied, were law-abiding, that is, non-riotous; doubtless they, like Los Angeles' whites, disapproved of the disturbances. The riffraff theory, it should be noted, was not formulated for the first time by the McCone Commission. It had been adopted a year earlier by Paul Screvane, acting mayor of New York City, and Nelson Rockefeller, governor of New York State, in order to explain the Harlem, Bedford-Stuyvesant, and Rochester riots.[11] Nevertheless, for the McCone Commission (as well as for the Brown administration and California's white majority), the conclusion that the Negro riffraff

[10] *MCA*, III, Testimony of Lieutenant Governor Glenn M. Anderson, 22; *MCR*, 1, 3, 5, 24.

[11] New York *Times*, July 22, Aug. 4, 1964; Newark *Evening News*, July 20, 1964; New York *Journal-American*, July 26, 1964.

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was primarily responsible for the Los Angeles riots was reassuring indeed.

If the rioters were only a small group of unemployed, ill-educated, delinquent, juvenile, and uprooted Negroes then the Los Angeles riots were less serious than the concern they aroused indicated. It follows that the rioting was not only peripheral to the issue of Negro-white relations, but also a manifestation of problems of poverty, which, in American thought, is alterable, rather than race, which is, by contrast, immutable. It also follows that the Los Angeles riots reflected not so much the social problems inherent in modern Negro ghettos as the personal disabilities of recent Negro newcomers. It follows further that the violent acts, the assaults, arson, and theft, were not expressions of legitimate grievances and that they were, in the words of the McCone Commission, "formless, quite senseless," and, by implication, meaningless.[12] Hence future riots could be prevented in southcentral Los Angeles merely by elevating the riffraff without transforming the Negro ghetto—without, in effect, radically changing greater Los Angeles or seriously inconveniencing its white majority.

Given the profound implications of the riffraff theory, its foundations should have been based on solid evidence. Yet little evidence, solid or otherwise, is contained in "Violence in the City." For all its hearings, interviews, and consultants, the McCone Commission made no surveys of riot participation. Instead, it derived its estimate that only two per cent of Los Angeles' Negroes joined in the riots from the impressions of Mayor Samuel Yorty, Police Chief Parker, and other officials who had good reason to minimize the extent of participation.[13] Furthermore, the commission based its conclusion that the rioters were the riffraff on nothing more than a statistical survey of the persons arrested during the rioting according to age, prior criminal record, and place of birth. It did not present the comparable statistics for southcentral Los Angeles which would have revealed that the number of juveniles, criminals, and newcomers involved was not, in fact, disproportionately

[12] *MCR*, 4-5.

[13] *MCA*, III, Testimony of Lieutenant Governor Glenn Anderson, 22-23; XI, Testimony of Police Chief William H. Parker, 87-89; XIV, Testimony of Mayor Samuel W. Yorty, 58-61.

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high.[14] Nor did it compile any data about the employment rates and educational levels of the rioters. Finally, the commission offered no proof that the great majority of Los Angeles' Negroes disapproved of the rioting, and even ignored the testimony of many middle-class Negroes who did not riot but admitted that they fully sympathized with the rioters.[15]

Why, then, in the absence of corroborating evidence, did the McCone Commission adopt the riffraff theory? The answer, I believe, can be traced to its conviction that no matter how grave the grievances, there are no legitimate grounds for violent protest—a conviction, shared by most whites and, until recently, most Negroes, which reflects the nation's traditional confidence in orderly social change.[16] To have accepted—indeed, even to have raised—the possibility that a substantial and representative segment of Los Angeles' Negroes participated in the riots would have compelled the commission to draw either of two conclusions: one, that the deterioration of the southcentral ghetto has destroyed the prospect for gradual progress and provided the justification for violent protest; the other, that even if the commission does not believe that the situation is anywhere so desperate, a large number of ordinary Negroes in Los Angeles does not agree with it. Neither conclusion could have been reconciled with the commission's commitment to orderly, and extremely limited, social change. And to have accepted either would have obliged the commissioners to re-examine a fundamental feature of the ideology of their class, race, and country. Not surprisingly, they, like most of their countrymen, were not inclined to do so.

The riffraff theory is wrong, however. On the basis of statistical

[14] For these figures, see Bureau of Criminal Statistics, California Department of Justice, "Summary of a Preliminary Report of Persons Arrested in the Los Angeles Riots" (Nov. 1965), *ibid.*, II; *MCR*, 24; U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Current Population Reports*, Series P-23, No. 18, "Characteristics of the South and East Los Angeles Areas: November 1965" (Washington, D.C., 1966), 38; *idem*, *United States Census of Population: 1960. Detailed Characteristics. California. Final Report* (Washington, D.C., 1962), 478, 485; The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, *The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society* (Washington, D.C., 1967), 75.

[15] *MCA*, XV, Interview 29; XVI, Interview 90.

[16] *MCR*, 6-7. See, also, Louis Hartz, *The Liberal Tradition in America* (New York, 1955), Chap. I; Gresham M. Sykes, *Crime and Society* (New York, 1966), 79.

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and other data now available, the McCone Commission's estimate that only 10,000, or approximately two per cent, of Los Angeles County's 650,000 Negroes participated in the riots is wholly far-fetched. For to claim that only 10,000 Negroes rioted when almost 4,000 were arrested is to presume that the police apprehended fully forty per cent of the rioters, a presumption which, as Harry Scoble has pointed out, is inconsistent with all the descriptions of the rioting.[17] Indeed, recent surveys conducted by David O. Sears, a U.C.L.A. political scientist, and John F. Kraft, Inc., an opinion research organization, reveal that the figure is at least 30,000 and perhaps even as high as 80,000.[18] Of the 650,000 Negroes then living in Los Angeles County, moreover, no more than 450,000 resided in the curfew area; and of these, roughly 180,000—nearly all children under twelve and adults over sixty—did not participate in the rioting.[19] Thus, of the potential rioters, the male and female adolescents and young and middle-age adults—and the McCone Commission notwithstanding, potential rioters, not total population, is the appropriate base on which to compute riot participation —a substantial minority, at the very least, joined in the 1965 riots.

Arrest data and survey research also refute the McCone Commission's conclusion that the rioters were the unemployed, ill-educated, delinquent, juvenile, and uprooted, and they alone. The commission's profile is not only internally inconsistent—in Los Angeles, a study prepared for the Area Redevelopment Administration by the U.C.L.A. Institute of Industrial Relations reveals, the newcomers tend to be better educated and more regularly employed than the older residents[20]—but, in addition, it does not accurately describe the rioters. Young adults and not minors made up the large majority of the arrestees; that most of them had prior

[17] Scoble, "The McCone Commission," 11.

[18] John F. Kraft, Inc., "Attitudes of Negroes in Various Cities," a report prepared for the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Executive Reorganization ([New York], 1966), 5-6; David O. Sears, "Riot Activity and Evaluation: An Overview of the Negro Survey" (1966), 1-2, unpublished paper written for the U.S. Office of Economic Opportunity.

[19] U.S. Bureau of the Census, "Characteristics of the South and East Los Angeles Areas," 38.

[20] Institute of Industrial Relations, University of California, Los Angeles, "Hard-Core Unemployment and Poverty in Los Angeles" (Washington, D.C., 1965), 143-45.

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records reflects not so much their criminality as the high incidence of arrest in the ghetto. Evidence about educational achievement suggests that the rioters were, if anything, slightly better educated than their peers; so, U.C.L.A. survey research indicates, were their parents. And data on employment and residence, also based on arrest records, show that the great majority of the rioters had lived in Los Angeles for at least five years and were currently employed. For these reasons the U.C.L.A. Institute of Government and Public Affairs study of riot participation concluded that the Los Angeles rioters were very much in "the mainstream of modern Negro urban life."[21]

The recent surveys of public opinion in the southcentral ghetto also contradict the McCone Commission's implication that an overwhelming proportion of Los Angeles' Negroes disapproved of the riots. Not only did a substantial and representative minority actually participate in the rioting, but, in addition, many others who did not riot sympathized with the rioters.[22] Nor did attitudes in the ghetto change later. Whereas a small majority of Negroes interviewed after the rioting expressed confidence in non-violence, nearly as many believed that the riots had improved the position of their race. Also, many who disapproved of the rioting gave as their reason the fact that Negroes, not whites, suffered the brunt of the casualties—the personal injuries as opposed to the property losses. Asked what impact the riots had on them as Negroes, a slight majority answered that they felt more pride, a large minority reported no change, and almost none said that they felt less pride.[23] Contrary to the McCone Commission's findings, then, the Los Angeles riots were made by a large minority of the potential rioters, typical of the young adult Negro population, which received widespread support within the ghetto.

This conclusion has very different, but no less profound, implications than the riffraff theory. If the rioters were a substantial and representative minority, sympathetically regarded by the

[21] Sears, 1-13; Los Angeles County Probation Department, "Riot Participation Study: Juvenile Offenders" (Nov. 1965); Bureau of Criminal Statistics, California Department of Criminal Justice, "Watts Riots Arrests: Los Angeles August 1965" (June 30, 1966).

[22] *MCA*, XVI, Interview 90.

[23] John F. Kraft, Inc., "Attitudes of Negroes," 4, 6, 7; Sears, 5-6.

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Negro community, then the Los Angeles riots were clearly of the utmost importance. They were not only central to the issue of Negro-white relations, but also manifestations of problems of race even more than class. Indeed, there is considerable evidence that working- and middle-class Negroes resent the indignities of ghetto life more than lower-class Negroes do. The rioting also reflected social problems endemic to Negro ghettos rather than personal disabilities peculiar to immigrant groups—or, as Bayard Rustin put it, the unpreparedness not of the newcomers, but of the cities. And the violent acts were expressions of genuine grievances and, as such, meaningful protests. If these implications are valid, moreover, future riots can be prevented only by transforming the southcentral ghetto, not simply by elevating the riffraff—a recommendation which is highly irresponsible and downright dangerous when exploited, as it was by the McCone Commission, to obscure the legitimate grievances of Los Angeles' Negroes.

II

The Los Angeles riots made it quite clear that many Negroes in the southcentral ghetto regard the conduct of the Los Angeles police as one of these grievances. The incident which precipitated the rioting—a commonplace and, were it not for what followed, trivial arrest for drunken driving—is otherwise incomprehensible. Why else did hundreds of Negroes gather at the site of the arrest—an arrest wholly justified and properly handled—shout abuse at the patrolmen, attempt to free the prisoners, and even hurl bricks at the police cars? Why else did so many Negroes believe the wild rumors that the patrolmen were mistreating other Negroes which swiftly spread through the ghetto? Why else did the arrival of police reinforcements attract a thousand or so Negroes to the scene and so incite them that the crowd was transformed into a mob? And why else did the rioters later vent their hostility against the Los Angeles patrolmen and not, with some exceptions, against the guardsmen?[24] So overwhelming is this evidence that even the McCone Commission realized that police action has an incendiary effect in the southcentral ghetto that it has nowhere else in Los

[24] *MCR*, 10-12; *MCA*, XII, Testimony of Benjamin Peery, a long-time Watts resident, 5-6; Cohen and Murphy, 50-59.

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Angeles. And for this reason the commission spent many of its sessions investigating Negro resentment of police.

A host of middle-class Negro witnesses testified at these sessions that many Negroes are unduly resentful of the Los Angeles police because of their earlier experience with Southern policemen. Nonetheless, they insisted, even in Los Angeles, Negroes are victims of police brutality and police harassment so often that their resentment is justified. The Negro witnesses also conceded that for the patrolmen who work there (as for the people who live there) the southcentral ghetto is a very dangerous place. Even so, they pointed out, Negroes are convinced, and with good reason, that the police enforce the law less rigorously in their community than elsewhere in Los Angeles.[25] It is because, as Assemblyman Mervyn M. Dymally told the McCone Commission, Negroes have "generally expected the worst from the police and generally received it"[26] that they resent the police. To ease this resentment, Dymally and the other Negro witnesses urged the commission to recommend that brutality and harassment be eliminated, law enforcement tightened, and an independent police review board established.

The Los Angeles Police Department spokesmen, Chief Parker, John Ferraro, president of the Board of Police Commissioners, and Mayor Yorty, replied to the Negro witnesses. They insisted that their charges—according to Parker, manifestations of the dwindling respect for law and order in the United States and attempts to undermine the effectiveness of law enforcement in Los Angeles—were altogether unfounded. Police brutality is extremely uncommon, they argued, police harassment is deplored and discouraged, and a single standard of law enforcement is maintained everywhere in Los Angeles. The resentment of Negroes, they claimed, is due to their past mistreatment in the South and present maladjustment in the North, and not to the conduct of the police in the ghetto. Negroes vent their hostility toward patrolmen not as

[25] *MCA*, III, Testimony of Councilman Thomas Bradley, 29-36; V, Testimony of John A. Buggs, executive director of the Los Angeles County Human Relations Commission, 18-23; VI, Testimony of Assemblyman Mervyn M. Dymally, 48-49; VIII, Testimony of Congressman Augustus F. Hawkins, 82-85; X, Testimony of Councilman Billy G. Mills, 9-10.

[26] Mervyn M. Dymally, "Statement Prepared for the Governor's Commission on the Los Angeles Riots" (Oct. 11, 1965), 2.

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patrolmen, but as representatives of white society and white authority; the police are the recipients, not the source, of Negro resentment. Past practices aside, the police department's spokesmen assured the McCone Commission, Los Angeles' Negroes have no genuine grievances against the police, and thus no major departmental reforms are necessary.[27]

The McCone Commission largely endorsed the police department's position.[28] It ignored the allegations of inadequate law enforcement, dismissed the charges of brutality and harassment, and concluded that the problem of Negro-police relations was a problem not of misconduct but of misunderstanding of the police by Negroes and of Negroes by the police. To alleviate this misunderstanding, the commission recommended that the police department's procedure for handling civilian complaints be revised, but it rejected Negro demands for an independent police review board —on the grounds that such boards have not worked well in two other cities (both of which were unnamed) and that they tend to demoralize patrolmen (though Negro, not police, morale was the issue here)—and proposed instead the creation of an "inspector general" under the jurisdiction of the chief of police. It also recommended the professionalization of the Board of Police Commissioners, the non-salaried citizens agency which has ultimate responsibility for the police force, and the expansion of the police department's current, though ineffective, community relations program.[29]

To reach these conclusions was no mean task. The McCone Commission had to do more than merely reject the testimony of its middle-class Negro witnesses. It also had to disregard the affidavits and other evidence submitted by the southern California chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union substantiating the allegations of police misconduct and to ignore the statement of one Los Angeles policeman who reluctantly admitted that most white patrolmen simply cannot distinguish between law-abiding and

[27] *MCA*, VI, Testimony of John Ferraro, president of the Los Angeles Board of Police Commissioners, 5-8; XI, Testimony of Police Chief William Parker, 3-36; XIV, Testimony of Mayor Samuel W. Yorty, 58-61.

[28] *MCR*, 27-28.

[29] *Ibid.*, 29-37.

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lawless colored people.[30] Finally, it had to accept unqualifiedly the testimony of Chief Parker, a man whose antipathy to the civil rights movement was exceeded only by his devotion to the Los Angeles police, whose professional views were extremely conservative even for an extremely conservative profession, and whose personal behavior at the commission's hearings bordered, I believe, on the paranoid.[31] The McCone Commission had to overcome all these seemingly insuperable obstacles without the benefit of any surveys or other data refuting the Negroes' complaints or supporting the police department's replies. That it—or, more accurately, Chairman McCone, for the other commissioners deferred to him in the examination of the problem of Negro-police relations—did so nonetheless is indeed remarkable.

What is even more remarkable is that McCone had already resolved this problem by the start of the investigation. Questioning George Slaff of the American Civil Liberties Union—to whom he was inexcusably rude[32]—McCone remarked that as CIA director he learned that in all the recent American riots and overseas insurrections the issue of police brutality was raised in order to destroy effective law enforcement. This tactic is reprehensible, he explained, because society is held together by respect for law, and respect for law is maintained by effective law enforcement, an assertion which reappeared almost verbatim in "Violence in the City,"[33] even though Slaff and others challenged its fundamental premise at the hearings. If police brutality is admitted, McCone reasoned, police authority will be undermined, law will be disregarded, society will be disrupted, and, in the words of the report, "chaos might easily result"—a prospect for which the commission was unwilling to assume any responsibility. That effective law en-

[30] *MCA*, XIII, Testimony of Richard Simon, Los Angeles Police Department, 8-9; Testimony of George Slaff, American Civil Liberties Union, 9-12.

[31] For indications of Parker's paranoia, see *ibid.*, XI, Testimony of Police Chief William H. Parker, 16, 37-38, 119, and especially 121, where he claimed that Negro leaders "seem to think that if Parker can be destroyed officially, then they will have no more trouble in imposing their will upon the police of America, and that's about what it amounts to, because nobody else will dare stand up."

[32] *Ibid.*, XIII, Testimony of George Slaff, American Civil Liberties Union, 9-11.

[33] See McCone's statement in *ibid.*, 26-27, and the commission's position in *MCR*, 28-29.

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forcement is only one among many sources of respect for law, that respect for law is only one among many supports of public order, and, indeed, that society is not simply a collection of predatory individuals and groups, McCone did not realize. Given his preconceptions and the other commissioners' deference, then, the commission could not have reached any other conclusions.

These conclusions are untenable, however, because they are inconsistent with the testimony and evidence offered by Negro witnesses and Civil Liberties Union spokesmen, and, more vital, because they are contradicted by two independent surveys of police conduct in the southcentral ghetto subsequently prepared by the Kraft organization and U.C.L.A. psychologist Walter J. Raine. These surveys reveal that most Los Angeles Negroes, middle class as well as lower class and law-abiding as well as lawless, have suffered police brutality or police harassment at one time or another.[34] These surveys also indicate that few Negroes in the southcentral ghetto believe that they receive adequate police protection, a belief which is supported by the crime statistics Chief Parker submitted to the McCone Commission. Hence, without analyzing the Negroes' complaints or the patrolmen's conduct at this point, it is still possible to define brutality, harassment, and inadequate protection as the primary problems which generate Negro resentment of the police in Los Angeles and which precipitated the riots in 1965.

The McCone Commission notwithstanding, these problems are problems of substance, not simply understanding, which the commission's recommendations do little to alleviate. Professionalization of the Board of Police Commissioners is irrelevant because it is not intrinsically related to the questions of brutality, harassment, and inadequate police protection in the ghetto. Establishment of an "inspector general"—as opposed to an independent civilian review board—is valueless because the Negroes will not place their trust in any police official, no matter how impressive

[34] John F. Kraft, Inc., "Attitudes of Negroes," 12-14, 23-25; Walter J. Raine, "The Perception of Police Brutality in South Central Los Angeles Following the Revolt of August 1965" (1966), 2-12, unpublished study prepared for the U.S. Office of Economic Opportunity; California Advisory Committee to the United States Commission on Civil Rights, "Report on California: Police-Minority Group Relations" (Aug. 1963), 7-31.

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his title. And expansion of the police department's community relations program is at best moderately beneficial and at worst, if exploited, as it was by the McCone Commission, to avoid the real issue, dangerously misguided. That issue is to provide southcentral Los Angeles with the same law enforcement as the rest of the metropolis, a policy which would reduce brutality and harassment and at the same time enhance police protection. This is not, politically or otherwise, a simple task. But if the relationship between police and Negroes in Los Angeles is to be improved so that commonplace incidents do not trigger terrible confrontations, it is absolutely imperative.

III

The McCone Commission did not do much better in its investigation of the other reasons underlying the 1965 riots. That there were other reasons no one, not the commission and not its critics, seriously doubted. After all, though only a thousand Negroes gathered at the scene of the triggering incident, thousands more, few of whom had witnessed the initial arrest, subsequently joined in the rioting. Night after night, for almost a week, they left their homes and, with a camaraderie and enthusiasm usually reserved for festive occasions, thronged the streets. There they not only attacked patrolmen (flinging bricks and Molotov cocktails and firing rifles from the rooftops), but also assaulted white passers-by and looted and burned neighborhood stores.[35] By these actions a minor disturbance developed into a full-scale riot. This development was not inevitable; there are too many instances in which bands of Americans, often adolescent members of ethnic minorities, challenged police authority without provoking widespread disorder for this to be so.[36] But neither was it accidental. It was rather a violent manifestation of the fact that the Negroes in Los Angeles resent several other conditions in the southcentral ghetto just as keenly as they resent police misconduct. To define these conditions, and to recommend action to remedy them, was the McCone Commission's principal responsibility.

[35] *MCR*, 12-20; *MCA*, II, *passim;* XVI, Interview 29; Cohen and Murphy, 85-175.

[36] Harrison Salisbury, *The Shook-Up Generation* (New York, 1958), Chaps. 2, 5, 6, 11.

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To this end the commission received from its witnesses and consultants sixteen volumes of testimony and reports which, for all its inconsistencies, made certain points quite clear. First, that in addition to police misconduct the crucial problems of Los Angeles' Negroes, and not only its lower-class Negroes, are economic deprivation, consumer exploitation, inadequate accommodations, and racial discrimination. Second, that these problems are deeply rooted in the conditions of ghetto life, especially in the high rates of unemployment, extreme risks of business enterprise, rigid patterns of residential segregation, and the profound weakness of Negro leadership. Third, that the Los Angeles rioters were so highly selective in their violence that, with few exceptions, they looted and burned only white-owned stores which charged outrageous prices, sold inferior goods, and applied extortionate credit arrangements.[37]

For the McCone Commission it was one thing to receive this information and quite another to accept it. A few examples should suffice to illustrate this difference. Jeffrey Nugent and Michael DePrano, University of Southern California economists, suggested that the rioting was generated by the disparity between the Negro's adequate educational achievements and his inadequate employment opportunities.[38] An imaginative hypothesis, but one incompatible with the riffraff theory, it was completely ignored by the commission. Paul Schrade, a United Automobile Workers Union official, argued that unemployment in the ghetto is due primarily to job shortages in greater Los Angeles, an assertion which contradicted the assumption that individual disabilities, not social conditions, provoked the rioting.[39] McCone sharply dissented, claiming that the problem is a function of insufficient training, and the commission adopted his position. Thomas Reddin, deputy chief of the Los Angeles Police Department, testified that the patterns of theft and arson in the riots revealed that the rioters vented

[37] Rustin, 29-30; Alex Rosen, "The Riots in Watts, Los Angeles," 7, paper presented at the 13th National Institute on Crime and Delinquency, Atlantic City, New Jersey, June 14, 1966; Fogelson, "The 1960's Riots," Chap. III.

[38] Michael E. DePrano and Jeffrey B. Nugent, "Economic Aspects of the L.A. Riots and Proposed Solutions," *MCA*, XVII.

[39] *Ibid.*, XII, Testimony of Paul Schrade, United Automobile Workers Union, 42-44.

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their resentment against the least scrupulous white merchants.[40] His testimony ran counter to the presumption that the rioting was meaningless, and, though confirmed by half a dozen witnesses, it, too, was disregarded by the commission.

Rejecting this and other evidence inconsistent with its preconceptions, the McCone Commission found three main reasons for the Los Angeles riots (other than police-Negro misunderstanding and irresponsible Negro leadership): excessive unemployment, inferior education, and inadequate transportation. The jobless Negro cannot attain a decent standard of living, the commission argued, nor can he assume responsibility for his family. Hence his self-esteem wanes, and his community ties erode; welfare, which feeds his children, intensifies his sense of dependency. Training the Negro worker to compete in the labor market is one solution. Also, the commission insisted, the Negro youngster cannot understand what is taught in the schools because he is culturally deprived. Nor can the schools help; they have insufficient equipment and a limited curriculum, too few experienced teachers and too many double sessions. To educate the Negro student so that he can be trained for skilled employment is another solution. Furthermore, the commission contended, the Negro is sorely inconvenienced as a worker and a student because the ghetto is isolated from Los Angeles. And it is isolated because in a metropolis which lacks adequate mass transit facilities only fourteen per cent of the families in southcentral Los Angeles, as opposed to over fifty per cent in Los Angeles County, own automobiles. Improving transportation in Los Angeles, and thereby facilitating movement in and out of the ghetto, is yet another solution.[41]

The McCone Commission's recommendations are consistent with its preconceptions, too. To reduce unemployment, it proposed that government, business, and labor create a job training and placement center in southcentral Los Angeles, that federal and state authorities insure that due advantage is taken of the available training programs and job opportunities, and, less vital, that the California legislature require employers and unions to disclose the racial composition of their employes and members. To upgrade educa-

[40] *Ibid.*, Testimony of Thomas Reddin, Los Angeles Police Department, 21.
[41] *MCR*, 38-47, 49-60, 65-67.

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tion, it urged that a permanent pre-school program be established in the Negro ghetto to assist three-year olds to develop the skills required to learn to read and write, and that certain elementary and junior high schools there—designated "emergency schools"—be authorized to set up literacy programs with classes limited to twenty-two students and special services provided by supplementary personnel. To improve transportation, it recommended that all transit companies in greater Los Angeles be consolidated with the Southern California Rapid Transit District, and that public authority subsidize the District to expand service in the ghetto[42]—a recommendation partially implemented when the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development granted $2.7 million to the District in May 1966.[43]

Neither these recommendations nor the reasons underlying them are satisfactory, however. Unemployment in southcentral Los Angeles—which, by the U.S. Census Bureau's conservative estimate, exceeds ten per cent—is indeed excessive. But inadequate training is only one among many reasons for unemployment, and unemployment is only one among many economic problems in the ghetto.[44] About these reasons—job shortages, racial discrimination, and criminal records—and these problems—irregular employment and low-wage employment—the McCone Commission said almost nothing. Education in the Negro ghetto—where, according to commission consultant Kenneth A. Martyn, test scores in all subjects and at all grades are extremely low—is inferior, too. But approximately one Negro in four who graduates from high school in southcentral Los Angeles cannot find employment anyway, and many others must settle for menial jobs.[45] To urge Negroes to acquire an education under these circumstances, as the McCone Commission did, is unfair and perhaps even unsafe. Finally, it is undeniable that mass transit is woefully inadequate in southcentral

[42] *Ibid.*, 47-48, 60-61, 67-68.

[43] New York *Times*, May 28, 1966.

[44] U.S. Department of Labor, "Sub-Employment in the Slums of Los Angeles" ([Washington, D.C.], 1966). For the commission's position on criminal records and employment opportunities, see *MCR*, 47.

[45] Kenneth A. Martyn, "Report on Education to the Governor's Commission on the Los Angeles Riots" (Nov. 1965), 2-30, *MCA*, XVIII; U.S. Department of Labor, *The Negroes in the United States: Their Social and Economic Situation* (Washington, D.C., 1966), 24-25.

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Los Angeles as well as in greater Los Angeles. But, according to a 1965 census, fully sixty-five per cent of the families in the Negro ghetto, and not, as reported by the McCone Commission, only fourteen per cent, own one or more cars.[46] The southcentral ghetto is indeed isolated, but not for reasons as simple and reassuring as dreadful bus service.

The McCone Commission's explanations and recommendations are particularly incomplete with regard to consumer exploitation and racial discrimination. The commission admitted that many witnesses charged that white merchants systematically exploit colored consumers in southcentral Los Angeles. But it insisted that low-income consumers are at a disadvantage everywhere, not only in the Negro ghetto, and denied that there was a correlation between the charges of consumer exploitation and the patterns of looting and burning.[47] To relieve consumer exploitation it merely recommended establishment of educational programs and expansion of legal services in the Watts area.. The commission's findings were derived from a blatant distortion of the evidence, however, and do not withstand careful scrutiny. Consumer exploitation is a function of race as well as poverty, of customers without credit, high-risk businesses, and merchants without scruples. The correlation between rioting, especially arson, and consumer exploitation is imperfect, but, the archives reveal, convincing just the same.[48] And the commission's recommendations are inadequate because, if implemented, they would not increase consumer credit, reduce business risks, or curtail mercantile cupidity in southcentral Los Angeles.

If the McCone Commission minimized consumer exploitation it ignored racial discrimination. For this the witnesses were not to blame. One after another—and sometimes with much eloquence—they spoke of discrimination. They testified that it started when

[46] U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Current Population Reports*, Series P-23, No. 17, "Special Census Survey of the South and East Los Angeles Areas: November 1965" (Washington, D.C., 1966), 13.

[47] *MCR*, 62-65.

[48] *MCA*, V, Testimony of Harvey Claybrook, an accountant formerly employed in Watts, 8-13; XII, Testimony of Thomas Reddin, Los Angeles Police Department, 21-22; XIII, Testimony of Helen Nelson, consumer counsel, state of California, 1-14. See, also, Rustin, 29-30; Cohen and Murphy, 111, 132; David Caplovitz, *The Poor Pay More: Consumer Practices of Low-Income Families* (New York, 1963), *passim*.

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colored people first migrated to southern California at the turn of the century and still persists today, fully fifty years and half a million Negroes later. They also testified that most whites, not only patrolmen, politicians, realtors, and merchants, treat most Negroes as unworthy, undesirable, and, even more aggravating, inferior.[49] Yet their testimony, which, while subjective, was quite restrained, made no impact on the McCone Commission—and for good reason. The commission could not concede that Negro resentment of racial discrimination (as well as economic deprivation and consumer exploitation) was justified, or that assaults on white passers-by and looting and burning of neighborhood stores were manifestations of these grievances, without abandoning its preconceptions about the riots. For that reason the McCone Comission failed to discover the conditions underlying the riots in Los Angeles and to devise recommendations which might prevent future rioting there.

IV

The McCone Commission also failed to explain why the customary restraints on rioting were inoperative in the southcentral ghetto in August 1965. To be sure, it did devote a large amount of its limited time to investigate the ineffectiveness of external restraints—paramilitary and military power—in Los Angeles. It questioned Chief Parker, Lieutenant Governor Anderson, and Lieutenant General Roderic Hill, commander of the California National Guard, about the coordination of local, state, and national police forces. It examined their activities during the riots to determine why the National Guard was not ordered in earlier—which it assumed, perhaps rightly, would have ended the rioting sooner.[50] To an observer who considers the Los Angeles riots a problem of Negro ghettos and not of police strategy, the questioning seems wide of the mark. The commission's finding, that Lieutenant Governor Anderson delayed unduly in responding to Chief Parker's request

[49] Loren Miller, "Relationship of Racial Residential Segregation to Los Angeles Riots" (Oct. 7, 1965), *MCA*, X; *ibid.*, XIV, Testimony of Sue Welch, a junior high school teacher in Watts, 17-22, 47-48.

[50] *Ibid.*, III, Testimony of Lieutenant Governor Glenn Anderson; VIII, Testimony of Lieutenant General Roderic L. Hill; XI, Testimony of Police Chief William H. Parker.

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for the National Guard, appears beside the point. And so does its conclusion that local law enforcement agencies and the National Guard should prepare plans for a quicker commitment and better deployment of the troops in the event of future emergencies.[51]

Far more serious, the McCone Commission spent little or no time analyzing the ineffectiveness of internal restraints in the ghetto. Indeed, it was so concerned about the damage done by the riots that it was oblivious to the risks run by the rioters. To riot with the support of the police, as the Irish did in New York in 1900, is one thing; to riot in spite of the opposition of the police and the military, as the Negroes did in Los Angeles in 1965, is quite another.[52] To discount this difference on the grounds that the patrolmen were outnumbered at the initial disturbance, that at first they attempted merely to contain the rioting, and that afterwards they exercised commendable restraint is to beg the question. However safe the rioters were during the first few days, they were in extreme peril during the last few days. By then all available police personnel and over 15,000 guardsmen were assigned to southcentral Los Angeles with orders to fire when fired upon and to take whatever action necessary, short of indiscriminate slaughter, to quell the rioting.[53] Thus, for several days the Negro ghetto was a very dangerous place—so dangerous, in fact, that by the time the authorities pacified it 34 persons were dead, over 1,000 injured, and nearly 4,000 arrested, almost all of whom were colored.

Given the grave dangers to life, limb, and liberty at the peak and near the end of the riots, it is not surprising that a majority of ghetto residents sought the safety of their homes. What is surprising is that a large minority, totaling scores of thousands of people, congregated in the streets and participated in the rioting anyway. The McCone Commission implied that their action reflected the growing sense of desperation among the Negro riffraff. This implication is unacceptable, however, not only because it misconstrues the composition of the rioters and discounts the risks involved in the riots, but also because the history of other under-

[51] *MCR*, 17, 19.

[52] Citizens Protective League, *Story of the Riot* ([New York], 1900); Gilbert Osofsky, *Harlem: The Making of a Ghetto, Negro New York 1890-1930* (New York, 1966), 46-52.

[53] *MCR*, 17-20; *MCA*, II, *passim*; Cohen and Murphy, Chaps. 15-21.

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privileged groups in the United States—native Americans in Appalachia, Puerto Ricans in New York, and Mexicans in southern California—reveals that poverty and functional illiteracy do not necessarily lead to rioting.[54] It is unacceptable, too, because it simply does not explain why Los Angeles' Negroes, however intense their resentment, refused to abide by the time-honored strategy expressed in the aphorism "Cheese it, the cops!" why they, unlike other ethnic minorities before them, insisted instead on a direct confrontation with the authorities, and why, in sum, they disregarded the cardinal restraints on rioting in the United States.

There are several such restraints: fear of arrest, and possible conviction and imprisonment, which is inconvenient at the time and burdensome later on; concern for personal safety, the reluctance to chance life and limb, especially when the opposition is far stronger; and, perhaps most compelling, the presence of faith, or the absence of despair, the conviction that necessary changes can be secured through legitimate channels and that the point at which violence is the only recourse has not yet been reached.[55] Accordingly, the rioting of the Negroes in the face of grave dangers meant not only that the grievances provoking them were insupportable, but also that the restraints inhibiting them were inoperative. To claim that these circumstances were complementary and equally crucial prerequisites for the 1965 riots is not to deny that the grievances generated the resentment which weakened the restraints. Indeed, this is just what happened in southcentral Los Angeles. It is rather to insist that there are certain other conditions—completely overlooked by the McCone Commission—which have further undermined the internal restraints on rioting in the Negro ghetto. And if the reason these conditions were overlooked can be uncovered, the explanation for the commission's failure will be sharply clarified.

Why the restraints on rioting were inoperative can be quickly outlined. To begin with, fear of arrest did not restrain the rioters

[54] The McCone Commission lumped the Mexicans and Negroes in Los Angeles together just the same. See *MCR*, 5.

[55] What I am suggesting here is not that these are the only restraints on rioting or that they function in similar ways in all groups and classes, but rather that these are the restraints which are considered, not without reason, crucial in American society.

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because the overwhelming majority of them—or of the men at any rate—had already been arrested, if not convicted and imprisoned. The exact proportion has not been calculated, but seventy-five per cent is a reasonable estimate; and whether it is a trifle too low or too high is not critical because most of the other twenty-five per cent presume that they, too, will be arrested sooner or later—if not for rioting then for something else.[56] Concern for personal safety did not restrain the rioters either because they had been hardened to the point of indifference by the relentless assaults on life and limb in the Negro ghetto. The rioting, tumultuous though it was, did not mark a fundamental discontinuity in their experience, nor pose an extraordinary threat to their security; thus they were not compelled to refrain from participating because of the dangers involved.[57] Lastly, confidence in orderly social change did not restrain the rioters because, whatever their objective circumstances, they were convinced that their trust was misplaced. Indeed, according to surveys conducted in the Negro ghetto shorty after the riots, a substantial majority of the residents still believed that violence was either necessary or, if not, probable just the same.[58]

The reasons for these conditions can be briefly summarized. The extreme incidence of arrest is due in large part to preventative patrolling in the ghetto, a police practice which, in the name of rigorous law enforcement, subjects the Negroes to intensive surveillance, unwarranted suspicion, and outright harassment. The high level of violence is a consequence of the Negroes' tendency to resort to illegitimate enterprises when legitimate channels to success are obstructed and to express through aggression against other Negroes the resentment which cannot be directed against white people. And the dwindling confidence in orderly change is a reflection of the disparity between the rapid rise in the Negroes' ex-

[56] For nationwide estimates—the only ones available—see President's Commission on Law Enforcement, *The Challenge of Crime*, 75, and R. Christensen, "Projected Percentages of U.S. Population with Criminal Arrest and Conviction Records" (Aug. 18, 1966), report prepared for the commission. See, also, Cohen and Murphy, 208.

[57] President's Commission on Law Enforcement, *The Challenge of Crime*, 62; Marvin E. Wolfgang, *Crime and Race Conceptions and Misconceptions* (New York, 1964), 38-44.

[58] *MCA*, II, 32; Cohen and Murphy, 207; John F. Kraft, Inc., "Attitudes of Negroes," 7.

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pectations and the more gradual advance in their achievements, a disparity which is more pronounced in the nineteen-sixties than at any other time in the twentieth century.[59] However brief this summary, one conclusion does emerge: the conditions undermining the restraints and the reasons underlying the conditions are all manifestations of slum (as well as ghetto) life in southcentral Los Angeles. For it is only in the slums, though not only in Los Angeles slums and not only in Negro slums, that preventative patrolling is practiced so intensively, illegitimate enterprises operate so openly, and minority groups are frustrated so frequently in their quest for a better life.

To the McCone Commission, however, southcentral Los Angeles was not a slum—not an urban gem, it conceded, but not a slum either.[60] Hence there was no reason for the commission to probe for the conditions which weakened the restraints on rioting in the ghetto. Commissioner Warren M. Christopher's examination of Judge Loren Miller provides a good starting point for determining why the commission failed to probe for these conditions. Christopher remarked that he returned from a recent visit to other Negro ghettos surprisingly reassured. "I wouldn't say that this [Watts] is a garden spot of South Los Angeles," he said, "but I see street after street of small well-kept homes and I find the contrast between that and the large tenement structures in New York and Philadelphia . . . quite striking."[61] What about this contrast, he asked? Miller, who was less impressed, answered that Watts did not resemble Harlem, but neither did Los Angeles resemble New York; and in any case the southcentral ghetto was a slum. Other witnesses agreed, insisting that closer observation of the Watts vicinity would have revealed that one of every three houses there was dilapidated or deteriorated. And so did others, who stressed that by any social, economic, or psychological—as opposed to

[59] Diane Fisher, "Police Investigatory Practices" (1966), report prepared for the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice; Richard A. Cloward and Lloyd E. Ohlin, *Deliquency and Opportunity* (Glencoe, 1960), Chaps. 1, 2, 4; Abraham Kardiner and Lionel Ovesey, *The Mark of Oppression* (Cleveland, 1962), Chap. 5; William Brink and Louis Harris, *The Negro Revolution in America* (New York, 1964), Chaps. 1, 2; Fogelson, "The 1960's Riots," Chap. IV.

[60] *MCR*, 3.

[61] *MCA*, X, Testimony of Judge Loren Miller, 17-18.

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physical—criteria, southcentral Los Angeles was unquestionably a slum.[62]

On what, then, if not the testimony of the witnesses, did the McCone Commission base its conclusion that southcentral Los Angeles was not a slum? The commission's observation that the streets were wide, clean, and lined with trees and that the houses were one- and two-family dwellings only repeats the question. For what the commission observed depended on what it deemed worth observing, which, in turn, depended on how it conceived of a slum. And despite a rash of studies showing that physical condition is only one, and by no means the principal, measure of a slum, the commission's conception was purely environmental.[63] By this conception, which the commission shares with most Americans, a slum is defined by its deviation from a middle-class residential suburb. And on the surface Watts does not deviate very much—a fact which no doubt helps explain why so many Los Angeles whites found the 1965 riots beyond belief. Indeed, this conception of a slum is altogether indifferent to the wide range of social, economic, and psychological indicators of community pathology. So, accordingly, was the McCone Commission, and for that reason it overlooked the extreme incidence of arrest, high level of violence, and dwindling confidence in orderly change which rendered the restraints on rioting inoperative in southcentral Los Angeles.

V

The McCone Commission also misinterpreted the Negro leaders' role in the Los Angeles riots. The leaders, the commission argued, incited the ghetto residents by various inflammatory activities. They denounced the disparities between the grandiose promises of the anti-poverty program and the patent inadequacy of its provisions and protracted bickering over its implementation. They also encouraged Los Angeles' Negroes to feel affronted by the pas-

[62] *Ibid.*, III, Testimony of Herb Atkinson, vice-president, South Los Angeles Transportation Company, 25; X, Testimony of John C. Monning, superintendent, Los Angeles Department of Building and Safety, 5-8; XIII, Testimony of Winston Slaughter, Compton Junior College student, 5-29; XIV, Testimony of Edward Warren, Watts real estate broker, 9-11.

[63] *MCR*, 3, 75-80; *MCA*, X, Testimony of Judge Loren Miller, 17-18. See Herbert J. Gans, *The Urban Villagers* (Glencoe, 1962), Chaps. 1, 14.

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sage of Proposition 14, a state-wide referendum which repealed California's fair housing act and precluded future fair housing legislation. (The commission's choice of words was perplexing here; given the obvious implications of Proposition 14, surely the Negroes needed no encouragement to feel affronted by its passage.) And inspired by reports of civil disobedience and outright violence elsewhere in the United States, they even exhorted Negroes to devise extreme and illegal remedies for wrongs in Los Angeles. On the basis of these findings, the McCone Commission recommended that Negro leaders curb their extremism and—in the phrase of one commissioner, the Negro pastor who disagreed with this recommendation—"put the lid on protest."[64]

These findings are not corroborated by the testimony offered at the hearings, however. The Negro leaders, the witnesses pointed out, had attempted to channel the ghetto's discontent into constructive outlets long before the riots.[65] They were, after all, middle-class in outlook, personally confident in orderly change, and professionally committed to non-violent protest. They also realized that rioting would not only endanger the rioters, but, by alienating their friends and comforting their enemies, undermine the civil rights movement as well. Once the riots erupted, moreover, the Negro leaders perceived that, their positions notwithstanding, they simply were not leading. They understood that the rioters were challenging their leadership in the Negro community and subverting their positions vis-à-vis white society. They could, and did, denounce the conditions responsible for the riots, but the intensity of the outbursts demanded something stronger than words. Hence, other than to join the rioting and assume its direction—which they were unwilling (and probably unable) to do—the Negro leaders had no alternative but to try to restrain the rioters. And from the beginning to very near the end of the riots, as the witnesses testified, these leaders roamed the stricken streets of Los Angeles doing precisely that.[66]

[64] *MCR*, 2, 85-88.

[65] *MCA*, IV, Testimony of Reverend H. Hartford Brookins, 24-32; Harry M. Scoble, "Negro Leadership Study: Tentative Findings" (1966), 9, unpublished paper written for the U.S. Office of Economic Opportunity.

[66] *MCA*, V, Testimony of Wendell Collins, first vice-chairman of CORE, 6-25; Dymally, "Statement"; Cohen and Murphy, 119-20.

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Yet none of them was successful.[67] In stressing that local leadership (not to mention national leadership) was incapable of restraining the rioters, I am not implying that the rioters were easily restrained; excitement was too great, grievances too strong, and customary restraints too weak. I am suggesting that the outbreak of rioting in southcentral Los Angeles revealed that Negro leaders had failed not simply to ameliorate the real hardships in the ghetto but also to direct the attendant resentment into non-violent channels. I am suggesting, too, that the timing of the riots—they started late each evening and stopped early each morning—provided Negro leaders with an opportunity to meet with residents of the ghetto under relatively calm circumstances every day, and yet they totally failed to exploit this opportunity. Taken together, these failures highlight the ineffectiveness of moderate leadership, individual and institutional, in southcentral Los Angeles, a problem much more serious than the McCone Commission's unfounded allegations about the extremism and irresponsibility of the Negro leaders.

There are several reasons why Negro leadership is ineffective in the southcentral ghetto. There is the intransigence of white Los Angeles, an attitude responsible for the approval of Proposition 14 and other discriminatory actions which have impaired the Negro leaders' prestige. There are the apathy of lower- and working-class Negroes, the competition of militant black nationalist organizations, and the absence of a distinctive Negro culture in the United States. There is also the weakness of Negro voluntary associations, which is largely due to the assumption of their traditional functions by public authority, private enterprise, and the mass media. And there is the lower- and working-class Negroes' antagonism to the middle-class Negroes who alone have the time, money, and energy to organize cohesive groups and fill positions of leadership.[68] These reasons cannot and need not be described in any depth here. One other reason is, however, worth discussing in more detail because it has implications for an examination of the

[67] *Ibid.*, 130-31. Neither were Negro leaders in other cities; see Federal Bureau of Investigation, "Report on the 1964 Riots" (Sept. 18, 1964), 3.

[68] *MCA*, III, Testimony of Herb Atkinson, 25; statement by Gloster B. Current in "Community Unrest: Causes, Effects, Prevention, Cure," transcript of NAACP seminar, Columbus, Ohio, April 2, 1966, pp. 27-28.

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McCone Commission as well as for a consideration of Negro leadership. That reason is the pronounced indifference of middle-class Negroes to the problems of the inhabitants and institutions of southcentral Los Angeles.

This is not to imply that middle-class Negroes are unsympathetic to the plight of lower- and working-class Negroes in Los Angeles; with a few exceptions, they are not. It is rather to argue that they have not displayed the same concern for the southcentral ghetto that middle-class Italians and Jews in Boston and New York showed for the North End and Lower East Side.[69] Middle-class Negroes in Los Angeles have instead left the ghetto physically and/or spiritually. They have left it physically not only because social conditions there do not meet middle-class standards, but also because housing there is vastly inferior to housing elsewhere in Los Angeles. The U.S. Census of 1965 reveals that houses in southcentral Los Angeles are the most overcrowed, substandard, and overpriced in the metropolis.[70] Middle-class Negroes have also left the Los Angeles ghetto spiritually to dissociate themselves not only from lower- and working-class people, a common practice of middle-class Americans whatever their color, but from what is for them, as the plantation was for their fathers, the embodiment of the Negroes' ignominious position in American society, the symbol of their subordination and segregation.[71] Within or without the southcentral ghetto, the middle-class Negroes are not of it, and thus cannot lead it.

What underlies the physical and/or spiritual flight of middle-class Negroes from the southcentral ghetto is the widespread system of involuntary residential segregation in greater Los Angeles. Just how widespread the system is has been too well documented elsewhere to warrant further proof here,[72] but its involuntary char-

[69] Gans, 298; Arthur Aryeh Goren, "The New York Kehillah: 1908-1922" (Columbia University Doctoral Dissertation, 1966), *passim;* Moses Rischin, *The Promised City* (Cambridge, 1962), Chap. 6.

[70] U.S. Bureau of the Census, "Characteristics of the South and East Los Angeles Areas," 34-37. See, also, Fred E. Case, "Housing in the Los Angeles Riot Area," *MCA,* XVII.

[71] *MCA,* III, Testimony of Herb Atkinson, 25. For the nationwide pattern, see E. Franklin Frazier, *Black Bourgeoisie* (Chicago, 1957), Part II; Louis E. Lomax, *The Negro Revolt* (New York, 1962), 202.

[72] Karl E. Taeuber and Alma F. Taeuber, *Negroes in Cities* (Chicago, 1965), *passim.*

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acter is worth stressing. Negroes, unlike Mexicans and other newcomers, did not choose to live as a group in Los Angeles; far from having chosen at all, they were simply compelled to reside together.[73] And the consequences were as unfortunate as they were inevitable. So long as Negroes were denied access to metropolitan Los Angeles' real estate market and so long as they were deprived of the chance to move freely if dissatisfied with the quality or cost of their housing, they were confined to overcrowded, substandard, and overpriced dwellings. Also, so long as they lived in southcentral Los Angeles only because there were no alternatives and so long as they regarded it as a place of confinement, they perceived the ghetto as the emblem of their subordination, segregation, and inferiority. Under these circumstances middle-class Negroes fled the ghetto in one way or another whenever by dint of herculean effort they could do so.

Yet the McCone Commission did nothing more than admit that involuntary residential segregation is practiced in metropolitan Los Angeles.[74] It did not consider its consequences or recommend its elimination, nor did it point out the implications of Proposition 14. For this the witnesses were once again free of fault. One after another they explained how involuntary residential segregation is implemented in Los Angeles and how the Negro community is victimized by this practice. Yet the McCone Commission ignored them because their testimony revealed the tremendous stakes that Los Angeles whites have in perpetuating the Negro ghetto. Merchants who overcharge customers, manufacturers who underpay laborers, and landlords who exploit tenants are only the most obvious beneficiaries. Less evident but more numerous are the homeowners who spend their lives in all-white suburbs and the parents who send their children to all-white schools. For the McCone Commission to have investigated involuntary residential segregation would have obliged it to abandon its preconceptions that the Los

[73] Miller, 1-9; Robert M. Fogelson, *The Fragmented Metropolis: Los Angeles, 1850-1930* (to be published in Cambridge, Mass., 1967), Chap. 9. See, also, Charles Abrams, *Forbidden Neighbors* (New York, 1955), Chaps. XII-XIV, XVI-XVIII; [California] Commission on Race and Housing, *Where Shall We Live* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1958), 36.

[74] *MCR*, 75-80.

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Angeles riots were manifestations of economic, not racial, problems and individual, not social, deficiencies.

Here as elsewhere, then, the McCone Commission offered inadequate recommendations based on erroneous analyses derived from untenable assumptions. And in so doing it demeaned the rioters, belittled their grievances, misunderstood their ghetto, misconstrued the riots, and thereby discouraged efforts to devise imperative and more radical reforms. As the official version of the Los Angeles riots, moreover, "Violence in the City" has shaped public policy—witness the federal subsidy to the Transit District—and also guided popular opinion. From it the residents of Los Angeles have either taken the conclusion that the rioting was meaningless or drawn the implication that the Negroes somehow lack the qualifications for responsible citizenship. That the McCone Commission provided them no other alternatives was not the least of its disservices to their community. Worse still, the commission reflected middle-class, white American ideas and values so well that its findings and recommendations, or facsimiles thereof, have also appeared in many official observations about other recent riots[75] —and, not surprisingly, with no more validity. Not until white America abandons the preconceptions about rioting, law enforcement, slums, and ghettos which misled the McCone Commission will it recognize the riots of the nineteen-sixties for what they were—articulate protests against genuine grievances in the Negro ghettos.

[75] See P. W. Homer, City Manager, "Report to the Rochester City Council on the Riots of July 1964" (April 27, 1965); New York *Times*, July 22, Aug. 4, 1964.

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The Red Prussianism of the German Democratic Republic

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The German Democratic Republic is variously described as the last "Stalinist" state in Eastern Europe, the most repressive regime east of the Elbe, and Moscow's most docile satellite. To many, it remains the Soviet zone of occupation. Its continued existence, we are told, depends exclusively upon the twenty Soviet divisions stationed within its borders. When it is referred to by spokesmen of the West, the words "so-called" inevitably precede its national designation. In contrast to the Federal Republic of Germany, it appears backward, sullen, and resentful, a Marxist aberration on hallowed German soil. Its population has revolted twice: once actively in 1953, once silently with their feet until the Berlin border closure in 1961. The implication is that popular hostility is endemic. Industry is alleged to lag and agriculture to stagnate. Its leadership is regarded as the most pedantic and pedestrian in the lackluster constellation of Eastern Europe. And almost everyone believes that East Germany is a transitory entity on the world scene, a relic of Soviet expansion from which the Russians will ultimately pull back; and that German unification based on free elections eventually will return a liberal, popular, Christian, and non-Communist government.

I

The thesis of this article is that "times have changed." The model of Stalinism most frequently associated with the German Democratic

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Republic has never had significant validity. For Stalinism, among other things, implies extreme police terror and capricious one-man rule. But since the inception of the GDR Ulbricht has had to share his power, first with Pieck and Grotewohl, presently with Erich Honecker and the party bureaucracy, on the one hand, and a rising class of managers and technicians, on the other.[1] Police terror—as it was once known under Stalin—has been largely absent in the GDR. The collectivization of agriculture in 1960, for example, was accompanied by a minimum of dislocation and repression. And church policy in the GDR has been consistently the most liberal and enlightened of any state in Eastern Europe.[2]

Or take the GDR's political leadership. Ulbricht admittedly is a caricaturist's delight—with his ridiculous goatee and high-pitched Saxon voice—but he is certainly not the ogre Stalin was, and his thirst for personal power has never cropped out in murderous vendettas. Indeed, Ulbricht has survived for almost forty years as one of the leading figures of German communism, and his longevity doubtless attests his basic acceptability to all factions, reformist as well as reactionary.[3] There is also the question

[1] The most detailed account of Ulbricht's leadership is Carola Stern, *Ulbricht: Eine politische Biographie* (Köln, 1964). Miss Stern's earlier book, *Porträt einer bolschewistischen Partei: Entwicklung, Funktion und Situation der SED* (Köln, 1957) is a standard work on East Germany. Also see Peter Christian Ludz (ed.), *Studien und Materialien zur Soziologie der DDR* (Köln, 1964), especially 15-52; Ernst Richert, *Das Zweite Deutschland* (Gütersloh, 1964). On the June uprising, see Arnulf Baring, *Der 17. Juni 1953* (Köln, 1965), 115-20; Stefan Brandt, *The East German Rising* (London, 1955). Also see Karl Wilhelm Fricks, "Disunity in The Socialist Unity Party," *Central Europe Journal*, June 1966, pp. 183-89.

[2] Welles Hangen, *The Muted Revolution: East Germany's Challenge to Russia and the West* (New York, 1966), 181-82; Markus Barth, "Church and Communism in East Germany," *Christian Century*, Nov. 23, 1966, pp. 1440-43; John Cogley, "God and Marx in Eastern Europe," New York *Times*, Nov. 27, 1966; Wolfgang Hoffmann, "A Visit to East Germany," *America*, April 9, 1966, pp. 486-92; Peter Lust, *Two Germanies* (Montreal, 1966), 136-54. Compare Richard W. Solberg, *God and Caesar in East Germany* (New York, 1962); Hans Georg Koch, *Neue Erde ohne Himmel* (Stuttgart, 1963); W. Maser, *Der Kampf der SED gegen die Kirche* (Mannheim, 1962).

[3] As Ernst Richert notes: "We now know . . . that this bloodless, immensely hard-working bureaucrat with the retentive memory and marked aptitude for trimming his sails to the wind, has never . . . been the embodiment of evil which legend has made of him. [He remains] a manipulator of power whose tactical skill enabled him to survive years of political impotence unscathed. . . ." In "Ulbricht and After," *Survey*, Oct. 1966, p. 153; Stern, *Ulbricht*, 79.

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of competence, for here, too, Ulbricht has been grossly underrated. Of all the European Communist heads of state, only Ulbricht must contend with a divided nation longing to be reunited—and his portion of that nation is scarcely the largest, the richest, or the most productive.

But the real changes in the German Democratic Republic have occurred in the past five years. Before then, the majority of the accusations hurled at it were justified. Its government was unloved; its social and political system unaccepted; its economy creaked along—a pale comparison to the dynamism of the Federal Republic. An outside observer could very well imagine the GDR a temporary expedient, and in such a context the epithet "so-called" was doubtless deserved. By 1961 every indication pointed to growing instability in East Germany, and it was to arrest that instability that the Berlin Wall was constructed and, indeed, was accepted by the Western powers.[4] In this sense the Wall provided eloquent testimony to communism's failure. The refugee exodus was draining the GDR's most productive elements, and popular unrest clearly was on the upswing. The position of Ulbricht's state was precarious, and continued hemorrhaging through West Berlin threatened its very existence. The increasing labor shortage alone posed grave dangers to the economy—to say nothing of the growing popular disaffection which followed in its train. Add to this the danger of an isolated incident setting off the tinder box and possibly kindling a global conflagration, and the reasons for the border closure become evident.

But if it is true that the Wall originally offered testimony to the popular backruptcy of the GDR, it is also true that it inaugurated one of Europe's most far-reaching economic miracles—and paved the way for an equally profound shift in popular attitudes. Since 1961 the pace of life has quickened in East Germany. The stark night-and-day contrast with life in the West no longer ap-

[4] Jean Edward Smith, *The Defense of Berlin* (Baltimore, 1963), 235-304; James L. Richardson, *Germany and the Atlantic Alliance* (Cambridge, Mass., 1966), 264-300; Philip Windsor, *City on Leave: A History of Berlin, 1945-1962* (New York, 1963), 230-60; J. M. Mackintosh, *Strategy and Tactics in Soviet Foreign Policy* (London, 1962), 203-12. Also see the very detailed article on East German preparations for the border closure in *Der Spiegel*, Aug. 15, 1966. For the Western response, see the issues of Aug. 22 and Aug. 29, respectively, and the reply of West Berlin Deputy Mayor Heinrich Albertz, Oct. 24, 1966, pp. 72-85.

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palls. Industries hum busily, the government enjoys a grudging respect, and, on the diplomatic front, the shock and international revulsion which the GDR created with the construction of the Berlin Wall has been slowly dissipated.

An additional result flowing from the 1961 border closure concerns German relations with Poland and Czechoslovakia. One can argue, for example, that had the flow of refugees from the GDR not been stayed, a vacuum would have been created in East Germany which could have been filled only by immigration from farther East. In other words, by securing his Western boundary, Ulbricht also secured his Eastern boundary, and in time his service to the German nation may be recognized.

Nevertheless, information on the German Democratic Republic comes hard. One of the reasons is that, just as we have not recognized China, we have never recognized the GDR's existence, and, therefore, many normal channels of communication are blocked off. There also are the sensibilities of Bonn to take into account, for the United States government could not very well sponsor the equivalent of a "Foreign Area Studies Program" on East Germany without giving credence to the idea that there were in fact two Germanys.

The academic community likewise neglects East Germany; studies of comparative politics concentrate on the Federal Republic, and those scholars dealing with problems of communism, including the nations of Eastern Europe, generally exclude the GDR from their purview.

Journalistic accounts are little better. Western newsmen generally are not accredited in the GDR, and most papers concentrate their Central European staffs either in Bonn or Warsaw. The upshot of all this is that our view of the GDR tends to be filtered through the hostile lens of the cold war at its coldest, and when changes occur, we are often unable to perceive them.

A lingering cause of confusion is our proclivity to insist that the East German government has no popular base of support, and that it is kept in power exclusively by the bayonets of the Red Army. Yet the idea of popular support is a curious one, and it is probably true that most governments are not so much supported as they are tolerated. In addition, the role of the Soviet Army in East Germany is often exaggerated. Today the Red Army in the

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GDR sits isolated in its barracks not unlike its British, French, and American counterparts in the West. Its visible presence recedes. And whether the Soviets could use their troops to intervene in East Germany under the circumstances that prevail in world communism today is far from clear.

But in any event, it would be naive to assume that the Communist government in East Berlin is simply the result of Russian *force majeure*. To begin with, communism is not an alien ideology in Germany. Marx and Engels were nothing if not German, and the entire logical structure of Marxist thought rests on the imposing edifice of nineteenth-century German philosophy—especially the works of Hegel and Feuerbach.[5]

In many respects, if there was a Marxist movement in the late nineteenth century, it was German. The cities of Eisenach and Gotha—located in the GDR—gave birth to modern socialism. With the exception of Lenin, most early interpreters of Marx were German; and it was in Germany alone in the Europe of 1912 that the Marxists constituted the largest single party in the parliament. The split of the party following the voting of war credits to the Kaiser in 1914 was a traumatic experience from which German Marxism never recovered.[6] And the Left Marxists—under Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg—were virtually as significant in the International as Lenin and Trotsky. The abortive Spartacist uprising in 1919 in Berlin provided German Marxism with its own martyrs—as did the Hitler period. And these are authentic German heroes.[7]

[5] Carola Stern, "East Germany," in William E. Griffith (ed.), *Communism in Europe* (Cambridge, Mass., 1966), II, 43-61. The standard work on the KPD in Weimar days is Ossip K. Flechtheim, *Die KPD in der Weimarer Republik* (Offenbach, 1948). For a documentary survey, see Herman Weber (ed.), *Der deutsche Kommunismus: Dokumente* (Köln, 1963). Also see Hilmar Toppe, *Der Kommunismus in Deutschland* (Munich, 1961). For a bibliographical survey, see Enzo Colotti, *Die Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands 1918-1933: Ein bibliographischer Beitrag* (Milan, 1961).

[6] A standard work for this period is Carl Schorske, *German Social Democracy 1905-1917: The Development of the Great Schism* (Cambridge, Mass., 1955). The classic, in spite of its USPD bias, remains Arthur Rosenberg, *The Birth of the German Republic 1871-1918* (London, 1931), 73-114. Also see John Peter Nettl, "The German Social Democratic Party 1890-1914 As A Political Model," *Past and Present*, XXII (1965), 85-95.

[7] See, especially, Werner T. Angress, *Stillborn Revolution: The Communist Bid for Power in Germany* (Princeton, 1963).

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Indeed, a visitor to East Berlin or East Germany today is struck by the "Germanness" of what he sees. The Federal Republic and West Berlin are thoroughly cosmopolitan and Americanized. But in the GDR one senses the pervasiveness of attitudes, of appearances, and of behavior which the popular mind most often associates with things German.[8] Today the countryside of the Federal Republic resembles nothing so much as upstate New York; the suburban areas approximate Westchester County. Material abundance abounds. The East German landscape, on the other hand, now that most of the war damage has been repaired, looks much as prewar Germany must have looked. And what is true for landscapes is equally true for popular attitudes and behavior: orderliness, tidiness, *Obrigkeit*, and the rigid observance of established forms remain a much more prominent feature of East Germany than of the West.

A new national consciousness lurks in the GDR, a consciousness of being German. And the government exploits and encourages it.[9] Statues of Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Blücher, and Yorck repose in their old locations on Unter-den-Linden. The bourgeois revolution of 1848 is embraced as an ideological precursor of the GDR. The historic center of Berlin, located in the East, is artfully and painstakingly restored to its former grandeur—and already differs strikingly from the tawdry and garish atmosphere of the Kurfürstendamm.[10] Indeed, if there is a sharply etched physical

[8] Also see Marion Gräfin von Donhoff *et al.*, *Reise in ein fernes Land* (Hamburg, 1964), 22-23; Eric Bentley, "In Bahnhof Friedrichstrasse," *Partisan Review*, XXXIII (Winter 1966), 97-109; Richard Rovere, "Letter From Bonn," *New Yorker*, Feb. 25, 1967, pp. 136-54.

[9] Carola Stern explains this effort as follows: "The Communist exiles who returned to Germany after World War II were determined not to repeat one of the worst errors they had made during the Weimar Republic, 'underestimation of nationalism.' They would be shrewder this time and adopt the sacred litany: 'nation,' 'patriotism,' 'love of country.' The 'emigres' had learned from Stalin, who had appealed to Russian patriotism during the 'Great Patriotic War' and won tremendous popular support." Stern, *Ulbricht*, 175.

[10] Christopher Isherwood captured the contrast before the war. As he elegantly expresses it in *Goodbye to Berlin* (New York, 1939), "Berlin is a city with two centres—the cluster of expensive hotels, bars, cinemas, shops round the Memorial Church, a sparkling nucleus of light, *like a sham diamond, in the shabby twilight of the town*; and the self-conscious civic centre buildings round the Unter den Linden, carefully arranged. In grand international styles, copies of copies, they assert our dignity as a capital city. . . ." (Italics added.)

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contrast between the two Germanys today, it is because of the conscious "Germanness" of things East, in opposition to the almost complete Westernization of the Federal Republic.

Traditionally, this cleavage in Germany—the Spartan, eastward-looking, self-denial of Protestant Prussia and the cosmopolitan, Western-oriented, worldliness of the Catholic Rhineland and Bavaria—is of long standing. But it scarcely reinforces the idea that the socialism of the GDR is an aberration from the normal pattern of German development. And the current stress on things German in the East represents a deliberate attempt to capitalize on this previous cleavage—to identify their own state with the "real" German past, while arguing that the materialists in Bonn have sold out, so to speak, to things alien. Also, isolated as the East Germans have been for the past twenty years, their last best hope seemed to dwell in the maintenance of a German heritage, for in spite of alleged Socialist solidarity, the East Germans continue to share traditional German disdain for their Slavic neighbors. And in such a case, their "Germanness" seemed all the more precious.

A further point is that historically the German Communist party has many grudges against the Soviet Union.[11] Lenin and Luxemburg frequently traded polemics. The abortive Spartacist revolt in Berlin in 1919 was in no small measure due to a misreading of the "revolutionary situation" by Moscow. The equivocal position of the party concerning Hitler's rise to power in 1933 was due to Stalin's faulty appraisal of the Nazi movement.[12] In other words, the ideological roots of communism run deep in Germany, and these roots do not necessarily lead to Moscow.

Concerning the East German government itself, we conveniently overlook its historical antecedents in Prussia. For Prussia, from

[11] See, especially, Ruth Fischer, *Stalin and German Communism* (Cambridge, Mass., 1948). Otto Ernst Schuddekopf," Karl Radek in Berlin: Ein Kapital deutschrussischer Beziehungen in Jahre 1919," *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte*, II (1962), 1-131; Kurt Rosenbaum, *Community of Fate: German-Soviet Diplomatic Relations, 1922-28* (Syracuse, 1965).

[12] Siegfried Bahne, "Die Kommunistische Partei Deutschland," in Erich Mattias and Rudolf Morsey (eds.), *Das Ende Der Partein, 1933* (Dusseldorf, 1960). Also see the unpublished Ph.D. dissertation by Horst Duhnke, "German Communism in the Nazi Era" (University of California, Berkeley, 1963). For a brief synopsis of this period, see Carola Stern, "East Germany," 49-54.

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the time of Bismarck, has always voted Red. And when the Russian Army marched into Germany in 1945, in some parts, at least, it was acclaimed by old Bolsheviks for bringing the Revolution on its bayonets.[13]

Aside from ideological receptiveness, another factor not to be discounted is the longevity of the Ulbricht government. Neither Weimar nor Hitler has endured so long, and the ramifications are extremely far reaching. Djilas, for example, wrote of a "new class" in Yugoslavia in 1956.[14] What do ten additional years mean in the creation of new elites—elites who owe much of their position to the current regime?[15]

Support at other levels also seems present. The Wall has made a very real change in the attitudes of many East Germans, not unlike that of the Hungarians after Budapest. Until then, people could well believe that the Ulbricht regime was transitory and that union with the West was in the offing. There was no reason to cooperate, for cooperation was unnecessary—and the specter of decommunization loomed large in the East. In addition, the running sore in West Berlin placed restraints on the Communists; there were limits to synchronization. And no Communist system has ever consolidated its position with open frontiers.

In other words, after the Berlin Wall people in the GDR finally realized that talk of "rollback" and "liberation" was primarily for U.S. domestic consumption, and that the West would do nothing to achieve it. And that realization helped trigger a disaffection

[13] Wolfgang Leonhard, *Child of the Revolution* (Chicago, 1958), 298-307.

[14] Milovan Djilas, *The New Class* (New York, 1957).

[15] Ralf Dahrendorf, "The New Germanies: Restoration, Revolution, Reconstruction," *Encounter*, XXII (April 1964), 50-58. As Dahrendorf suggests: "The most important single feature of East German social development has been the emergence, or rather the systematic creation, of a new and homogeneous upper class" (p. 52). Also see Ernst Richert, "Ulbricht and After." According to Richert, the GDR represents a "marriage of convenience." "With a current intake of academic new blood which embraces far more than 20 percent of the age group in question, of which about three-quarters are receiving technical, economic, and scientific training; with an administrative (but not political) ruling class numbering between 700,000 and 800,000; with an intelligentsia of whom about two-thirds were trained during the Communist era; and finally, with about 60 per cent of the working population employed in industry, construction, non-private trades, and government distribution services, the new high-performance society has a mass corps d'elite. . ." (p. 156).

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with the West. As in Hungary, the apathy which previously had pervaded the GDR disappeared, and people settled down to make the best of their present situation. If it can be said that the Hungarians have won their revolution, it can also be said that the Wall has improved the material life of the average East German.

This change in popular attitudes is probably the most striking aspect of the contemporary East German situation. For no other country in Eastern Europe is so exposed to the variety of Western television and radio as the German Democratic Republic, and no country has moved so far in the past five years in terms of popular acceptance of Communist government.[16]

II

At first blush this seems hard to accept, so let me document the assertion with several examples. First, the visitor from the West no longer encounters overwhelming admiration for the higher Western standard of living. Instead, he finds pride and self-confidence in the accomplishments of the GDR. Well-heeled visitors from West Germany, in particular, are greeted with skepticism, if not contempt; and the days when the rich relative from the West was eagerly awaited for gifts of coffee and fruit and other luxuries are over.[17]

The most surprising aspect of this new confidence is the degree of identity one finds among citizens of the GDR with their govern-

[16] Consider the testimony of Dr. Kurt Spannenberg, West Berlin's senator for external affairs: "Through their continuing relationship with the regime [the people of East Germany] have subconsciously identified themselves with it. They are well informed about conditions over here; not only do they listen to our radio, but 60 to 70 per cent can watch our television programmes. They tend to disapprove of our way of life; they see the advantages of socialism, though not of communism. They think us superficial because most of our people are more interested in the good things of life . . . than in politics. . . ." Quoted in Judith Listowel, "The View from West Berlin," *The Listener*, Oct. 13, 1966, p. 530. See Jean Edward Smith, "The Limits of Political Persuasion: The GDR and Soviet Policy in Central Europe," paper presented to the Annual Convention of the American Political Science Association, New York, September 10, 1966, pp. 20-23. Also see Hangen, *Muted Revolution*, 92, 182-83.

[17] These findings largely derive from an extensive visit to East Germany in the summer of 1966. Also see Welles Hangen, "New Perspectives Behind the Wall," *Foreign Affairs*, XLV (1966), 35-47; Karl Lowenstein, "Berlin Revisited: Thoughts on Unification," *Current History*, LI (1966), 263-68.

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ment and with the new society which is emerging. Young people particularly express approval for the German Democratic Republic, and ask accusingly why the West refuses to recognize it. "It is our state, after all," many say, "and by refusing to deal with it you are merely hurting us." Identification with Bonn has also lost its appeal, for the Berlin Wall makes it abundantly clear where life must be spent.[18] And the initial reaction of the citizens of the GDR to make the best of it has now yielded to a reluctant enthusiasm.

This does not mean that Ulbricht would command a majority in a free election in East Germany, but then neither would any of the parties or personalities in Bonn. And the reasons are clear. First, the sixteen million people of East Germany have shared an arduous experience of twenty years. They are now emerging into the prosperity which West Germany experienced ten years ago. But their own success seems all the greater because it was achieved by their own efforts—and in many cases contrary to the wishes of their occupiers. Today, the government gets credit for this achievement, and the young factory manager or technician feels that when his generation gets its turn, things will be even better.[19] For the older

[18] The comment of East German novelist Christa Wolff (*Divided Sky*) is typical: "You always come up against the question of how the division is to be sealed. The fact is that the cultural ties between the two parts of Germany were broken long before the physical links were. The result is that writers here and in West Germany have developed in completely different ways. Except for the war, their experiences are completely different. My youngsters, for example, regard West Germany as a foreign country." Quoted in Hangen, *Muted Revolution*, 211. Also see Lowenstein, 265.

[19] See, especially, Ernst Richert, *Das Zweite Deutschland* (Gütersloh, 1966), 209-23. The quest for expertise has produced a corps of industrial executives in East Germany which ranks among the youngest in the world. Wolfgang Lungershausen, director-general of the office machinery trust, is thirty-eight. The average age of directors at the huge Schwarze Pumpe Lignite processing complex is thirty-four. The GDR's new economic ministers, Gerhard Zimmerman and Rudi Georgi, are thirty-nine and thirty-seven respectively. Both are successful former industrial managers. Dr. Günter Mittag, the Politbüro's chief of heavy industry and construction, is thirty-nine, as is Dr. Werner Jarowinsky, Central Committee secretary and first deputy minister of trade and supply. His chief, Gunter Sieber, was a full minister at thirty-five. Gerhard Schürer, Erich Apel's deputy and successor as chairman of the Planning Commission, is forty-five. Horst Soelle, minister of foreign and intra-German trade, is forty-one. See Thomas A. Baylis, "The New Economic System," *Survey*, Oct. 1966, pp. 150-51; Welles Hangen, "East Germany: The Prosperous Prisoner," *The Reporter*, Aug. 11, 1966, p. 31; David Childs, "The East German Elite: Red Jesuits and Others," *The World Today*, XXII (1966), 32-41.

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leadership all too often has been trapped by the dogmas of the past, while the new one is prepared to look opportunity in the face and solve whatever problems arise just as pragmatically as their countrymen in the West. But this, then, is one reason for attachment to the SED: the feeling of a commonly shared experience, successfully concluded.

Second, and directly related, is the rise of a new generation in the GDR, a generation of technocrats and managers, unencumbered by the dogmas of the past and unburdened by the stigma of guilt. These are not the men who manned the barricades. They are the products of the system those men established, the *apparatchiki* of industry and commerce. The fight to establish communism has been won; their task is to make it work. It is the task of men like the late planning chief, Erich Apel, or his successor, Gerhard Schürer, or Günter Mittag, men who have risen rapidly in the past five years, young men. The average age of the Council of Ministers in the GDR today is forty-four, eleven years less than Erhard's last Cabinet, for example, and eight years less than President Johnson's. And this is at the top. Their numbers and importance multiply as one descends the pyramid. These are pragmatists. They are competent. They are also dedicated Communists. And the current success of the GDR is in large measure a reflection of their efforts and, to be fair, of the system which produced them.

Third, there is a growing revulsion at Bonn's claim to represent the only Germany and to speak in the name of the citizens of the GDR. "If this is true," one is often told, "then where was Bonn on August 13, 1961?" In other words, while most East Germans were once willing to look to Bonn for leadership, the feeling today is that the Federal Republic forfeited that claim when it stood by and did nothing while the Berlin Wall was built. And Bonn's increasing intransigence in refusing to recognize what the East Germans themselves know to be the reality of the present situation galls even more. "Recognize us and be done with it," in other words, "and then perhaps we can make some progress on the German question."

Fourth, the political and social institutions created in the GDR seem to have taken root. And while the personalities of the SED may not win universal approval, the system they have established seems accepted. Indeed, this may be the most surprising aspect of

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the changes which have taken place in the GDR, for too often we have felt that German socialism was a hothouse flower.

Fifth, the collectivization of agriculture has been an unvarnished success—and is recognized as exactly that by East Germany's agrarian population. Admittedly, 1960 and 1961 were difficult years. But in the farming villages of the GDR today one hears surprising praise for the new cooperatives. The Germans are farmers, not peasants. They admire efficiency, and they recognize that their former small holdings were irrational in the days of mechanized agriculture. "Bonn has not yet solved its problem," one hears, "nor has the common market. But we have, and today our farming is done economically and efficiently." And the statistics support this claim. The total value of agricultural products in the GDR has increased from 12.9 billion marks in 1959 (the last year before complete collectivization) to 19.2 billion marks in 1965—an increase of 49 per cent. The production of eggs has doubled. The production of milk has increased by 23 per cent, while the number of cows has declined by one-fifth. Per acre yields tell a similar story: sugar beets, up by 32 per cent; grain, up by 20 per cent; potatoes, up by 16 per cent. And these are East Germany's three principal crops. The number of persons employed in agriculture has declined by one-fifth—not only attesting its efficiency, but freeing 300,000 persons for work elsewhere in the economy. The results are consistent. Collectivization has been a success, and the regime reaps the harvest.[20]

Sixth, and doubtless indicative of the new feeling of confidence which the SED enjoys, the daily propaganda dosage of the average East German has been reduced substantially. Exclusively Communist appeals diminish. The days of Red banners posted prominently throughout the country are past. Children at party youth camps play and work virtually unexposed to the former lessons in Marxism-Leninism. And direct political pressure at the local level is vanishing fast. Communism, in other words, increasingly is taken for granted, and the regime's propaganda apparatus concentrates on other things, such as mobilizing sentiment against

[20] *Statistiches Jahrbuch der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik: 1966* (hereafter, *SJDDR: 1966*), 29, 262, 282-98, 313; U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, *The USSR and the Eastern Europe Agricultural Situation, Review of 1965 and Outlook for 1966* (Washington, D.C. 1966), 25-30.

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Bonn—or against the United States in Vietnam. For both issues capitalize on latent sympathies in the GDR: revulsion against Bonn for its aloofness—the revulsion which comes naturally to a poor relation—and abhorrence of war in any form, especially of war that involves bombings—the abhorrence of a nation that has known nothing but defeat.

Seventh, and directly related, are two additional factors in the East German milieu which redound to the regime's advantage: the Lutheran tradition of Prussia, and the so-called "administrative state"—the *Rechtsstaat* of Bismarck and the Emperor. Lutheranism, almost by definition, is an inward experience. Accommodation to government—whatever that government—is a fundamental trait. The church got along with Ulbricht's predecessor; it gets along with him. And for its part, the government reciprocates. The population is not deluged with atheist propaganda, and the church does not raise its voice against the state.

The tradition of the administrative state likewise functions on Ulbricht's behalf. Government is institutionalized; coercion is bureaucratic; the norms of behavior are established. The citizen obeys, but he does so freely. The tradition is as old as Prussia itself, and Ulbricht is the beneficiary.

Indeed, today one even hears guarded praise for the border closure in 1961. Until then, people say, we didn't know what to do. Now our mind has been made up. And this sentiment is true even among the older generation, which until recently had been hostile to the government. "The Wall came five years too late," is a refrain which one hears frequently today in the GDR.

III

The most significant reason underlying this new sentiment is the economic miracle now underway in East Germany. Under the so-called "New Economic System," industry has been rationalized, the profit motive plays an increasingly large role, world prices and standards have been accepted as the standards for production, and an improved system of distribution melds manufacturing costs with social necessity. Of all the nations east of the Elbe, the GDR has gone farthest in this respect, and the benefits accruing are probably the greatest.[21]

[21] New York *Times*, Jan. 16, 1967; Manfred Rexin, "Recent Reforms in East Germany," *The World Today*, XXI (1965), 300-07. As Marion Gräfin von Dön-

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The reasons for East Germany's previous economic retardation are clear: extensive dismantlement of plants and equipment; exorbitant reparations payments; high occupation costs; continued Soviet exploitation; inadequate international integration; extensive labor losses to West Germany; faulty planning and investment policies, at least through 1963; and a crippling lack of hard currency.[22] For fifteen years after the war the East German economy was directed almost exclusively to fit Soviet political and economic ends, and the welfare of East German society was secondary. Indeed, when one considers the successive burdens placed on East Germany's economy, the revival now underway looms all the more significant.[23]

Equally serious—and this brings one to the nub of the changes in the GDR—was the highly doctrinaire system of economic planning under which East Germany suffered until recently. Under the old system, tonnage output was the alpha and omega of industrial production. Artificial prices, hidden state subsidies, excessive central control, and misleading tonnage figures concealed intense economic stagnation. But in the GDR today subsidies have been cut or cancelled, modern accounting practices accepted, a flexible price system introduced which reflects actual market conditions, and industrial autonomy and initiative officially encouraged.[24] Indeed,

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hoff, editor of *Die Zeit* (Hamburg), reported following a visit to the GDR in 1964: "We soon realized that everyone—writers, scientists, white collar employees, workers, those who are against the regime—all look spellbound to the new economic policy. Some hope for more liberation or, rather, less dogmatism from it; others hope their regime will thereby become more efficient and hence more popular." Reise, 24.

[22] See Heinz Köhler, *Economic Integration in the Soviet Bloc* (New York, 1965), 10-19. Also, "On East Germany's Foreign Economic Relations," *Social Research*, XXIX (1962), 226. Compare Hans Apel, "East German Miracle," *Challenge*, XII (1963), 11. Also see John Peter Nettl, *The Eastern Zone and Soviet Policy in Germany 1945-1950* (London, 1951); Wolfgang Stolper, *The Structure of the East German Economy* (Cambridge, Mass., 1960); *idem*, "The National Product of East Germany," *International Review for Social Sciences*, XII (1959), 153; Henry C. Wallich, *Mainsprings of the German Revival* (New Haven, 1955); Guy Roustang, *Developpement économique de l'Allemagne Orientale* (Paris, 1964).

[23] See Dorothy Miller and Harry G. Trend, "Economic Reforms in East Germany," *Problems of Communism*, XV (1966), 30; New York *Times*, March 3, 1966. Also see Wolfgang Stolper, "Labor Force and Industrial Development in Soviet Germany," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, LXXI (1957), 518-45.

[24] New York *Times*, Jan. 16, 1967. See, especially, James R. Elliott and Anthony E. Scaperlanda, "East Germany's Liberman-type Reforms in Perspective,"

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the profit motive plays an increasing role in the GDR's economy —which now includes such Western innovations as large consumer purchases on long-term credit.

Indicative of the success of the new system, the work-week in East Germany has been reduced from forty-eight to forty-four hours, with every other Saturday free. For the past three years, total GNP has increased by over 7 per cent annually, and economic reinvestment in industry by over 8 per cent. The East German Mark, which in 1961 sold at 4.5 to 1 for each West Mark, sells today at 3.1—and even at the official exchange rate of 1 to 1, it has a somewhat higher purchasing power for basic consumer necessities. Housing, in particular, is less, taking but 5 per cent of the average family income in the GDR against 15 per cent in the Federal Republic.[25]

Indeed, it is in the area of consumer goods that the greatest progress has been made during the past five years. Luxury items are expensive, but available. Forty-nine per cent of the households have television; twenty-eight per cent have washing machines; twenty-six per cent have refrigerators. Three times as many people have automobiles as in 1960. Personal savings, which stood at a level of 17 billion East Marks in 1960, now exceed 32 billion—or almost 2,000 Marks per person.[26] The average East German is living better than at any time in the past twenty-two years—and far better than his "Socialist" neighbors. And growing affluence scarcely militates against the system.[27]

Quarterly Review of Economics and Business, VI (1966), 39-52; Ray Vickers, "East Germany Leads the Way in Red Scramble for Reform," *Wall Street Journal*, Oct. 4, 1965; Hangen, "New Perspectives Behind the Wall"; Heinz Brass and Dieter Schulmeister, "Input-Output Analysis as an Instrument for Coordinating Production and Foreign Trade" (from *Wirtschaftswissenschaft*, 1965, No. 3), *American Review of Soviet and Eastern European Foreign Trade*, I (1966), 25-49.

[25] *SJDDR: 1966*, 21-22, 434-35; compare *Statistisches Jahrbuch der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: 1965*, 497-98.

[26] *SJDDR: 1966*, 441-44; See the interesting comparative income statistics for the USA, FRG, and GDR in Erich Klinkmüller and Heinrich Machowski, "Nationaleinkommen und Bruttosozialproduct einiges RWG-Länder, der USA, und der BR Deutschland," *Ost Europa Wirtschaft*, XI (1966), 151-69. Also see M. K. Chaudhuri, "Problems of Perspective Planning in the German Democratic Republic," *Economics of Planning*, II (1964), 99-104.

[27] *SJDDR: 1966*, 388-90; Appendix, 32-55. Also see Gerhard Grote, "Problems of Realizing the New Economic System of Planning and Managing the Economy

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The SED naturally has taken credit for the recent economic progress—just as it was blamed for previous failures—and there seems little indication that the clock can be set back.[28] The new system of economic planning has become a prominent feature on the East German horizon. And to give the devil his due, it has been Walter Ulbricht who has done the most to override the objections of some of his more intransigent party functionaries and to promote the spirit of the new economic system. Said Ulbricht in his 1967 New Year's message: "Plants that fail to make a profit can no longer expect to live at the cost of others."[29]

The virtues of the new economic system are obvious. First, it counters the appeal of the West German *Wirtschaftswunder*. It presents an attractive set of material goals. It appeals to the interests of the rising class of engineers and managers without offending the basic canons of Marxism-Leninism. Finally, it enjoys the appeal of the scientific and the modern. And as it is embraced by the population of the GDR, it represents another milestone on the Ulbricht regime's road to legitimacy.[30] Individual effort is a valued commodity in the GDR today, and, by and large, the individual has reciprocated.

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in the Area of Foreign Trade" (from *Wirtschaftswissenschaft*, No. 8, 1964), *American Review of Soviet and Eastern European Foreign Trade*, I (March-April 1966), 3-26; Gunter Kohlmey, "Economic Growth and Foreign Trade" (from *Aussenhandel*, 1965, No. 3), *ibid.*, I (May-June 1966), 3-24.

[28] Hangen, "East Germany: The Prosperous Prisoner." For a detailed analysis of differential governmental expenditures between East and West Germany, see Frederic L. Pryor, "East and West German Governmental Expenditures," *Public Finance*, XX (1965), 300-59.

[29] New York *Times*, Jan. 16, 1967; Baylis, 146-57; Hangen, *Muted Revolution*, 96-97; Richert, 154-55.

[30] The suicide of Erich Apel in December 1965 and the creation of a new set of ministries at the Eleventh Plenum of the SED in January 1966 have led some commentators to suggest that economic reaction was rife in the GDR. (See, especially, Peter Christian Ludz, "East Germany: The Old and the New," *East Europe*, XV [1966], 26). The opposite seems closer to the truth. The discretionary power of the directors of the VVB's, if anything, has been expanded, particularly in the planning process. The abolition of the National Economic Council, headed by long-time functionary Alfred Neumann, also suggests greater freedom for economic initiative. Of the nine new ministries replacing it, only two are headed by *apparatchiki* (Neumann and Fritz Scharfenstein); the other seven heads are managers or economic experts. In addition, Apel's successor as chief of the planning commission, which has been strengthened as a result of the dissolution of the NEC, is Gerhard Schürer, a forty-five-year-old technocrat with extensive planning experience.

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The question of an intellectual liberalization in the GDR is something else again.[31] As last year's trials in the Soviet Union indicate, ideological coexistence is simply beyond the pale primarily, of course, because ideology legitimizes the totality of the Communist state, and to tolerate what amounts to heresy would undermine the rationale of the entire political fabric.[32] Our own society, by contrast, places a premium on pluralism and diversity. Dissent can therefore be institutionalized. The Communist system is politically unitary, and no unitary system can endure if the rationale of that unity is called into question. Ideology, in other words, provides the *raison d'être* of Communist regimes, and this is particularly true in the case of a divided nation such as Germany. Thus Ulbricht, while revamping the GDR's economy, simply cannot afford to allow the doctrinal foundations of his state to be undermined. Were we to plot the overall trend of revisionism in the GDR, it would show a continued upward climb, interrupted by brief periods of restriction.[33] For Ulbricht appreciates that disruptions are most likely to occur in times of relaxing tensions rather than the reverse. Thus, the periodic attempts to reassert party dominance.

[31] For discussions of the contemporary intellectual scene in the GDR, see Ilse Spittmann, "Soviet Union and DDR," *Survey*, LVIII (1966), 168 ff; Margaret Vallance, "Wolf Biermann," *ibid.*, 177-85; Marcel Reich-Ranicki, "The Writer in East Germany," *ibid.*, 186-95. Also see Kurt Shell, "Totalitarianism in Retreat: The Example of GDR," *World Politics*, XVIII (1965), 105-16; and Roland H. Wiegenstein, "Zur Situation der Schriftsteller in der DDR," *Neue Rundschau*, LXXVII (1966), 330-50; Fritz Kaufmann, "Gegenwartstheater in der Sowjetzone," *Die Neue Gesellschaft*, XIII (1966), 304-16; Hans Helmut Pringles, "Politischer Kino-Spuk in Ost Berlin," *Die Zeit*, July 29, 1966.

[32] But as the case of Professor Robert Havemann suggests, the limits of official punishment are considerably more circumscribed in the GDR than in the Soviet Union. In a series of lectures at East Berlin's Humbolt University in 1963-64, Havemann argued the value of dissent in Socialist society. Said Havemann: "What is indispensable to socialism, and what was lost in the Stalinist period, is democracy. Socialism cannot be realized without democracy" (Robert Havemann, *Dialektik ohne Dogma* [Reinback, 1964], 52). Havemann was expelled from the party, lost his teaching position at Humbolt, and in March 1966 was dropped from the East Berlin Academy of Sciences (although the government failed to muster the required three-fourths majority). But he was neither arrested nor tried, nor is he likely to be.

[33] See, especially, Dahrendorf. What Marcel Reich-Raniki notes concerning the opposition of certain leading writers in the GDR is typical of the attitude of many others. This "should never be mistaken for anti-communism. It is not that

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How stable is East Germany? What will happen when Ulbricht leaves the scene? Here again we allow wishful thinking to cloud our vision. Also, we are congenitally inclined to attribute too much to one leader, or one leadership group. In the days before the modern bureaucratic state it was perhaps possible for a vigorous leader to chart his nation's policies on virtually a clean slate. Today a leader operates under the most rigorous restraints. In addition to the considerable limits imposed by external circumstances, there are the very real ones which derive from the continuing governmental structure—and the continuing domestic demands placed upon it. And the Communist state, particularly the Communist East German state, is nothing if not a bureaucratic creation.

This does not suggest that there will be no struggle to succeed Ulbricht; some dislocation is inevitable. But as a product *par excellence* of the *apparat*, Ulbricht has paved the way for his succession with accustomed thoroughness. And standing by as a benign *pater familias*, he intends to oversee its execution. Regardless of who emerges on top afterwards, we should not expect GDR policy to take off in any radically new directions; the built-in resistances are simply too great.

Domestic stability, in other words, reflects more than ideological congruence or charismatic leadership, for the more important questions relate to the degree of integration of the entire social fabric. In East Germany—as in the Communist states of Eastern Europe generally—a new social order has been established, and the government has been the locomotive of that change. This does not imply a value judgment concerning the desirability of that change. It merely suggests that it is scarcely conducive to the formation of an efficacious policy on East Germany to assume these changes have not occurred.

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they question the ideological principles of the DDR, but they resist actively or passively . . . the pedantic, rigid, narrow-minded functionaries who fear more independent thinking by party members. And whereas writers during the Stalin era were in the main isolated within society, today they are . . . spokesmen for a not unimportant number of intellectuals within the DDR" (p. 190). Also see Hannah Arendt's penetrating "Portrait" of Berthold Brecht in the *New Yorker*, Nov. 5, 1966, pp. 68-122.

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The Transplantation of American Democratic Institutions: The Case of Hawaii

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A most revealing aspect of the relationship between the United States and Hawaii has been the attempts at transplantation of American democracy to the Hawaiian Islands. A superficial examination of the interaction between the United States and Hawaii leads to an overemphasis upon the vigor and dynamism of Hawaii's democracy, but during a long period prior to 1945, in which American influence was substantial, American democracy in Hawaii was not overwhelmingly successful. The failure of homesteading in Hawaii is one example of this. Hawaii's approach to homesteading was necessarily very different from the approach used on the mainland of the United States. Hawaii had no great supply of virgin land waiting to be put to use. Small-scale family-farm type of homesteading seems particularly adaptable where there is a noticeable lack of capital and where a wilderness exists that will yield only to hard, slow, manual labor. Hawaii did go through a period when the development of public lands was something to be encouraged, but at no time in her modern history has there been a situation in which a vast acreage of arable lands was lying in need of development for agricultural purposes. Once the seed of sugar cane had been planted, the growth of the industry was rapid in terms of the acreage used. Homesteading, not really introduced as a major consideration or policy until the late eighteen-

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hundreds, came *after* much of the arable public lands had already been leased to sugar interests. For this reason, no rational argument was possible that homesteading would lead to the use of the lands, for they were already in use. Despite the obvious disadvantages of timing which the homestead experiment faced in Hawaii, the question of the use of public lands was important and could not be dismissed simply because the lands were in use by someone. More important to democratic thinking was by whom the land was being used, and for what purpose. The kinds of support which a homesteading program needed in order to succeed in Hawaii, however, were not forthcoming. Rather, the program was used to reduce criticism of the elite, reduce pressures from the Hawaiian community, and gain a stronger grasp on public lands by the elite. During the twentieth century, the failure of the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act provides the focus for the study of homesteading, and democratic, failure.

The Failure of HHC and Homesteading

Sweeping social and economic upheavals transformed Hawaii during the nineteenth century. The first of these upheavals was the replacement of the ancient Hawaiian religions by Christianity and by economic changes through which a subsistence economy based on fishing, taro raising, and home industries was supplanted by a plantation economy based on sugar cane and pineapple. The quasi-feudal system of land tenure characteristic of old Hawaii was gradually replaced by a system of private land ownership. This emerging system did not, however, produce a community of small landowners tilling their own soil; on the contrary, it was associated with the continuation of a pattern of extensive landholdings by a small number of families and with the development of plantations. As a product of the labor requirements of the plantation system, the Islands' population was steadily replaced by large groups of immigrants from China, Japan, the Philippines, and elsewhere. These newcomers soon dwarfed in size the declining population of native Hawaiians. A marked decline in the numbers and condition of the native Hawaiians took place throughout the nineteenth century. By the twentieth century it appeared to many that Hawaiians were doomed to extinction.

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As the early years of the twentieth century passed, organized data about the condition of the Hawaiian became available. Social statistics indicate that the condition of the Hawaiian had deteriorated seriously by 1920. The general crime rate for people of Hawaiian ancestry was significantly higher than that of other groups. A high rate of juvenile delinquency—an ominous sign for the future—was noted.[1] In addition, in the political sphere the Hawaiians also faced the gradual loss of their majority position within the electorate to the Oriental segment of the population.[2]

As a result of the decline of the native population, a combination of forces supported a bill aimed at the rehabilitation of the Hawaiian people. The Hawaiian Homes Commission Act was passed by the United States Congress in 1921,[3] and since that time has constituted an important element in the social and political structure of Hawaii. Under that act nearly 200,000 acres of Hawaii's public lands were set aside for a homesteading experiment designed to assist that portion of the Hawaiian "race"[4] which was believed to be most in need of "rehabilitation."[5] Current figures indicate

[1] See Romanzo C. Adams, *The Peoples of Hawaii* (Honolulu, 1932), 35-41. Adams' data indicate that non-juvenile Hawaiian and part-Hawaiian males had an above-average number of convictions in Territorial courts for manslaughter and fraud, and a significantly higher number of convictions for burglarly, robbery, embezzlement, forgery, drunkenness, and "sex crimes." Hawaiians and part-Hawaiians had the highest number of juvenile delinquency convictions per 100,000 children ten to seventeen years of age of all races except the numerically small Korean group.

[2] Large numbers of Japanese and Caucasians were residents in the Territory at that time, though many of them had been born abroad and were ineligible for citizenship. Most of the native-born American citizens among them had not yet reached their majority. The trend, however, was clearly in the direction of a substantial increase in the percentage of the citizenry which was of Oriental, particularly Japanese, ancestry. See Andrew W. Lind, *Hawaii's People* (Honolulu, 1955), 89.

[3] Act of July 9, 1921, 42 Stat. 108, Chap. 42, as amended, cited as "Hawaiian Homes Commission Act, 1920."

[4] The practice in Hawaii has been to consider the various ethnic groups and combinations as separate races. This paper will conform to local usage and use race when referring to ethnic categories.

[5] The meaning of the term "rehabilitation" is discussed in U.S. Congress, House Committee on Territories, *Hearing on Rehabilitation and Colonization of Hawaiians and Other Proposed Amendments to the Organic Act of Hawaii and on Proposed Transfer of Buildings of Federal Leprosy Investigation Station at Kalawao on Island of Molokai to Hawaii*, 66th Congress, 2nd Session, 1920.

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that the program initiated through the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act provides benefits for the families of approximately 1,800 homesteaders, or a total of about 11,000 individuals. Although it is not possible to determine what percentage of the total eligible Hawaiian population this constitutes, or how many of those eligible by blood actually need assistance, it is clear that the number of people living on homesteads has never represented more than a small percentage of the Hawaiian community. The program has not provided for many of the Hawaiians in need of help,[6] nor has it aided the number of eligible and interested Hawaiians to the degree envisaged by its founders.

Results have been disappointing regarding the resettlement of homesteaders on family farms and the general manner in which the lands have been utilized for the direct purposes of Hawaiian rehabilitation. Although beneficiaries of the Hawaiian Homes program continue to be termed "homesteaders," less than ten per cent of the program's available lands have been utilized for the development of farms and ranches in the traditional pattern. As of September 1963, there were only 30 farmers and 55 ranchers out of the total of nearly 1,800 Hawaiians holding current leases on Hawaiian home lands. The remaining beneficiaries hold leases on houselots, an indication that the overwhelming emphasis of the program has come to be the development of urban and suburban housing, rather than agricultural homesteads. Accentuating this conclusion is the finding that the current demand for Hawaiian home lands is for houselots rather than farms, and that the intensity of demand is for land on urbanized Oahu, rather than on neighboring islands where farming lands are more readily available. More specifically, some seventy-nine per cent of all current applicants for Hawaiian home benefits are seeking land on Oahu, with fifty per cent of all applicants seeking land at one specific location, Waimanalo.[7]

[6] For a general examination of program failure, see Allan A. Spitz, *Social Aspects of the Hawaiian Homes Program* (Honolulu, 1964).

[7] Waimanalo is located on the eastern end of Oahu, about twenty minutes by car from Honolulu. Only one per cent of the applicants are seeking land in the ranching homestead area at Waimea, Hawaii (some twelve applicants in all). The remainder have applied for houselots on Maui (11 per cent), Molokai (3 per cent), Kauai (2 per cent), and elsewhere on the island of Hawaii (4 per cent).

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A summary presentation of the present and planned use of Hawaiian home lands appears in Table 1.

TABLE 1

Present and Planned Hawaiian Home Land Homesteads

1963

	Houselots		*Farms*		*Ranches*	
	Number	*Acres*	*Number*	*Acres*	*Number*	*Acres*
In Present Use	1,591	1,661	30	1,421	55	15,909
Additions Planned for the Near Future	650	196	—	—	—	—
Projected Totals	13,400	3,682	446	8,200	97	60,000

Source: Hawaii State Land Inventory as corrected.

Considering the use of Hawaiian home lands from the perspective of those using the lands, it may be noted that of the 185,000 acres available to the program, Hawaiian beneficiaries are currently leasing less than eleven per cent of the total. More than fifty-five per cent of the total, over 100,000 acres, is leased to non-homesteaders. The remainder is either not in use, is set aside as forest reserve, or is being used by other governmental agencies.

The initial emphasis upon agricultural pursuits has been replaced by an emphasis upon non-agricultural, urban housing developments, resulting in a marked change in the orientation of the Hawaiian Homes program. As Table 1 indicates, the trend continues to point toward non-agricultural development. Given today's high cost of developing a three hundred-acre family ranch (from $17,000 to $20,000) or a thirty-acre family farm (from $8,000 to $12,000) in contrast to the lower development cost for a houselot (from $2,000 to $4,000), the emphasis on non-agricultural development may be defended if monetary criteria alone are a major determinant of policy.

The uses which have been made of the lands set aside to the Hawaiian Homes Commission have, to some extent, determined the kind of life homesteaders now live. An examination of the specific conditions facing the homesteaders provides a socio-economic profile of the homestead population.

As compared to other residents of the state of Hawaii and mainland United States, it has been found that:

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(1) The homesteaders, considered as a whole, are earning substantially below average income.

(2) The homesteaders and their children have a much lower level of educational attainment; non-homesteaders have done much better than homesteaders in raising their educational attainment.

(3) Homesteaders live under more crowded conditions in their homes.

(4) Homesteaders come from and produce larger than average-size families.

(5) Homesteaders, generally speaking, are below average in the number of professional, managerial, civil service, clerical, and sales occupations represented, and well above average in the number of semi-skilled and unskilled occupations. Furthermore, movement into the educationally more demanding occupational classes is considerably less apparent for the homesteaders.

(6) A larger percentage of the homesteaders are presently unemployed, receiving unemployment compensation or welfare assistance.

(7) Homesteaders have sharply restricted membership in community organizations and severely limited reading habits.

In evaluating the Hawaiian Homes program, the most damaging inference one can draw from these data is that there is no clear evidence of progress in such critical areas as the educational and occupational development of the present homesteaders. That is to say, with respect to education and occupation, the present homesteaders have not advanced appreciably beyond the level attained by their parents. Even more disturbing is the indication that the benefits offered by the homesteading program do not appear to have enabled the children of the homesteaders to make any significant progress in these areas.

In judging the contribution of the homesteading program, it should be noted that it was enacted in 1921 partly because of the expressed fear that the Hawaiian people were in danger of extinction. Since 1920 the number of pure-Hawaiians has decreased by half, while the size of the part-Hawaiian population has more than quintupled. Actually, the increase in the number of part-Hawaiians and the decrease in the number of pure-Hawaiians is inevitable over time unless pure-Hawaiians are limited to marrying only pure-Hawaiians.

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It is clear that the Hawaiians are hardly becoming extinct. Although they are increasing in numbers, the Hawaiian Homes program, as presently constituted, actually serves to deter the progress or rehabilitation of the Hawaiian people in the sense that the present program segregates homesteaders from the larger community, thus reinforcing the existing outlook and habits of the homesteading population and contributing to the subnormal levels of the homesteads. These considerations require us to consider some of the explanations for the failure of the Hawaiian Homes Commission program.

Barriers to the Transplantation of Homesteading

In searching for the cause of the failure of the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act and the transplantation of homesteading we must consider the character of Hawaii's ruling elite. At the beginning of the nineteenth century the Hawaiian Islands were ruled by a Hawaiian king under conditions of quasi-feudalism. Prior to annexation to the United States in 1898, however, the ancient Hawaiian leadership gradually had been replaced by the Caucasian descendants of American missionaries. At the time of annexation, a small group of these Americans were almost in complete control of the political and economic sectors of the community,[8] but they had little commitment to democracy. They had, as it were, been cut off from the democratic revolution in America or, if late arrivals to Hawaii, possibly had sought refuge from the democratic growth on the mainland. Oligarchic by ascription, achievement, or choice, they accepted democratic ideology primarily as a tactic by which they could secure their own position of control over the land. Because the basic source of their wealth and of their political and economic privilege was sugar, the dominant force in Hawaii's economy by 1898, they had a crucial interest in the manner in which Hawaii's limited arable land was used.

External developments always have been important factors in the well-being of Hawaii's sugar industry. Almost from its inception Hawaiian sugar has faced considerable difficulty on the free market, frequently due to the lack of an assured market. Although

[8] The most astute examination of Hawaii in the nineteenth century from a social science point of view is by Lawrence H. Fuchs, *Hawaii Pono: A Social History* (New York, 1961).

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privileges afforded it by the United States government in particular, and later the government of the state of Hawaii, have kept it competitive and prosperous, the tariff has been the most common means of protection, supplemented in more recent years by quota controls.

The first and most important protective step was the Reciprocity Treaty of 1876 with the United States, which provided for the reciprocal free admission into Hawaii and the United States of a number of commodities.[9] Sugar was the most important item included. The privileges accorded by the first treaty were only a beginning, but they were never withdrawn. Table 2 depicts the association between the treaty and Hawaiian sugar exports. Twelve thousand export tons of sugar in 1875 increased to eighty-five thousand tons a decade later.[10]

TABLE 2

Hawaiian Sugar Yields—Selected Dates, 1837-1950

Year	*Number of Tons*
1837	2
1840	180
1850	375
1861	1,281
1863	2,646
1865	7,659
1875	12,540
1885	85,695
1895	147,627
1905	426,428
1915	646,445
1920	556,871
1930	924,463
1940	976,677
1950	960,961

Sources: (1) 1837-1930: David L. Crawford, *Hawaii's Crop Parade* (Honolulu, 1937), 255;
(2) 1940 and 1950: Andrew W. Lind, *Hawaii's People* (Honolulu, 1955), 65.

[9] Convention for Commercial Reciprocity with Kingdom of Hawaii, 19 Stat. 625.

[10] William A. Russ, "Hawaiian Labor and Immigration Problems Before Annexation," *Journal of Modern History*, XV (1943), 207.

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The year 1890 was critical for Hawaii's sugar industry. Rather startling expansion after 1875 had engendered great enthusiasm and hope. The passage of the McKinley Tariff Act in 1890, however, provided for duty-free admission of sugar into the United States. In addition, the McKinley Act provided for a special bounty per pound to home producers, a further disadvantage to Hawaiian producers.[11] The loss of the special position granted Hawaiian sugar by the Reciprocity Treaty put Hawaiian planters at a disadvantage when compared with producers in more favorable natural environments and in locations closer to the mainland market. Cuba represented the major competition.

The continuing problems facing sugar led many members of Hawaii's sugar elite to favor annexation. But annexation itself brought new problems to the sugar industry. Certain conditions inherent in the new association with the United States necessitated a reconsideration or alteration of policies which had been followed when Hawaiians were still the formal rulers of the islands.

The two most obvious areas for which change was mandatory were immigration and suffrage. Policy with respect to American immigration into Hawaii demanded that unlimited immigration from certain areas in the world could not continue. Nor could the conditions of contract labor, characteristic of the arrangements under which Hawaii's Oriental plantation labor was recruited, be permitted to exist in an American territory.

The Organic Act, establishing the government of the Territory of Hawaii, demanded a system of universal manhood suffrage for citizens of the United States. The heterogeneity of Hawaii's population, of course, indicated that an increasing amount of political power would necessarily be exercised by the non-Caucasian population. But in 1905 the main concern of the elite was with the Hawaiians rather than with the still young citizens of Oriental ancestry. Appeals by the elite to restrict the voting rights of the Hawaiians were rejected by Congress, however, and the ruling Caucasian elite was compelled to deal indirectly with the threat which large numbers of Hawaiians represented to the position of power which the elite held.

[11] John W. Coulter, *Land Utilization in the Hawaiian Islands* (Honolulu, 1933), 66.

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A number of forces converged in 1920 which urgently required consideration and resolution by Hawaii's political leaders. These forces were: (1) the generally agreed upon need for positive action to help the Hawaiians, whose position in the community was continuing to deteriorate; (2) the necessity of responding in some way to the insistent demand for homestead lands by the vociferous proponents of the traditional American idea of homesteading; and (3) the urgent need to protect the future of Hawaii's profitable sugar industry from extensive losses which might be occasioned by applying homestead laws to cultivated sugar lands.

The Hawaiian Homes Commission Act was enacted, in part, to deal with these contending forces. The experience with the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act, as with all previous homesteading experimentation in Hawaii, was a dismal one. Nineteenth-century attempts to encourage homesteading at best met with only moderate success. The Hawaiian Homes Commission Act has been an even greater failure and has not prevented the continuation of the precipitous decline of Hawaiians. In reconsidering the nineteenth century we can see that only a moderate number of people genuinely interested in living on family farm units applied for land under the several laws intended to encourage this kind of activity. More important for those mainly concerned with the physical preservation of the Hawaiian people through the establishment of family farms, the Hawaiians as a group showed no particular inclination or desire along these lines. The evidence is overwhelming from all the experiments which preceded the passage of the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act and the development of its program that even when lessees purported to have an interest in farming their homesteads on an individual basis, it was only a relatively short time before many had given up the land to the plantations or had abandoned it.

Yet early evidence of the difficulties facing homesteading in the Hawaiian Islands was ignored when the opportunity developed for new homesteading at the end World War I. Leases on vast public land tracts of sugar-cane land under cultivation by major plantations were to expire between 1917 and 1920. The price of sugar began a steady spiral upward as wartime shortages of European beet sugar sources worked to the benefit of the Hawaiian industry. The sharp increase in the value of sugar was juxtaposed in point

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of time with growing insecurity of land tenure resulting from the approaching termination of leases of public lands. This insecurity was constantly aggravated by the pressure of the American democratic view of homesteading as a primary method for increasing stability of individual and family life while simultaneously leading to the settlement of undeveloped lands. This pressure was continually emphasized by admonitions from the Congress of the United States concerning the use of Hawaii's public lands, and was written into law in various forms. One of the best examples of the latter was the requirement in the Organic Act that specific areas of public lands be opened for general homesteading upon the petition of twenty-five or more legally qualified potential homesteaders. A costly experiment at Waiakea, Hawaii, provided an example of the great financial losses to the elite which might result from this kind of activity, and served as a critical example to the elite of the threat which homesteading represented to their continued domination of Hawaii's political and economic structure. The transition from highly developed plantation land to individual homesteads would necessarily lead to serious losses in cane production even if the new lessee chose to continue the raising of sugar cane. The period during which lots were surveyed and awarded and roads built meant a considerable discontinuity in the current crop.

The exigencies of the First World War permitted a slight delay in coming to grips with Hawaii's homestead problem. Sugar was necessary for the war effort, but considerable force still remained in Hawaii for an expansion of homestead opportunities. One suggestion was that the homestead laws should be suspended temporarily or that, at the very least, sugar lands should not be included among potential homestead lands for the war period and a few years thereafter. The problem was resolved for the war years, but the Wilson administration made it quite clear that it had no intention of removing the sugar lands from the list of lands available for homesteading at a later date. Secretary of the Interior Lane's Honolulu address of June 22, 1918, made this clear:

> There has been a difference of opinion . . . as to the possibility of applying the homestead law to sugar lands, but that experiment must be made. . . . And whatever opportunity remains with the limited amount

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of public land that you have should be availed of to make the experiment which the law requires. . . .[12]

Since late in the nineteenth century homesteading has been in almost direct conflict with the prevailing political and economic system so typical of Hawaii. Homesteading might have been successful in this community in which a plantation type of agriculture exists, but only if the political and economic elite of the community had been willing to work actively for its success. The specific problems encountered by the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act are often related to the follow-through by the government once family homesteads had been created. Achievement of success with the family-farm type of homesteads requires considerably more than the good will and strong back of the homesteader. One writer has recently commented that family-farm success is dependent upon at least the following basic forms of support:[13]

(1) a continual improvement in agricultural credit polices in order to permit competent operators of non-efficient farms an opportunity to expand and thus put a complete line of equipment to use; the goal in this case would be to raise the earnings for labor and management by farm families to a level comparable to non-farm families with similar capacities;

(2) a constant effort to establish equitable contracts between farm families, government, and markets in order to bring farm output into line with demand;

(3) a continual effort to provide an opportunity for new families to gain farms.

The record in Hawaii is less than satisfactory as measured by any of these criteria. Homesteading, when it has been attempted, rarely had a dimension beyond that of the initial offering of a parcel of land. Credit, reclamation, and marketing were areas that went largely unexplored. Where the possibility of a broader understanding of the difficulties of homesteading are acknowledged in some way by law, as in the Hawaiian Homes Act experience, the selec-

[12] Part of Secretary Lane's speech, quoted in Ralph S. Kuykendall and Lorin T. Gill, *Hawaii in the World War* (Honolulu, 1928), 403.

[13] John M. Brewster, "The Relevance of the Jeffersonian Dream Today," in Howard W. Ottoson (ed.), *Land Use Policy and Problems in the United States* (Lincoln, Nebraska, 1963), 133.

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tion of land and tenants has been such that the possibilities of success in agriculture were slim indeed.

Both the passage of the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act and its subsequent failure to accomplish its publicly stated aim to help the Hawaiian represented major victories for Hawaii's political and economic elite. The passage of the act was important, for it satisfied the traditional American pressures for a homestead law and the specific demands of the Hawaiian community for help. In accomplishing these purposes, close ties were established between the elite of the Hawaiian community which existed until the post-World War II democratic revolution in Hawaii. Furthermore, so long as a homestead law is part of the law of Hawaii, and is accepted and supported by those it is asserted to help, little pressure exists for a more workable homesteading experiment. A really successful Hawaiian Homes program, however, would have represented a major threat to the sugar elite, for it would have encompassed both a demand for the use of those sugar lands legally belonging to the Hawaiian Homes program, but under lease to the sugar plantations, and an increased demand for a homestead program devoid of the ethnic restrictions built into the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act.

These several considerations help to put the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act into broader perspective, for they indicate the many dimensions of political manipulation associated with the genesis and subsequent use of the act's provisions. The act must be considered as one aspect of the struggle for the use of Hawaii's arable land. It indicates the manner in which Hawaii's landed elite used 200,000 acres of public land, set aside for the specific use of an underprivileged ethnic group, almost completely for its own purpose.

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Sociology of Knowledge and Moral Philosophy: The Place of Traditional Problems in the Formation of Mannheim's Thought*

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In the main stream of sociology today, as in most contemporary philosophical discussions, Karl Mannheim's work in the sociology of knowledge is respected—when it is at all recalled—as a pioneering contribution to a new inquiry, but as a work unfortunately marred by certain epistemological and ethical pretensions which are seen to emanate in part from the obfuscating influence of Central European philosophy, in part from the normal confusions which attend a mode of inquiry when it first arises, when it has not yet become self-critical. Mannheim is valuable, it is then said, because he dramatically called attention to the fact that the development of doctrines and ideas and sciences is always a social happening and as such properly matter for such explanations as sociology can provide. He is misled and misleading, however, first and most generally because he imagined that the exploration of the social origins of any intellectual product has a bearing on its epistemological status, and second because he thought that he could claim such a relevance without falling into relativism.

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In fact, it is said, the only logical way in which the claim of epistemological relevance can be at all maintained is on the assumption of some sort of naturalistic identity between actual and normative process, and then relativism is the unavoidable consequence of his finding of diversity. Mannheim is thus patronized as an interesting pre-scientific pagan.[1]

But Mannheim's separation from orthodoxy cannot be treated so lightly; if he is indeed a sinner, then he must be burned as a heretic, not gently relegated to the limbo of sages. In Mannheim's first approach to the sociological explanation of cultural and intellectual phenomena, he stated quite categorically:

> The truth or falsity of a proposition or of the entire theoretical sphere can be neither supported nor attacked by means of a sociological or any other genetic explanation. How something came to be, what functions it performs in other contexts is altogether irrelevant for its immanent character of validity.[2]

[1] Despite interesting and important differences among themselves, the following exemplify the argument broadly summarized here: T. B. Bottomore, "Some Reflections on the Sociology of Knowledge," *The British Journal of Sociology*, VII (1956), 52-58; Gerard de Gre, "The Sociology of Knowledge and the Problem of Truth," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, II (1941), 110-15; Gottfried Eisermann, "Ideologie und Utopie. Aus Anlass der dritten Auflage von Karl Mannheims Buch," *Kolner Zeitschrift fur Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie*, V (1952-53), 128-35; Ernst Grunwald, *Das Problem der Soziologie des Wissens* (Wien-Leipzig, 1934), 184 ff.; Jacques J. Maquet, *The Sociology of Knowledge: Its Structure and Its Relation to the Philosophy of Knowledge* (Boston, 1951); Robert Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure* (Glencoe, 1957), 490 ff.; Albert Salomon, "Karl Mannheim, 1893-1947," *Social Research*, XIV (1947), 350-64. Not all recent treatments of Karl Mannheim follow these lines, of course. Compare the work of Kurt H. Wolff, especially "The Sociology of Knowledge and Sociological Theory," in Llewellyn Gross, *Symposium on Sociological Theory* (Evanston, 1959), 567-602; "A Preliminary Inquiry into the Sociology of Knowledge from the Standpoint of Man," *Scritti di soziologia e politica in onere di Luigi Sturzo* (Bologna, 1953), 585-618; "Karl Mannheim in seinen Abhandlungen bis 1933," in Karl Mannheim, *Wissenssoziologie* (Berlin and Neuwied, 1964), 11-65. Not relevant for present purposes are the works of those who clearly place themselves out of the "main stream."

[2] Karl Mannheim, "Uber die Eigenart kultursoziologischer Erkenntnis" (unpublished typescript, dated 1921P), p. 80. The author is indebted to Dr. Paul Kecskemeti for access to this manuscript, as well as to the other unpublished early essay to be cited below. It is Dr. Kecskemeti's plan to secure publication of at least the most important sections of these manuscripts within the next years. See, also, Karl Mannheim, "Structural Analysis of Epistemology," in *Essays on Sociology and Social Psychology*, ed. Paul Kecskemati (New York,

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It is only after this, in a long essay written two years later, that Mannheim moved toward his puzzling conceptions of "relationism" and "perspectivism," announcing that he had been forced "after extensive reconsideration, to the conclusion that even the purely methodological problems of thought cannot be solved without sociological orientation."[3]

Matters are even more serious with Mannheim than indicated thus far. In the conventional account of Mannheim's development, it is also customary to claim that after he came to England in 1933 he was progressively enlightened by non-Central European influences and came increasingly to see the folly of his earlier unscientific ways. Now it is true that in several of his writings published at that time he makes professions which seem to justify such a hopeful appraisal of his soul's pilgrimage (from *Geist* to intellect, perhaps); but it is unfortunately also true that some of the most elaborate expositions of "relationism" occur in lectures which Mannheim gave a few months before his death.[4] This seems to make him a lapsed heretic, the worst sort.

But enough of the metaphor. The point is that Mannheim's claims that his sociology of knowledge has a contribution to make to epistemology—specifically to the development of criteria of validity in the various spheres of judgment—are not easily eliminable survivals of early philosophic habits, but are central to Mannheim's whole entry upon this line of investigation. Moreover, it is argued, Mannheim's conduct of investigations of this sort was at all times controlled by these interests. One clear sign of this last crucial element is the difficulty encountered by anyone seeking to treat Mannheim's writings in this sphere as imperfect examples of scientific inquiry, only incidentally linked to grand claims of the sort common to German grand theorists; Merton and others have found a great variety of untestable and unclear form-

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1953), 40, note, and *idem*, "The Ideological and the Sociological Interpretation of Intellectual Phenomena," *Studies on the Left*, III (1963), 54-66 (a revised version of a portion of the unpublished manuscript cited above, edited by Kurt H. Wolff).

[3] Karl Mannheim, "Eine soziologische Theorie der Kultur und ihrer Erkennbarkeit" (unpublished, undated typescript, probably 1924), 1.

[4] See file labeled "Principles of Education Lectures, 1946" in collection of Mannheim materials housed in the library of the University of Keele.

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ulations of the relationships alleged by Mannheim to exist between social factors and the ideas supposed to "correspond" to them, to be "determined" by them, and so on. To take Mannheim's work seriously on its own terms, it will not do to assign it to the prehistory of scientific sociology, to win easy victories over it by applying standards expressly rejected by Mannheim at the outset of his activity, or to attempt a translation of its contentions into operational language and testable hypotheses. All of these things can be done, of course, but only by way of dissecting an organism then prejudged from the very outset to be devoid of life. It is proposed here to approach Mannheim without this prejudice. Instead, it will be argued that Mannheim's turn to the sociology of knowledge was an integral part of a life-long effort to deal with a wide range of issues not amenable to treatment considered rigorous by the canons of science upheld by Mannheim as well as by his critics. This paper, then, undertakes: (1) to identify the questions to which the enterprise of sociology of knowledge was primarily addressed; (2) to interpret the formation of the sociology of knowledge in relation to these questions; and (3) to assess the value of taking Mannheim's sociology of knowledge seriously on its own terms, by commenting on the value of the questions themselves and on the prima facie case made in behalf of its relevance to them.

I

The work of Karl Mannheim must be assigned to the "style of thought" whose major attributes have been explicated elsewhere through study of the eighteenth-century Scottish moral philosopher, Adam Ferguson.[5] Characteristic of this style of thought, here to be identified as the "moral-philosophic syndrome," is a set of issues which it seeks to master. These may be stated as the effort to reconcile the following five pairs of initially antithetical aspirations:

(1) meeting contemporary standards of philosophic and scientific method (reference in the paradigmatic case was to the

[5] David Kettler, *The Social and Political Thought of Adam Ferguson* (Columbus, 1965). The concept "style of thought" itself derives from Mannheim. See "Conservative Thought" and "The History of the Concept of the State as an Organism: A Sociological Analysis," in Mannheim, *Essays on Sociology and Social Psychology*, 75, 165.

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eighteenth-century trinity of Bacon, Newton, and Locke) and yet retaining the presumed classical capacity for securing certain knowledge about true ends as well as about efficient means;

(2) combining the scientific conception of nature as a structure of efficient causes and impersonal powers with the traditional conception of a beneficent logic of purposes either immanent in nature or transcending it, but in either case not limited to that which appears to be actual as "mere" fact;

(3) reconciling the post-medieval picture of the good life as a life of achievement, equal right to happiness, and individual integrity with the earlier ideals of excellence, harmony, and identification with the greater whole;

(4) blending the modern criteria for a social life, demanding above all progress, peace, and prosperity, with the classical image of communal life as integrated by a common conception of the good and dedicated to eliciting from each man the greatest contribution he can make to the common good; and

(5) satisfying the liberal notion of the state (or of the public order, more generally) as a guarantor of man's equal rights and of society's existence—needing to be empowered lest it fail to protect the rights of the individual, but needing to be restrained lest it interfere with the beneficent societal process—and yet also yearning for the antique image of political life as the main vehicle for achieving the moral objectives of the community, of the public order as *paideia*, a school for virtue.[6]

So stated, the issues are very broad, and a considerable variety of doctrines can be seen as representative of the moral-philosophic syndrome so defined. Nevertheless the category is not uselessly vague; it is possible to identify schools of thought which stand outside the syndrome, and to offer certain generalizations about the way in which the schools manifesting the syndrome tend—despite vital differences among themselves—to attack their common tasks of reconciling these seeming antinomies:[7]

[6] The catalogue of "modern" and "classical" aspirations is familiar, being a standard product of intellectual history early in the century, but only recently introduced to many American social scientists through the work of Leo Strauss and his group.

[7] This syndome, as argued in the study of Ferguson cited above and as will be developed at greater length in the forthcoming study of Mannheim, identifies

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(1) Natural science and the philosophy related to it are not challenged on their own ground, as a rule. Their mastery within their proper sphere is conceded and may even be elaborately described, but their claim to set forth the only way of achieving results which may be called "true" or "valid" is strongly denied. Moreover, their moral stature (as the sole expression of "reason," as the only way to explore "nature") is called into question, if not radically denigrated. An approach different from that generally identified with the natural sciences, then, is said to be capable of discovering the truths of the matters with regard to which man requires orientation essential to judgment and practice.

(2) Corresponding to the modes of inquiry mentioned above are diverse objects of knowledge. Thus, over and above the complex of efficient causes or functional interrelations is seen at least one sphere of *meaning*, having at least equivalent ontological standing. Often there is said to be some integral connection between these spheres, but the nature of the connection is always described in the language of the non-naturalistic one(s). Very common among the various schools of this type is the recourse at this point of the argument to some conception of the historical process as counterpart to the naturalistic process, although this approach is by no means the only one utilized (as can be seen by the cases of Dewey, Nietzsche, and Husserl, for example).

(3) With regard to the moral question, of central significance to the group as a whole, the response tends to concentrate on the requirement of an individual freely and knowingly giving himself to active and efficacious participation in that process said to be ultimately meaningful. Powerlessness is then generally as much a matter of reproach as slavishness or irrelevance. Integrity, responsibility, and authenticity are common terms here.

(4) The process in which the individual is called upon to participate is normally envisioned as in some sense communal; the whole argument at this point commonly but not invariably involves an attack on factors said to inhibit such participation, and turns to a social application of its main concepts, with a view to overcoming such inhibitions. The attack on society as conducive to "aliena-

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that group of "men of knowledge" most commonly called "the intellectuals" in recent Western culture.

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tion," as antithetical to the activity of an authentic man is a familiar, common, and typical approach.

(5) The political problem has been the most difficult for this style of thought. With a few important exceptions—like John Stuart Mill, John Dewey, and Leon Trotsky—representative thinkers have tended to slight it, either because they believed that their approach to the social issues obviates the political ones, or simply because they did not recognize its importance at all. It also happens, as in the case of Mannheim himself, that a whole career reveals a search for political education. But when there is political theory, it involves a reconstruing or reconstructing of the political so as to put it in the service of the process considered decisive. All but inevitably there appears some conception of a rational will as master of the power involved in the political process, and the rationality in question has been, of course, that special "higher" one referred to above.

It is a little dangerous to attach the label "moral-philosophic" to this particular style of thought because the term is used in a far more limited sense in most analytic dissections of philosophy as a discipline. Yet there is, first, good historical authority for proceeding in this way. The label "moral philosophy," like that of political economy, came in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century to be quite identified with the Scottish school, whose textbooks introduced the whole range of issues to schoolboys and students for almost a century. Second, the label reminds practitioners of the many disciplines generally conceded to be offsprings from the historic moral philosophy (like sociology, economics, psychology, political science, esthetics, and so on) of the energies which served as animating impulses for the disciplines and whose force may still be operating secretly in unexamined concepts and tacit assumptions. But it is the third reason for retaining this old name which is the decisive one. At the core of all writings within the style stands the moral problem, in the narrow sense (however it may be disguised). Epistemology and metaphysics and logic, then, are characteristically subordinated to a moral search, and the issues listed under (3) above and their answers integrate the work of a writer in this tradition. Typically he proceeds on the basis of some peculiar variation of the old Socratic formula: "if I know who I am, what it means to be who I am, I shall know what I must do."

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II

This last pattern is particularly clear in the work of Mannheim (as has already been stressed by Wolff),[8] through all phases of his intellectual development. From his juvenile lecture, published in 1917 under the title *Soul and Culture*, to his very last English writings, the basic objective was to secure orientation through gaining an awareness of vocation or destiny. In the works of his youth, the self whose mission had to be explicated was imagined to be the member of a cultural generation, an expression of the spirit in his time; in the later years, the guiding conception was that of adviser to a ruling elite, a scientific policy-planner; but in the most productive central years, during his fourteen years of activity in Germany, Mannheim portrayed the self to be understood as bearer of an identity and role socially defined, although the characteristic activity whose meaning was to be explicated remained, as in his youth, the activity of the knowing and judging spirit. Sociology of knowledge was to be the technique for discovering what it means to be an intellectual; it was to provide a moral and practical orientation.

This aspect of Mannheim's thought is clearly apparent in his well-known works, particularly in *Ideology and Utopia*, where the occasion for the work is said to be the disorientation of intellectual life and its objective, the securing of orientation. In a whole series of essays prepared at the height of his career, during the late twenties and early thirties, the theme of orientation plays a central role, as it did in the lectures delivered at Frankfurt during 1931 and 1932.[9] More revealing, however, are Mannheim's earliest writings, where he first turns to culture and the sociology of culture, because in these the whole complex of concerns is expressly spelled out. In the present essay, the formative principles of Mannheim's sociology of knowledge will be examined in a group of writings which

[8] See Wolff, "Sociology of Knowledge."

[9] See, especially, "Zur Problematik der Soziologie in Deutschland," in Karl Mannheim, *Wissenssoziologie*, 614-24; "Competition as a Cultural Phenomenon," in *Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge* (London, 1952), 191 ff.; *Die Gegenwartsaufgaben der Soziologie* (Tübingen, 1932), especially 22-27; "De Sociologie der Intelektuellen," *Amsterdamsch Studenten Weekblad. Propria Cures*, XLIV (Oct. 29, 1932), No. 7, pp. 87-91. The lecture notes are in the Keele collection.

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have not been available to English-speaking scholars (and two of which do not appear to be known at all). There follows, then, a brief discussion of a paper Karl Mannheim wrote in 1917, "Soul and Culture," under the influence of George Lukacs and George Simmel, in which he refers the basic problems of the moral-philosophic syndrome to the theme of "renovation of culture," seeing in the cultural process itself the center of meaning; then a consideration of an early German essay by Mannheim, written in 1922 when he was striving earnestly to make his own the major tendencies of contemporary German philosophy, "Concerning the Peculiarity of Cultural-Sociological Cognition," in which Mannheim is primarily concerned to defend the moral-philosophic enterprise against the threat he believes posed by "Marxism"; next a side-look at a work of decisive importance for Mannheim's development, George Lukacs' *History and Class-Consciousness*, for its influential argument that the cultural "solution" of the moral-philosophic problems presupposes a social frame of reference and action, and for its provision of such a framework; and finally a return to Mannheim, for the highly interesting unpublished work probably written in 1924 under the immediate impact of *History and Class-Consciousness*, "A Sociological Theory of Culture and its Knowability," where the basic rationale for sociology of culture (and sociology of knowledge within it) as the decisive approach to coping with the characteristic dilemmas of the moral-philosophic syndrome is most clearly put forth.[10]

III

The general proposition that the sphere within which the antinomies of the moral-philosophic style of thought must be overcome is the cultural is already implicit in Rousseau's critique of the quality of life in modern society, but it first gets careful development in Schiller's very interesting essays *Concerning the Aesthetic Ed-*

[10] It should perhaps be emphasized that this stress on unpublished works is not intended to create any sort of mystery about Mannheim. His published works of the time were more polished and "professional" and therefore more modest in aspiration. He took greater intellectual risks in the essays written for self-clarification and these are, accordingly, more self-revealing. The present purpose places special premium on these qualities. In other contexts, greater attention would naturally be paid his finished productions.

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ucation of Man (1795). This is not the place to discuss this effort nor the subsequent story of the "culturist" stream within the moral-philosophic tradition, as it moves through diverse "Romantic" writers and over the Nietzschean cataract. At the beginning of the present century the diagnosis of a crisis in culture, as a way of putting the concerns which had already animated Ferguson and his generation, enjoyed considerable vogue, particularly in central Europe; and one important sign of this was the widespread insistence on the separateness of humanistic or cultural studies from the natural sciences as well as from the positivistic social science which prided itself on its naturalism. Late in the First World War a group of young Budapest intellectuals organized a lecture series and study group called "Free School for Humanistic Studies." They published, as program statement, the text of a lecture by Karl Mannheim (then twenty-four years old), called *Lelek es Kultura* ("Soul and Culture").[11]

According to the introductory statement, two characteristics distinguish this lecture series. First, it rejects all popularization and is addressed only to "those who no longer need the primer-knowledge of lectures which are eternally nothing more than introductory" (p. 29). Secondly, the lectures "want to propagate the world-view of the new spirituality and idealism," to express the point of view which "speaks of the importance of the problem of transcendence, as against the materialism which is already receding into the past, of the univocal validity of principles, as against relativistic impressionism, of the pathos of normative ethics, as against an anarchic world-view" (p. 30). These two characteristics are bridged, at least in part, by the basic function of the series itself.

[11] Karoly Mannhaim, *Lelek es Kultura. Programmeloadas a II szemeszter menvitase alkalmabol tatotta* (Budapest, 1918). The existence of the pamphlet was first called to the attention of the author by Dr. Zoltan Horvath; a transcript of the rare Hungarian text was made available by Dr. Jozsef Szigeti, director of the Philosophical Institute of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences; Felicitas Goodman prepared an English translation under a grant from the Graduate School of the Ohio State University. The material was put at the disposal of Kurt H. Wolff, who has now included a German translation in Karl Mannheim, *Wissenssoziologie*. For detailed examination of "culturism" in the careers of Mannheim and Georg Lukacs between 1917 and 1919, see David Kettler, *Marxismus und Kultur* (Neuwied, 1966). The following summary of "Soul and Culture" is taken from that text. Numbers in parentheses refer to page numbers in the original pamphlet.

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It is premised on the assumption that the viewpoint to be propagated is actually coming to the fore: it is a "time of intellectual rebirth"; "the culture of Europe is turning, after the Positivism of the nineteenth century, once again towards metaphysical idealism"; "it is a matter not simply of new knowledge, but of a *new culture*" (p. 30). And this new culture, or culture renewed after the eclipse of the positivist era, is being carried by "the type of European who is now in the making." The lecture series is addressed to the present and potential representatives of that type in Hungary; "The lectures are to help them find themselves and gather strength out of the consciousness of a new generation-community" (p. 30). There is, then, no occasion to seek out a mass audience in order to propagate the group's views; the point is to bring to consciousness those already entrusted with the mission of carrying through the renovation of culture.

Mannheim's ambitious lecture seeks to give a more comprehensive account of this position, and particularly of its diagnosis of the situation. He begins with two efforts at self-characterization which he himself terms inadequate, but which are very interesting from the standpoint of the history of ideas: a listing of individuals and movements to which the group feels affinity, and a catalogue of basic principles. In his first list, he opens with Dostoevski, "one with us in world-view and sense of life" and Kierkegaard, "with the same ethical convictions as we"; he then mentions several neo-Kantian philosophers, refers to Paul Ernst and Alois Riegl as sources for "our aesthetic views," and concludes "that in our artistic culture we could well use as our slogan Cezanne, the new French lyric poetry—especially the movement of the *Nouvelle Revue Française*—and . . . Bela Bartok or Andreas Ady . . . and the Thalia theater movement" (p. 7). "Naturalism and impressionism in art," as well as "Marxism in sociology," he lists as movements which have been "factors in our own development" and which have now been outgrown, "although we don't want to forget what they taught us" (p. 7). Others mentioned favorably in the course of the lecture were Simmel—of particular importance to Mannheim, who had studied with him in Berlin from 1912 to 1913—Kant, and Meister Eckhardt. The image evoked by all of these name-slogans is strengthened by Mannheim's reformulation of the school's principles: "Our ethical and aesthetic convictions are marked by a cer-

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tain normativism, which is not, however, bound to rules in an academic manner; our world-view is characterized by an idealism which strives towards metaphysics but could not be further from that forced and strained idealism of doctrinal religions" (pp. 7-8).

Turning from these general slogans and themes, Mannheim contends that the underlying unity of the group can best be comprehended as a shared perspective toward culture. Culture, according to Mannheim, must be seen from two sides, "subjective" and "objective": subjective culture is the activity of the soul, "striving to arrive at itself through a medium which is alien to it" (p. 10). Objective culture is "all the concrete manifestations of the spirit, as transmitted . . . in the course of historical development as a human inheritance" (p. 9). Except for a few chosen ones with special mystical gifts, the soul cannot attain fulfillment except through the medium of some "work" (Mannheim uses the German word *Werk*, in a sense taken over from the mystics), and all reliance on these externals tends to build up an ever widening gap between the subjective and objective dimensions of culture. This, according to Mannheim, is the tragedy of all culture. Objective culture, the accumulation of "works" past and present, of necessity becomes increasingly autonomous, increasingly independent of the experiences of human souls.

The tragedy of human culture derives from several paradoxical attributes of the cultural act, Mannheim contends. To bring order to the inchoate experiences of the soul, the act of creating a "work" necessarily involves submission to the laws inherent in some medium; but these laws also introduce into the cultural act an element alien to its source in the soul. Moreover, the "work" enables the soul to communicate with other souls because its very composition is social; but precisely this "socialness" also brings culture under the sway of all the heterogeneous forces which shape history. Then, too, the "work" of one individual can live and can be extended beyond his short lifetime, but the qualities which make this possible also make possible the perpetuation of techniques when all significance has died. Culture tends toward "mis-development," toward "inauthenticity" (pp. 11-15).

In Mannheim's account, this tendency is said to be distributed more or less evenly over all aspects of a given cultural community, so that it is possible to speak of historical periods marked by one

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or another stage of the development. Following the pattern of the Comtean scheme, Mannheim depicts three historical stages, each corresponding to a distinctive "intentioning" (a concept borrowed from German art-history) or focus characteristic of man: first, there are religious cultures, when the soul is addressed directly to the "primeval facts," when "the creator is above all taken up with the soul, which cannot be comprehended but is nevertheless present" (p. 18); then come artistic cultures, when man's efforts are applied to "the best and most complete working of the material" (p. 18); finally comes the culture which is esthetic and critical, and at this time "the feeling of estrangement" becomes strong, "the discrepancy between forms and substances becomes increasingly clear" (p. 19), and, while the creative artist becomes impotent, the critic flourishes.

Not surprisingly, it is Mannheim's contention that the culture of his time had arrived at a critical moment of this last stage. This is a very bad condition, because "an aesthetic culture . . . directs man exclusively to this one special capacity (i.e., the capacity to appreciate form as such) to the detriment of his other capabilities and of man's directedness towards life" (p. 21). Culture then becomes a *golem*, taking on a life of its own which dominates man; it has "no more relation to the soul than has a parasite to its host" (p. 15); and man is condemned "always to feel that the content being confronted is alien and not identical with oneself, always wanting to place oneself outside of this content and outside of oneself, because one is incapable of a decisive choice of viewpoint" (p. 17). But, as is characteristic of all crises, the moment also promises a vital turning-point: "this alienation becomes visible for the individual when here and there the soul is already being shaken by new experiences, the primeval facts of the soul. Only then does it become clear that the old contents are no longer immediately relevant and that the old forms are alien to us. We feel that at the present time we are living in such an epoch . . . ; although the new contents which appear on the horizon are not as yet formulated, their lightning-like immediacy makes obsolete much that is old" (p. 16). Mannheim's generation can lead the way to the new culture: "Even if it is never given unto us to see the new contents in the light of a new form, we are confident that we shall have accomplished something if we prepare the way for that new culture

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for which we so yearn, by as complete an understanding of the old one as possible" (p. 27).

Like the group in its general proclamation, Mannheim emphasizes repeatedly that it is precisely his generation, "woven together by a common development and a shared sense of life" (p. 6), which can fulfill the promise implicit in the cultural crisis. The group must heed the "signal of the renewal of culture" (p. 27), become fully conscious of itself and of its mission, and—by so doing—transform its relationship to culture and thus the culture itself. The historical injunction of the moment must be heeded; efforts in the direction of new forms, new creativity, however audacious, cannot transform the situation. The generation must prepare the way by performing the task of criticism assigned to it.

The structure of this argument—diagnosis of a crisis, with its implicit threat and promise, produced by necessary historical forces, the renovating mission of a group needing to become conscious of itself, and the requirement that the group carry out the dictates of the historical moment without attempting to anticipate the future development—is characteristic of all future work by Mannheim, and it is also familiar because it corresponds in form so closely to the profound and now widely accepted interpretation of Marx developed in the early twenties above all by Lukacs, who was at that time Mannheim's mentor and leader of the group around the Free School for Humanistic Studies, although in no way yet a professed Marxist. In Mannheim's talk, then, existing culture is condemned as empty of the spiritual qualities which give culture its value, but there are no express references in the essay to social and political conditions, except insofar as social or political institutions might be considered aspects of culture. There is much of Simmel here; but there is also a quiet confidence which differs markedly from Simmel's resignation. Mannheim offered himself as spokesman for a "generation" which was not content with solving the social and political "problems" defined by some social-scientific approach. This generation, through the renovation of culture, would reaffirm the dignity of the human spirit; in a very important sense, in this view, it would contribute to the salvation of the human soul.

In summary, it may be well—even at the risk of some excessive schematizing—to spell out explicitly the connection between

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Mannheim's approach, at the time of "Soul and Culture," and the characteristic preoccupations of the moral-philosophic style of thought:

(1) The authentic mode of participating in culture and ultimately of knowing one's soul is clearly as valid a mode of "knowing," of apprehending reality, as is natural science in its proper and restricted sphere.

(2) The sphere of the soul and its manifestation in culture has highest ontological reality.

(3) The renovation of culture clearly implies and has as ultimate object the renovation of the individual, and participation in this mission is self-evidently rewarding.

(4) The whole fate of the enterprise turns on a process involving the whole community, although this historical development has no significance apart from its cultural meaning. The "generation" which Mannheim sees as cultural renovator happens at the moment of his talk to be slaughtering itself by the hundreds of thousands, a fact never even hinted at in the whole of the lecture. Cultural renovation gives social happenings whatever meaning they have.

IV

In "Soul and Culture," then, Mannheim quite categorically excluded the aid of sociological instruments for understanding culture. Marx is thanked for having pointed the way to the problem of relating cultural happenings and artifacts of a given moment to some deeper underlying stratum, but this stratum is seen to be the process of culture evolution itself, not social or economic development. It is accordingly necessary to account for the fact that Mannheim devoted his first effort at a book-length study after he found refuge in Germany to the problems of sociology of culture.[12] Partly this was personal and accidental; he had been greatly impressed by Simmel before the war and was now working closely with Alfred Weber, who was interested in this theme. But two additional elements are crucial here: (1) A defense of the intrinsic worth of culture against what was felt to be a challenge

[12] "Uber die Eigenart kultursoziologischer Erkenntnis" ("On the Characteristics of Knowledge in Sociology of Culture"). Numbers in parentheses refer to page numbers in this manuscript.

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from Marxism. It is characteristic of the moral-philosophic style of thought to seek comprehensiveness; it respects all ongoing intellectual enterprises. The Marxist "sociological" interpretation of cultural phenomena, in the form of ideology-studies, was clearly going on and saying something. The challenge, as Mannheim perceived it, was to delimit what it could be saying, without pretending that it did not exist or was altogether meaningless. (2) A defense of the integrity of the individual's cultural experience against the relativizing impact of historicism and analyses of *Weltanschauungen*. To Mannheim there appeared to be a serious question whether an authentic individual experience was at all possible or whether all experiences which seemed to be such were nothing more than passive involvements in some collective act, over which the individual has no control.

The response was a conception of sociology of culture which affirmed it as a possible mode of interpreting culture, but denied it all impact on the validity or value of any cultural product. Sociological interpretation, according to Mannheim, sees cultural objects in functional relationship to socio-economic processes, a relationship mediated through the study of *Weltanschauungen* (as initiated by Dilthey). Thus there may be a way of looking at things, a habit of mind, a conception of the kind of thing that is important or interesting, which is common to performance of certain functions within a certain social and economic system and to the creation of a certain cultural object. We can then say, Mannheim argues, that the one corresponds in some sense to the other, but this clearly is no genetic statement in the causal sense, nor does it affect the claim of the cultural object to be good, true, or beautiful. This whole way of looking at things, this sociology of culture itself is, Mannheim goes on—echoing the general attitude of "Soul and Culture"—a sort of decadence-appearance, a function of the fact that we have no immediate and vital relationship to culture and are therefore always looking at its forms and structures. Sociology of culture in this essay is presented as a crippled way of relating to culture in a crippled age; the major consolation is that it manifestly does not penetrate very deeply into its object. Thus we can see that being human is not totally dependent on social and cultural conditions; it is possible to be man alone.[18]

[18] In this section Mannheim is strongly influenced, as he acknowledges, by the phenomenological school.

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"Is there a path of aloneness," he asks, "are there spheres within us which according to their very essence must remain alone? Does the historical-social process change anything about the destiny of being human?" (p. 156). Historicism has loosened the sense of established order; we believe that everything could have been and has been different. Although at first only external structures are viewed historically, in time the feeling of historical determination comes to apply to everything; "our entire ego is sacrificed, we seem as if we were suspended above ourselves." But the sailor, the historian, and the pure sociologist of culture (with whom Mannheim is at this point identifying himself) act out of the same impulse. They have all three found a way

> to take leave of oneself, to separate the social and historical ego from the substantial one, and to experience our being human in general, purely as such. And just as the original empirical-historical homelessness (of sailor, historian and sociologist), which at first led us to wander through cultural and historical epochs and areas, became transformed into the deliberate homelessness of our humanity, so the most hardheaded structural analysis of social consciousness transcends itself, attaining to new substantive insights, until finally, at the last point at which we can stand, it reaches a sociological *cogito ergo sum*, it arrives at something which we cannot doubt any further" (p. 157).

As the conclusion of this passage shows, the rather bleak and ascetic mood was not upon Mannheim long, and faith in the essentially beneficent character of process (still understood as in "Soul and Culture") continues to play a part even during this time.[14] What is particularly important about this phase for present purposes is that Mannheim here accepts pretty completely the neo-Kantian position on the question of validity and rejects the "genetic fallacy" quite as sweepingly as, say, Karl Popper. If Mannheim subsequently again reversed his position, it was not because he had never heard of this alternative. In essence, then, on this crucial question Mannheim here accepted the view of sociology of culture generally identified with Max Scheler and with later positivist schools of sociology. Nevertheless, as shown, his encounter with the discipline is charged with moral-philosophic significance. The

[14] Published work deriving from this period are the essays on "The Ideological and Sociological Interpretation of Intellectual Phenomena" and "On the Interpretation of Weltanschauung" and "Historicism," in *Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge*, 33-133.

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integrity of cultural activity as the activity of highest value has presumably been preserved. This work, then, must be seen as supplementary to the broad position set forth in the earlier essay. The decisive shock came from the work of the man whose inspiration had also governed this first stage of Mannheim's development.

V

How George Lukacs moved from mentor of the esthetic avant garde of Budapest to acting commissar of culture in the Bela Kun regime and to German Communist party spokesman on cultural affairs is itself a highly instructive story.[15] But present concern is with the bearing of the collection of essays he published in 1923 under the title "History and Class-Consciousness"[16] upon Mannheim's development of sociology of culture, in particular sociology of knowledge, as the discipline central to the encounter with the problems of moral philosophy. Lukacs' own work does not, of course, propose such a course; it purports to treat sociology of culture as an almost incidental by-product of a revolutionary social theory. But Lukacs raises to central importance within his theory (or his interpretation of Marx's theory) precisely the most important of those contents which had formerly been comprehended under the rubric of culture, and he argues in a manner which someone like Mannheim cannot ignore that exactly the social function of those contents is their meaning, is the most important thing about them, and that any "renovation of culture" can only be a by-product of a social revolution produced not by the immanent laws of cultural development but by a distinctly social process. A detailed examination of this argument is matter for another occasion; for the present it will suffice to order the main points within the general framework of the moral-philosophic syndrome.

(1) Lukacs offers dialectical thinking as the ultimately valid way to participate in truth. This is a way of thinking which strives toward a total view, rejecting division of knowledge among distinctive ontological spheres, each having a type of science peculiar to it. The appearance of distinct spheres and distinct sciences is itself a matter capable of being interpreted from the standpoint of

[15] See Kettler, *Marxismus und Kultur.*

[16] George Lukacs, *Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein* (Berlin, 1923).

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the most comprehensive view. Reality must be examined, then, according to Lukacs' view, as being integrated according to a principle which tolerates "contradictions" or conflict, even while it develops constantly toward resolution of those conflicts and contradictions. On such a view, Lukacs stresses, concepts must necessarily be imprecisely defined, because their full meaning can only be explicated in the course of a discussion; and the facts must be related to a process whose total meaning is unlikely to be fully revealed by the state of the facts at any given moment. Dialectics, then, is characterized as the theoretical counterpart of a purposeful practical actor who knows who he is and consequently what he is called upon to do, in a situation ripe for his task. Key terms are words like "diagnosis" and "consciousness" and "calling" (in the sense of "vocation"). Strictly speaking, dialectics is for Lukacs not a method of thought alone, but a practical mode of relating to reality and thus acting to change it.[17] Physical science, and social science patterned upon it, can, according to Lukacs, describe some factual interconnection or other, necessary in the external world but only peripherally meaningful to man, and necessary in the social world only insofar as men do not in practice change the power which sustains any given constellation of factors. Moral science in the sense of the old moral philosophy or Kantian ethics can construct some ethical utopia, but cannot show how the being inhabiting the world of necessary causal laws of physical science could possibly conform to these norms. Dialectical thinking supercedes this incoherence. It is only available, however, from the practical and activist standpoint of the actor whose time has in reality come—for Lukacs, the revolutionary proletariat whose mission it is to destroy the capitalist order. Without this directional energy and situational opportunity, in his view, dialectics becomes just another formula offering some rhythmic fiction about the development of reality.

(2) The comprehensible, becoming reality in which practical man participates, has at its bitter core the questions of existence and power, about which the life of mankind has turned, but it has as its fruit a rich, authentic culture. The question of existence and

[17] Compare John Ladd, "The Place of Practical Reason in Judicial Decision-Making," in Carl J. Friedrich (ed.), *Rational Decision* (New York, 1964), 120 ff.

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reality must provide the frame of reference for discussion and action, but the whole is given meaning in its fullest sense only by the emancipation of man's humanity. History, then, must be seen as a meaningful story in which development from one social-economic epoch to another through the conflict of classes provides the basic plot. But the plot is not the value or the point of the story, nor does capacity to define the present situation in terms of that plot enable one to prophecy what must happen next. As the story moves to its climax, the machinery ceases to function, according to Lukacs, and the characters must take over.

(3) Practical action toward the revolutionary transformation of the social and economic order, then, is neither a matter of class reflex nor base pursuit of mean interest. It is morally free commitment to a mission in behalf of the highest human good; it is heeding a call. In contrast, and this is vehemently pressed by Lukacs, to refuse this commitment is to be constrained ever more to moral emptiness and dishonesty. Wisdom and virtue are again, as in Plato, combined: wisdom involves knowing and being who you are, and this involves self-transforming action.

(4) And the arena for action is the society in change within which we live, while the character of action is participation in the process of social revolution. Lukacs concentrates his diagnosis and indictment of bourgeois society on the phenomenon of "reification," the transformation of human needs, activities, and relations into measurable, interchangeable, standardized, saleable things. The process which leads to reification is often called alienation, but in these essays Lukacs is more disposed to trace the dimensions of the reified condition than to explore the processes by which it comes about. Every aspect of bourgeois society, from the basic exchange of commodities and the labor market to the character of science itself, is marked by this condition, according to Lukacs. Men limit their vision to the calculable and serve to perpetuate a world in which the incalculable, the creative and free, are forcibly repressed; men break down creative work into component processes having no coherent connection with some human need or objective; men look to some functional norm to direct them into a given course of action and refuse to face themselves in freedom; men hypostatize "rational," formal-mathematical knowledge and fail to examine the qualitative irrationalities which underpin its

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sway. Men look to "natural laws" and "facts" and ignore that laws rest on force which can be counteracted and that facts can be changed. Such a condition is not the result, in Lukacs' view, of simple moral delinquency, nor can it be changed by firm resolution alone.

Reification is a pattern of relationships implicit in a set of economic and social arrangements in which powerful men have powerful stakes and within which we are all caught up. The capacity to see this and to change it (and the two are intertwined) is reserved to those associated with the class in society which is least caught up in the pattern (only the worker's labor is for sale—not his soul, as with journalists and professors) and has the capacity to envision and carry through an alternate pattern of social organization. Thus social revolution is the indispensable prerequisite for any cultural or moral renovation. If the proletariat surrenders to false consciousness and accepts the political or other rules of the game of the existing order, then the dehumanizing process will intensify. The symptoms of reification no longer have for Lukacs the kind of esthetic charm which his former teacher Georg Simmel saw in a decadent culture, or which he himself, in his earlier writings, had discerned in an esthetic culture. They are of interest only as symptoms; the cultural products of value are those produced by bourgeois culture at its full vitality, before it was forced to lie or to squirm with self-doubt.

There are many things about this argument which merit discussion, but for the present what is decisive is that Lukacs undertook to explode the barrier between the social function and intrinsic value of cultural products which writers like Mannheim had carefully maintained, and he did so in terms likely to be authoritative or at least persuasive for Mannheim; Lukacs denied the relevance and potency of any effort to secure orientation by reference to the ultimate value of the cultural process alone. He argued that a healthy culture presupposes a healthy society, and that an adequate interpretation of the meaning of a cultural work or a satisfactory diagnosis of the cultural condition require a committed and practical putting-to-the-question of the social process as a whole. A dissonant and dishonest culture, then, cannot be the authentic expression of the human soul; a soul led to inhibit its own characteristic expressions cannot create a human culture. And,

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according to Lukacs, the dissonances, dishonesties, and inhibitions which cripple culture are functions of social processes.

VI

In 1924 Mannheim completed about two hundred pages of a new systematic treatise which he called "A Sociological Theory of Culture and of Its Knowability. Conjunctive and Communicative Thought."[18] Like its predecessor of two years earlier, the work clearly arose out of Mannheim's experience in the seminar of Alfred Weber and of his emerging interest in the lectures of Heidegger and the writings of Husserl. In addition, however, it represents Mannheim's effort to meet the challenge of Lukacs' "History and Class-Consciousness."[19] While in the earlier work Mannheim felt free, as already noted, to draw a radical division between the academic activities of exploring ties between social happenings and intellectual events, on the one hand, and the activity of assessing value or validity, on the other, now Mannheim had clearly become much less certain of this distinction. Most disturbing to him, it seems, was a growing doubt whether a neo-Kantian dualism or phenomenological pluralism could be sustained, a growing conviction that all modes of knowing are functions of a historically changing societal subject within the knower. Now this issue had already been radically posed for Mannheim by the historicist writers (above all, Dilthey) with whom he was familiar, but it was the influence of Lukacs (and probably also the work of Ernst Troeltsch) that led him to raise the issue to central and comprehensive importance—not least, it would appear, because Lukacs suggested to him a way in which the full weight of the seemingly relativistic critique of knowledge could be borne without giving up fundamental moral and ethical aspirations. Mannheim never

[18] Karl Mannheim, "Eine soziologische Theorie der Kultur und ihrer Erkenbarkeit."

[19] On this matter, the weighty advice of Arnold Hauser counsels against ascribing this effect to Lukacs' Marxist essays. Still, the evidence appears too strong; the sweeping rejection of Marxism, which had played so important a part in essays before this is here replaced by the effort to comprehend and integrate it within a broader context, and always at the key point the reference is to Lukacs. The intent and thrust of the argument is still, to be sure, anti-Marxist, but Mannheim's stance has nevertheless changed. After 1923, and at least until 1930, Mannheim no longer claimed a confident superiority to Marxism.

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accepted Lukacs' faith in the Communist party as concrete manifestation of the proletarian class-consciousness, and he never even really accepted the Marxist account of the proletarian mission; but he did take over and adapt once more the conception of a group-mission founded on a group self-consciousness as the functional equivalent for a relativism-defying absolute norm. In this essay, then, begins Mannheim's striving for the utopia of a genuine synthesis among all the diverse intellectual currents of which he was aware. And it is the experience of carrying on sociology of knowledge which is supposed to create the newly self-conscious intellectual who will be able to know and to judge.

Mannheim distinguishes between two spheres of intellectual activity, the communicative and the conjunctive. The former is the area of general scientific explanation; the latter is the realm of the interpretation of meanings. Corresponding to this distinction is that between *erklären* and *verstehen*, as well as that between *Naturwissenschaften* and *Geisteswissenschaften*. Working out these distinctions occupies most of the manuscript, and eventuates in the general contention that adequacy in the sphere of conjunctive knowledge cannot be measured by the standards of the communicative, but that adequacy here is of far greater intrinsic importance to the life of man than is any verifiable precision in scientific endeavors (narrowly understood). The measure of adequacy, according to Mannheim, is defined by the historical variability of the context of meanings, in the first place, and, secondly, by the diversity of perspectives within a given context. This pattern of definition he calls "perspectivism." Moreover, an adequate conjunctive understanding can only be conveyed to others within a given conjunctive community; outsiders cannot comprehend it. Conjunctive thinking does not abide by what Mannheim now calls the special and historically peculiar prejudices of communicative thinking and of its special form, the natural sciences. Thus, according to Mannheim, conjunctive thinking concentrates on the comprehension of a life filled with meanings, not the comprehension of things; it is better understood by Aristotelianism, medieval thought, and the Romantic consciousness, than by Descartes and his followers; it views the world quite unashamedly as anthropomorphic, and not as a sum of masses and forces; it rejects the ideal of translating everything into quantity and of screening

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out everything peculiarly human as well as all insights limited to particular individuals or groups; it acts out of concrete situations, provides orientation for practice, and is not limited to the search for the universally valid, the calculable portions of reality. In its method, according to Mannheim, the conjunctive cultural sphere of thought proceeds through *"Einheitsschau,"* not analysis and dissection; in its concepts, it must use "naming" or "describing" terms whose full range of meanings can first become clear in the course of their use and which can in any case only be properly understood by those who share in the community. Precise, rigorously defined concepts are simply inapplicable here.

Mannheim characterizes the differing realms of application for the two types of thought in various ways. First, in terms of technical disciplines, he identifies, as already noted, the communicative with the natural sciences and the conjunctive with the cultural sciences. While it is possible, in his view, to treat certain aspects of the cultural sphere (or spiritual sphere) with natural-scientific means, this does not get to the meaningful dimensions of those happenings. Second, he distinguishes the two areas by the differing uses to which understanding is being put: in the conjunctive sphere, man seeks orientation, he must know what to do; in the communicative, he seeks to use nature as mere instrument. Third, and this is the argument taken over from and expressly credited to Lukacs, he ascribes the rise of the communicative habit of thought to the rise of the bourgeoisie and the general condition of bourgeois society; from the standpoint of that class and under the conditions of that social order, men are transformed into priceable commodities, relationships are reified into inhuman, abstract, precisely calculable interactions. Conjunctive thought, then, is borne by the anti-capitalist classes, first, only by those identified with earlier epochs (and this is expressed, according to Mannheim, in movements like Romanticism and nationalism), but then also blended with the modernism of the new anti-capitalist class, the revolutionary proletariat, into a genuine dialectical synthesis. This last full acceptance of Lukacs' version of the argument, however, is rapidly qualified, if not altogether put aside by Mannheim, who turns instead to Tönnies, Alfred Weber, and perhaps even Othmar Spann for help. Fourth, then, the conjunctive is the sphere of "real life," of the irrational, emotional life of communities, of the every-

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day substratum underneath the formal, contractual, societal veneer. In any case, the basic point, of course, is that Mannheim has denied the normative authority of those scientific and philosophic criteria which he identifies with the communicative sphere, or, more accurately, he has grudgingly granted their sway over a small portion of intellectual activity. Conjunctive thought, he maintains, must be subjected to altogether different controls.

Mannheim accepts and in fact strongly argues the position that the intellectual rehabilitation of the conjunctive sphere signifies a return to the search for metaphysics and objectively valid ethics. But he denies that it justifies a "leap" to some metaphysical or ethical system conjured up by the theorist—whether in the form of some timeless absolutes or philosophy of history—or simply taken over from the past.[20] The basic control which must be applied to disciplined conjunctive thought is authenticity, and this demands that the search for the new comprehensive philosophy be carried on through modes expressive of the present dilemma of thought. The present is a critical epoch, not a religiously constructive one. An authentic response will take into account that it is an age when an examination like Mannheim's own becomes possible, when intellectual approaches are relativized and "appreciated," instead of being accepted or rejected, when there is self-doubt. To meet the challenge, it is necessary to pursue historical-sociological researches, secure in the expectation that out of them, within them, there will spontaneously arise a "metaphysic of history" which cannot be "schemed out" beforehand (p. 36). "The problem of relativism, as it has come to be a question of life or death for us," he writes, "can only be overcome if we make it into the axis, the point of departure for theory, and only ask afterward how it could be overcome at the stage at which we encounter it" (p. 47). The intellectual mission of intellectuals, if they are true to their mission at this time and place, will in itself lead to their self-transformation, their coming to a new consciousness, and will thus decisively transform the situation. The task is to comprehend

[20] In an aside which applies also to latter-day disciples of the phenomenological sects which flourished in his time, Mannheim gibed: "They falsify too little to produce anything really creatively new, free to our present-day tensions, and they falsify too much to serve fruitfully at least as historians." "A Sociological Theory of Culture and of Its Knowability," 34.

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and thus to shape the aspirations of the next epoch in world history. The sociological interpretation of conjunctive knowledge is the conjunctively appropriate route to self-discovery; it defines the adequate relationship between the intellectual and the situation in which he must act and judge and choose, and it does so in two senses: first, as itself an appropriate activity for an intellectual in this time, and, second, as a way out of the time, spontaneously creating a new world-view and a new outlook.

The essay goes on to attempt a more detailed account of conjunctive knowledge and of the possibility of communicative knowledge, but it is not necessary to pursue the argument further at this time. Enough has been shown to make it clear that at least Mannheim's turn to the sociology of knowledge was animated by the kinds of concerns which have been here combined under the label, "moral-philosophic syndrome." Such concerns, it appears, continue to animate Mannheim's work throughout his career, although they are not always explicitly avowed. The solution (or quasi-solution) for key problems described above is tacitly assumed in a work like *Ideology and Utopia.* This accounts for the lack of clarity about just what constitutes "knowledge" of the sort for which information about social genesis has a bearing on assessment; the concern throughout is with a "conjunctive" interpretation of "conjunctive" types or aspects of "knowledge." It accounts for Mannheim's strenuous but unclear insistence on the difference between relativism and relationism or perspectivism; conjunctive knowledge firmly rooted in a group at a time has all the certainty and security of which it allows. And it accounts for the frustrating lack of precision in the terms used to characterize the presumed relationships between sub- and super-structures. The "naming" and "describing" terms of conjunctive inquiry cannot aspire to univocality; precisely the richness of their associations gives them their vitality.

VII

To account for something is not to justify it, of course. All that has been offered so far is reason for believing that Mannheim's work in the sociology of knowledge can best be understood on its own terms when it is viewed as part of an effort to solve, in sometimes alarmingly eclectic and sometimes ingenious but withal in

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quite typical form, the characteristic dilemmas of the moral-philosophic syndrome. What about justification? Has all this not simply pronounced a death-sentence on Mannheim's claim to be taken seriously by social scientists or disciplined philosophers? I think not.

The moral-philosophic syndrome, with its conflicting aspirations and grand ambitions, has been the most provocative and productive force in the development of social and political thought of the last two centuries, at least. And there is reason to believe that a social science which ignores these issues will exhaust itself in pursuing within ever narrower range the one all-absorbing objective of perfect rigor.[21] The insight which Mannheim shared with many of his contemporaries remains relevant: social scientists labor under a discipline in intellectual work which increasingly prevents them from dealing with the matters which first drew them to intellectual work. Mannheim's most fundamental question came to be—and it does not appear to be a frivolous or boring one—whether this manifestation of alienation and reification in the intellectual sphere is not associated in some important way with comparable processes in other spheres of social life.

As it was for Mannheim, the problem remains that of finding a way of "taking seriously" the kind of enterprise characteristic of the syndrome. The task is to build a discipline, to devise controls which will be permissive enough to foster man's effort " 'to place himself' in the world, to come to terms intellectually and emotionally with himself and his environment,"[22] while they are also demanding enough to distinguish between more or less "adequate" orientations. Mannheim's suggestion, and it is central to the emergent sociology of knowledge as interpreted here, was that a basis for an adequate perspective is clear awareness of what one is about. Important links connect this approach with a "conservatism" like that of Michael Oakeshott; coherence and continuity are secured

[21] Stated thus generally, this sounds like the great universal lament of those who often end up as anti-scientific obscurantists. The task is, of course, to uncover the inner connection between the lamenters and that which they lament, to gain full clarity about the situation. C. Wright Mills laments intelligently, but fails to give substance to his concept of "Sociological Imagination." "Moral-philosophic syndrome," although less exhortatory a term, seeks to give some historical specificity to the matter.

[22] John Plamenatz, *Man and Society* (New York, 1963), I, xix.

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by heeding the intimations of a role, of an activity.[23] Of course, the activity here in question is far more "rationalist" and daring than the normal conservative imagines, and occasions may arise for hard choice among roles equally available. But Mannheim's celebration of the intellectual (quite apart from his later politically illiterate effort to see him as an elite) and the attempt to explicate the implications of his activity point in a still promising direction. The present study represents an effort to explore it a little further. Mannheim repeatedly rouses the interest of scholars; and each time they put him aside in disappointment, finding that he stands up very poorly to the criteria they attempt to apply to him, and wonder just what it was that drew their attention in the first place. This paper has attempted some explanation for that interest, some account of the "something" that draws to him members of the conjunctive community still strongly affected by the moral-philosophic syndrome.

[23] See David Kettler, "The Cheerful Discourses of Michael Oakeshott," *World Politics*, XVI (1964), 483 ff.

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Thomas Hobbes on the Family and the State of Nature*

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Among the most celebrated passages in the literature of political philosophy is Thomas Hobbes' classic description of the incommodious, barren, and uncertain life in the state of nature: "no Arts; no Letters; no Society; and which is worst of all, continuall feare, and danger of violent death; And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short." Seventeenth-century critics, assuming that even the most rudimentary social unit, the family, was excluded from the Hobbesian state of nature, often opposed this view of "*the* NATURALL CONDITION *of Mankind*" with the patriarchally governed household and insisted that the natural "warre of every man against every man"[1] never existed. The reaction of Bishop John Bramhall was typical:

> there never was any such time when mankind was without Governors and Lawes, and Societies. Paternall Government was in the world from the beginning, and [by] the Law of Nature. There might be sometimes a root of such Barbarous Theevish Brigants, in some rocks, or desarts,

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[1] Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan, or the Matter, Forme, & Power of a Common-Wealth Ecclesiasticall and Civill* (1651), ed. W.G. Pogson Smith (Oxford, 1909), 97, 94, 98.

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> or odd corners of the world, but it was an abuse and a degeneration from the nature of man, who is a politicall creature.[2]

Manifesting the same attitude, Sir Henry Sumner Maine wrote in the last century:

> It is some shifting sandbank in which the grains are Individual men, that according to the theory of Hobbes is hardened into the social rock by the wholesome discipline of force. . . . But Ancient Law, it must be repeated, knows next to nothing of Individuals. It is concerned not with Individuals, but with Families, not with single human beings, but groups.[3]

And G. P. Gooch has said against Hobbes' conception, "The unit of primitive society was not, as [Hobbes] imagined, the individual, but the family or some other group. . . ."[4]

All three of these statements suggest the more familiar complaints of Sir Robert Filmer, who wrote in opposition to the Hobbesian theory of original and natural freedom and equality:

> I cannot understand how this right of nature can be conceived without imagining a company of men at the very first to have been all created together without any dependency one of another, or as mushrooms (*fungorum more*) they all on a sudden were sprung out of the earth without any obligation one to another, as Mr. Hobbes's words are in his book *De Cive*, chapter 8, section 3; the scripture teacheth us otherwise, that all men came by succession, and generation from one man: we must not deny the truth of the history of the creation.[5]

These anti-individualist interpretations rely, in large measure, upon the presumption that the Hobbesian state of nature was intended as an actual historical account of man's prepolitical condition. It is generally argued today, however, that Hobbes designed his state of nature as a logical and reductionist device that was to dem-

[2] John Bramhall, *A Defence of True Liberty from Antecedent and Extrinsicall Necessity* (London, 1655), 107.

[3] Henry Sumner Maine, *Ancient Law: Its Connection with the Early History of Society and Its Relation to Modern Ideas*, ed. Frederick Pollock (4th American ed.; New York, 1906), 250.

[4] G. P. Gooch, *Political Thought in England: Bacon to Halifax* (London, 1946), 34.

[5] Sir Robert Filmer, *Observations Concerning the Originall of Government* (1652), reprinted in Peter Laslett (ed.), *Patriarcha and Other Political Works* (Oxford, 1949), 241.

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onstrate the necessity of absolute government.[6] I suggest that this is an oversimplified notion that should be modified in view of Hobbes' failure to maintain a consistent distinction between the logical and historical aspects of his political theories; the point here is that any such differentiation was wasted on Hobbes' contemporaries. Many seventeenth-century thinkers shared with Filmer the belief that it was only necessary to show that familial status had been established by God at the Creation to prove that natural equality and liberty and a state of nature constituted an absurd and irrelevant point of departure for a discussion of political obligation. Hobbes himself gave the lie to these critics—or at least attempted to do so—when he asserted in the seventeenth chapter of *Leviathan* that families had existed in the prepolitical world. To this position Thomas Tenison anonymously replied, "You rather overthrow than prove your supposed state of Nature."[7] Filmer had reasoned that if children were subjugated to their fathers, "there would have been little liberty in the subjects of the family to consent to [the] institution of government."[8]

Hobbes had gone even further than the remarks of Tenison and Filmer indicate; he had specifically identified familial and political rule, saying, "Cities and Kingdomes . . . are but greater Families."[9] In his own English translation of *De Cive*, he stated that "a family is a little city,"[10] later writing that "a great family is a

[6] See, for example, F.C. Hood, *The Divine Politics of Thomas Hobbes: An Interpretation of Leviathan* (Oxford, 1964), 74; C.B. Macpherson, *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke* (Oxford, 1962), 20-22; John P. Plamenatz, *Man and Society: A Critical Examination of Some Important Social and Political Theories from Machiavelli to Marx* (London, 1963), I, 333; George H. Sabine, *A History of Political Theory* (3d ed.; New York, 1961), 464; Howard Warrender, *The Political Philosophy of Hobbes: His Theory of Obligation* (Oxford, 1957), 30, n. 1, 237-42; J.W.N. Watkins, *Hobbes' System of Ideas: A Study in the Political Significance of Philosophical Theories* (London, 1965), 72; and T.D. Weldon, *States and Morals: A Study in Political Conflicts* (London, 1946), 105. Some writers have challenged this view. See Stuart M. Brown Jr., "Hobbes: The Taylor Thesis," reprinted in K.C. Brown (ed.), *Hobbes Studies* (Oxford, 1965), 67 n. 25, and Isaiah Berlin, "Hobbes, Locke, and Professor Macpherson," *Political Quarterly*, XXXV (1964), 448-49.

[7] [Thomas Tenison], *The Creed of Mr. Hobbes Examined in a Feigned Conference between Him and a Student in Divinity* (London, 1670), 134.

[8] Filmer, 239; see, also, 241.

[9] *Leviathan*, 129.

[10] Thomas Hobbes, *De Cive* (1642), translated by Hobbes as *Philosophical Rudiments Concerning Government and Society* (1651), reprinted as volume

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kingdom, and a little kingdom a family."[11] Numerous similar and related comments are scattered throughout Hobbes' writings. Together they comprise a patriarchal element in his political philosophy that has not previously been recognized.[12] What follows is an examination of the familial aspects of the *Leviathan*, *De Cive*, and other works by Hobbes. While I have by no means attempted to reassess the whole of his political thought, I have, in several places, called attention to some of the problems that this patriarchalism raises for interpretations of other aspects of Hobbes' theory.

I

Political power, Hobbes said, arose either from acquisition or institution; the power of fatherhood—like that of conquest—was derived from acquisition:

> The attaining to the Soveraigne Power, is by two wayes. One, by Naturall force; as when a man maketh his children, to submit themselves, and their children to his government, as by being able to destroy them if they refuse; or by Warre subdoeth his enemies to his will, giving them their lives on that condition. The other, is when men agree amongst themselves, to submit to some Man, or Assembly of men, voluntarily, on confidence to be protected by him against all others. This latter, may be called a Politicall Common-wealth, or Commonwealth by *Institution;* and the former, a Common-wealth by *Acquisition*.[13]

So far as Hobbes was concerned, there were no differences between instituted and acquired commonwealths once they were es-

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II of Hobbes, *The English Works*, ed. William Molesworth (London, 1839-41), Chap. vi, Sect. 15, p. 84, note. This work will be cited throughout in accord with the established usage by the Latin title, *De Cive*, and the *English Works* will be cited as *E.W.*

[11] *Ibid.*, viii, 1, *E.W.*, II, 108.

[12] Since writing this article, I have read Keith Thomas' illuminating essay, "The Social Origins of Hobbes's Political Thought," in K.C. Brown, 185-236. Thomas has found "traces in [Hobbes'] writings of a patriarchalism which he did not succeed in justifying in wholly contractual terms" (p. 188). His treatment is very brief and differs from my analysis in its examination of Hobbes' use of this doctrine as a product of his times rather than logically and in terms of his own political philosophy.

[13] *Leviathan*, 132. The same point was made in *De Cive*, v, 12, viii, 1, and ix, 10, *E.W.*, II, 70-71, 108, 121-22. But see viii, 1, *E.W.*, II, 109, and the earlier *De Corpore Politico*, where Hobbes made parenthood a distinct and therefore a third source of dominion in the state of nature. (*De Corpore Politico: or the Elements of Law* [1640], II, iii, 2, *E.W.*, IV, 149.)

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tablished, for "The Rights, and Consequences of Soveraignty, are the same in both."[14] In *De Corpore Politico* he wrote, in a

> monarchy by acquisition . . . the sovereignty is in one man, as it is in a monarch made by *political institution.* So that whatsoever rights be in the one, the same also be in the other. And therefore I shall no more speak of them as distinct, but of monarchy in general.[15]

It therefore follows that acquisition provided no less valid a title than institution,[16] and it appears that Hobbes accepted patriarchal power and consent as equally valid though distinguishable sources of governance.

In fact, in his little known *Dialogue Between a Philosopher and a Student,* published in 1666, Hobbes implicitly adopted much of the patriarchal position of some of his critics and attributed to primitive fathers many of the characteristics of sovereignty:

> And first, it is evident that dominion, government and laws, are far more ancient than history or any other writing, and that the beginning of all dominion amongst men was in families. In which, first, the father of the family by the law of nature was absolute lord of his wife and children: secondly, made what laws amongst them he pleased: thirdly, was judge of all their controversies: fourthly, was not obliged by any law of man to follow any counsel but his own: fifthly, what land soever the lord sat down upon and made use of for his own and his family's benefit, was his propriety by the law of first possession, in case it was void of inhabitants before, or by the law of war, in case they conquered it. In this conquest what enemies they took and saved, were their servants. Also such men as wanting possession of lands, but furnished with arts necessary for man's life, came to dwell in the family for protection, became their subjects, and submitted themselves to the laws of the family.[17]

In his debate with Bishop Bramhall Hobbes admitted, "*It is very likely to be true, that since the Creation there very likely never*

[14] *Leviathan,* 152; see, also, 154 and *De Cive,* ix, 10, *E.W.,* II, 121-22.

[15] *De Corpore Politico,* II, iv, 10, *E.W.,* IV, 159.

[16] *Ibid.,* II, iii, 1, *E.W.,* IV, 148-49.

[17] Thomas Hobbes, *A Dialogue Between a Philosopher and a Student of the Common Laws of England* (1666), *E.W.,* VI, 147. See *Leviathan,* 133 ff., for a discussion of the nature of sovereign power. Hobbes' derivation of a father's authority over his family from the law of nature in the passage quoted above may perhaps be explained by reference to the fourth law of nature as discussed in the *Leviathan.* See below, n. 28.

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was a time when Mankind was totally without Society." Bramhall, Hobbes continued, "*saw there was Paternal Government in Adam, which he might do easily, as being no deep consideration.*"[18] But in *De Cive*, he dismissed as a justification for monarchy the argument "that paternal government, instituted by God himself at the creation, was monarchical" because, along with other similar notions, it made its case "by examples and testimonies, and not by solid reason."[19] In the *Leviathan* Hobbes asserted that an independent family was a small kingdom:

> a great Family if it be not part of some Common-wealth, is of it self, as to the Rights of Soveraignty, a little Monarchy; whether that Family consists of a man and his children; or of a man and his servants; or of a man, and his children, and servants together: wherein the Father or Master is the Soveraign. But yet a Family is not properly a Common-wealth; unlesse it be of that power by its own number, or by other opportunities, as not to be subdued without the hazard of war.[20]

Breaking sharply with the patriarchalism of Bramhall, Filmer, and Tenison, Hobbes insisted both that paternal power had existed in the state of nature and that it was not derived from fatherhood as such. If patriarchal sovereignty was a product of procreation, he reasoned, then the mother, who shares equally in the act of generation, should have an equal claim to dominion over the child. A sharing of authority was impossible, however, for it would have violated two axiomatic principles, that no man can serve two masters and that supreme power is indivisible.[21] Presumably, this judgment was applicable to the power of Adam, too, which, as has been shown, might well have been patriarchal for all Hobbes cared. Hobbes' denial of the generative origins of the governmental authority of fathers allowed him to rest his political doctrine on the proposition that no status among men was natural. The subordination of men was due to convention and human consent, not to nature.[22] The power of parents was a virtual reward for preserving

[18] Thomas Hobbes, *The Questions Concerning Liberty, Necessity, and Chance Clearly Stated and Debated* (London, 1656), 139.

[19] *De Cive*, x, 3, *E.W.*, II, 129.

[20] *Leviathan*, 157.

[21] *Ibid.*, 154; *De Cive*, ix, 2, *E.W.*, II, 115.

[22] See the statement quoted in n. 17, above, from the later and less philosophic *Dialogue*: "the father of the family *by the law of nature* was absolute lord of his wife and children" (emphasis added).

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the lives of their children when they had the ability and right to destroy them. For in their natural condition, because there was a potential danger from all equals, men were entitled to take steps to keep a subdued individual in a permanently weakened condition.[23] But a man who preserved someone whom he might have destroyed is entitled to obedience from the person he saved. Thus, in the state of nature, "if the mother shall think fit to abandon, or expose her child to death, whatsoever man or woman shall find the child so exposed, shall have the same right which the mother had before; and for this same reason, namely, for the power not of generating, but preserving."[24]

Power over a child initially belongs to the mother, according to Hobbes, "insomuch as she may rightly, and at her own will, either breed him up or adventure him to fortune."[25] The obligation of the child to obey a mother who does not destroy him is derived from his tacit or projected consent to her power over him. As Hobbes said in *De Cive*:

> If . . . [the mother] breed him, because the state of nature is the state of war, she is supposed to bring him up on this condition; that being grown to full age he become not her enemy; which is that he obey her. For since by natural necessity we all desire that which appears good unto us, it cannot be understood that any man hath on such terms afforded life to another, that he might both get strength by years, and at once become an enemy. But each man is an enemy to that other, whom he neither obeys nor commands.[26]

The point was more succinctly made in the *Leviathan* where Hobbes said that paternal authority "is not so derived from the Generation, as if therefore the Parent had Dominion over his Child because he begat him; but from the Childs Consent, either expresse, or by other sufficient arguments declared."[27] Ultimately, the future consent of the child was probably derived from Hobbes' fourth law of nature, the law of gratitude, which required "*That a man which receiveth Benefit from another of meer Grace, Endeavour that which giveth it, have no reasonable cause to repent him of*

[23] *De Corpore Politico*, I, i, 13, *E.W.*, IV, 85.
[24] *Ibid.*, II, iv, 3, *E.W.*, IV, 155. See, also, *Leviathan*, 132.
[25] *De Cive*, ix, 2, *E.W.*, II, 116.
[26] *Ibid.*, ix, 3, *E.W.*, II, 116.
[27] *Leviathan*, 153. See, also, *De Corpore Politico*, II, iv, 3, *E.W.*, IV, 156.

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his good will." For if men fail to respond gratefully to such beneficence, "there will be no beginning of benevolence, or trust; nor consequently of mutuall help; nor of reconciliation of one man to another; and therefore they are to remain still in the condition of *War.*"[28] Applied specifically to the relations of fathers and children in the state of nature, this aspect of Hobbes' theory of consent provided the means of legitimately transforming what was earlier termed "Naturall force" into sovereignty. The key to the process was the fact that the child did not resist his father's will. It will be seen that Hobbes apparently included this acquiescence within the category of consent "by other sufficient arguments declared" and could thus assert that paternal dominion was derived from the consent of the child. What was central to Hobbes' political thesis was, once again, a demonstration that men, not nature, were the authors of their own subjection.[29]

Howard Warrender, however, concludes that "the propriety on Hobbes's part of applying the notion of tacit covenant to the child-parent relationship is very doubtful."[30] This observation is based on Hobbes' having denied the ability of children to make covenants because they "have not the use of reason"[31] and on his later statement that

> Over naturall fooles, children, or mad-men there is no Law, no more than over brute beasts; nor are they capable of the title just, or unjust; because they had never power to make any covenant, or to understand the consequences thereof; and consequently never took upon them to authorise the actions of any Soveraign, as they must do that make themselves a Common-wealth.[32]

These notions, Professor Warrender suggests, "would seem to be more consistent with Hobbes's doctrine in general" than the "tacit

[28] *Leviathan*, 116.

[29] In *De Cive* Hobbes said that in their natural condition men are "without all kind of engagement to each other." He specifically limited to "three ways only" the procuring of "a dominion over the person of another." Those ways were contract, conquest, and generation. (*De Cive*, viii, 1, *E.W.*, II, 109.) In *Leviathan* it was asserted that there is "no Obligation to any man, which ariseth not from some Act of his own." (*Leviathan*, 166.)

[30] Warrender, 124.

[31] *Leviathan*, 125.

[32] *Ibid.*, 208.

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covenant children are supposed to make with their parent(s) by whom they are preserved." He attributes Hobbes' derivation of parental authority from the consent of the child to a possible "anxiety to forestall at their inception . . . contemporary paternalistic theories of sovereignty."[33] Warrender seems to have missed, however, the full meaning of Hobbes' identification of political and familial authority in the state of nature; he therefore fails to appreciate the importance of Hobbes' notion that *all* sovereign power springs originally from voluntary human actions rather than from natural causes. The logical discrepancy would be removed if the tacit compacts of children were equivalent to the consents that would be forthcoming as soon as each child came of age and became master of his own reason. This is approximately the conclusion that Hobbes reached in his debate with Bishop Bramhall when he attempted to explain how children could be bound by the laws of their ancestors:

> The Conquerour makes no Law over the Conquered by vertue of his power; but by vertue of their assent that promised obedience for the saving of their lives. But how then is the assent of Children obtained to the Laws of their Ancestors? This also is from their desire of preserving their lives, which first the Parents might take away, where the Parents be free from all subjection; and where they are not, there the Civil power might do the same, if they doubted of their obedience. The Children therefore when they be grown up to strength enough to do mischief, and to judgement to know that other men are kept from doing mischief to them, by fear of the Sword that protecteth them, in that very act of receiving that protection, and not renouncing it openly, do oblige themselves to obey the Lawes of their Protectors; to which, in receiving such protection they have assented.[34]

Functionally, authority over the child in the state of nature belonged to anyone who had the power to kill it. In the first instance this person was always the mother, and the patriarchal title originated in power over her, not in the inherent rights or superiority of either males or fathers. Fathers have this authority in society, Hobbes reasoned, "because for the most part Common-wealths have been erected by the Fathers, not by the Mothers of families."

[33] Warrender, 256, n. 1; 124.
[34] Hobbes, *Liberty and Necessity*, 136-37.

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In nature where there are no matrimonial regulations, without individual and specific contracts, children are under the dominion and subject to the disposition of their mothers. Without laws governing marriage, "it cannot be known who is the Father, unlesse it be declared by the Mother: and therefore the right of Dominion over the Child dependeth on her will, and is consequently hers." On the other hand, when the mother is subject to her husband, "the Child, is in the Fathers power,"[35] just as the child in society is the subject of his father's sovereign.[36]

II

It has been customary for modern commentators to draw sharp distinctions between two kinds of sovereignty in Hobbes' writings, that is, between the government that arises "when a man maketh his children, to submit themselves, and their children, to his government," and that which springs from the "Covenant of every man with every man."[37] The former is said to have been the true *historical* beginning[38] of society recognized by Hobbes, whereas the latter is supposed to represent the logical basis. An essential corollary to this view stresses the logical existence of the state of nature, falling back upon Hobbes' own words: "It may peradventure be thought, there was never such a time, nor condition

[35] *Leviathan*, 154-55. See, also, *De Cive*, ix, 6, 7, *E.W.*, II, 118-19.

[36] *Leviathan*, 155; *De Cive*, ix, 6, *E.W.*, II, 118.

[37] *Leviathan*, 132, 131.

[38] Perhaps it should be indicated that by "history" I do not mean the recapturable pasts of specific states or peoples but the anthropologically real antecedents of human social and political organization in general. This definition has, I think, been at least implicit in the secondary literature and would not have to be mentioned were it not for Professor Warrender's having contrasted the explanation of the source of sovereign authority discussed here with "Hobbes's treatment of his subject where he is really concerned to give an historical survey, as when he traces the origins of some parts of the British Constitution to the customs of the Saxons, in his *Dialogue of the Common Laws*" (p. 239). Hobbes' interpretations of *English* history are not relevant here and seem to have very little to do with Warrender's argument. With the exception of J. G. A. Pocock, commentators have generally ignored Hobbes' views on specific or national history. (See Pocock's *The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law* [Cambridge, 1957], 162-70.) The only sustained attempt to relate this aspect of Hobbes to the more familiar components of his "political philosophy" of which I am aware is M. M. Goldsmith, *Hobbes's Science of Politics* (New York, 1966), 228-42.

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or warre as this; and I believe it was never generally so, over all the world."[39]

G. C. Robertson was the first commentator to express this view. Despite the great attention Hobbes paid to the contract, Robertson said "that states had their natural beginning in families when not in conquest . . . is evidently the real opinion of Hobbes."[40] To the same end is the analysis of Leslie Stephen; he also sees an opposition between the two positions and goes even further than Robertson, claiming that the contract thesis is not only "absurd historically, but is also irrelevant to Hobbes."[41] Richard Peters, too, treats familial government as a form of rule apart from that instituted by men and calls attention to Hobbes' "lack of interest" in patriarchal authority, holding that "it was *institution* that appealed to his way of thinking."[42]

The most extreme member of this school is Leo Strauss, who says that Hobbes "maintained up to the end that paternal authority and consequently patrimonial monarchy is, if not the legal, nevertheless the historical, origin of all or the majority of the States." Professor Strauss further asserts that Hobbes always acknowledged "the precedence of the natural over the artificial State." According to Strauss, Hobbes "went beyond" the historical demonstration that society was originally patriarchal. Instead, he constructed "a completely defective state of mankind" from which even the most simple of human associations had been eliminated. This condition was "the war of every one against every one." Hobbes "derives this war from its origin in human nature," Professor Strauss continues, implying that even human nature and history are in opposition to the Hobbesian scheme. Finally, Strauss says, "Hobbes considered the philosophic grounding of the principles of all judgement on political subjects more fundamental, incomparably more important than the most thoroughly founded historical knowledge." Therefore, the state of nature is "not an historical fact, but a necessary condition."[43]

[39] *Leviathan*, 97.
[40] G. C. Robertson, *Hobbes* (London, 1886), 146.
[41] Leslie Stephen, *Hobbes* (London, 1904), 209-10.
[42] Richard Peters, *Hobbes* (Baltimore, 1956), 211.
[43] Leo Strauss, *The Political Philosophy of Hobbes: Its Basis and Genesis*, trans. Elsa M. Sinclair (Chicago, 1952), 60, 66, 104.

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This interpretation is not altogether satisfactory, primarily because it omits two very important statements made by Hobbes: first, that there were no meaningful differences after inception between sovereignty by acquisition (which includes patriarchal power) and institution,[44] and, second, that patriarchal power was derived not from the right of the father but from the tacit or projected consent of the child to be bound by the governance of his parent(s) and from the fourth law of nature, the law of gratitude.[45] Further textual evidence—to say nothing of Warrender's persuasive reinterpretation of the status of obligation in the prepolitical situation—suggests that Hobbes conceived of the state of nature as something less than the "completely defective state of mankind" envisaged by Professor Strauss and not quite the total anarchy seen by his Stuart critics.

Professor Warrender is aware of the lack of significant differences between instituted and acquired sovereignty, but he, too, says, "In any event, when Hobbes turns to consider the general problem of men in the State of Nature and the erection of a sovereign authority, he is clearly interested in logical and not historical analysis." He does concede, however, that Hobbes "bases no important point" upon the distinctions between logic and history and argues that "it is more likely that he regarded the two types of sovereignty simply as different patterns determined by circumstance, without prejudice to where or how often each of them had been instanced historically."[46] Even this reading is incomplete, for there is yet a further interpretation possible, one that attempts to assert the similarities between the notions that political societies grew out of the family and, alternatively, that they sprang from the state of nature.

III

The difficulties of interpretation arise from Hobbes' imprecise use of the state of nature concept and his failure to distinguish at all times between two apparently different things he was doing in

[44] *Leviathan*, 152; *De Corpore Politico*, II, iii, 1, and II, iv, 10, E.W., IV, 148-49, 159.

[45] See above, nn. 26-28.

[46] Warrender, 238-40.

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his political writings. In those works, Hobbes was both justifying a particular kind of political authority and discussing the historico-anthropological evolution of the state. To be sure, these are analytically separable operations that are carried out on different levels, and it is to the credit of previous commentators that they have drawn attention to these distinctions as they may be extracted from the political philosophy of Hobbes. In the seventeenth century, however, these activities were not always separate. For many political writers, historical origins provided a valid justification for authority,[47] and it is not at all apparent that Hobbes should be *totally* excluded from the authors who accepted this kind of reasoning. In fact, much of what Hobbes wrote might be rendered more intelligible if the moral significance that his age attached to origins is kept in mind. This is especially true of his theory of the state of nature, for the construct is appropriate to political and logical justification as well as to historical reconstruction. Hobbes clearly used the state of nature to serve both ends —and sometimes simultaneously. Seen in this light, Hobbes' two tasks are revealed as having been very much alike, and the differences between the historical and logical analyses in his writings need not be as great as Robertson, Stephen, Peters, Strauss, and Warrender suggest. If attention is directed primarily to the place of the family in the state of nature theory, it is possible to argue that there is no difference at all.

"A son," Hobbes declared in *De Cive*, "cannot be understood to be at any time in the state of nature, as being under the power and command of them to whom he owes his protection as soon as ever he is born, namely, either his father's or his mother's, or him that nourished him. . . ."[48] This statement was validly derived from the conception of the state of nature as the condition in which "there were no common Power to feare."[49] Removal of a son from the state

[47] This aspect of seventeenth-century English political thought and its historical antecedents have both escaped the attention of most commentators. However, see Sterling P. Lamprecht, *The Moral and Political Philosophy of John Locke* (New York, 1918), 41; Francis C. Haber, *The Age of the World: Moses to Darwin* (Baltimore, 1959), 72; and Guenter Lewy, *Constitutionalism and Statecraft during the Golden Age of Spain* (Geneva, 1960), 47.

[48] *De Cive*, i, 10, note, *E.W.*, II, 10.

[49] *Leviathan*, 97. In *De Corpore* Hobbes wrote, "The appetites of men, and the passions of their minds, are such, that, unless they be restrained by some

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of nature is doubly significant because, as the context reveals, it was part of an answer to a critic (whom Hobbes failed to identify) and not a possible confusion that had passed unnoticed. Moreover, this position had already been incorporated into the original text of *De Cive* when Hobbes declared that the equality of nature applied only to "all men of riper years."[50] It was as if the state of nature extended only to the door of the household but did not pass over the threshold, for Hobbes claimed that there was private property in the family but not in the state of nature. There can only be private ownership where there is sufficient security, a qualification that precluded the state of nature.[51] But a family, Hobbes wrote, "is a little city. For the sons of a family have a propriety of their goods granted them by their father, distinguished indeed from the rest of the sons of the same family, but not from the propriety of the father himself."[52] In the *Leviathan*, Hobbes said that the American Indians lived in a virtual state of nature and except for the internal organization of their families were without the benefits of order: "For the savage people in many places of *America*, except for the government of small Families, the concord whereof dependeth on naturall lust, have no government at all; and live at this day in that brutish manner, as I have said before."[53]

As has already been observed, Hobbes regarded a "great Family if it be not part of some Common-wealth," as itself a commonwealth so long as "it be of that power by its own number or by other opportunities, as not to be subdued without the hazard of war." A closer examination reveals that these family-commonwealths existed in a state of nature vis-à-vis other units, for they would have faced each other with "no common Power to feare." In the state of nature, independent fathers were "absolute Sovereigns in their own Families," and their rule was civil rule because they had authority over their children and servants, which

power, they will always be making war upon one another." (*De Corpore* [1655], I, vi, 7, *E.W.*, I, 74.) These unbridled appetites and passions are recognizable as the state of nature of the *Leviathan* and *De Cive*.

[50] *De Cive*, ix, 2, *E.W.*, II, 115. See, also, the discussion in the *Leviathan* of the inability of children to enter into covenants (p. 208).

[51] *De Cive*, vi, 1, *E.W.*, II, 72.

[52] *Ibid.*, vi, 15, note, *E.W.*, II, 84. See, also, *De Corpore Politico*, II, iii, 4, *E.W.*, IV, 151.

[53] *Leviathan*, 97.

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"has no place but in a State Civill, because before such estate, there is no Dominion of Persons."[54] It is these fathers who, as the representatives of their families, were in the state of nature and engaged in the "warre of every man against every man." Thus, "every man" can certainly be understood as "every independent father" (or patriarch) without changing Hobbes' basic argument. The members of families were the subjects of their father-sovereigns who secured private belongings for them. "But fathers of divers families, *who are not subject to any common father nor lord*, have a common right in all things," Hobbes asserted in *De Cive*.[55]

All that was missing was a formal statement that it was the agreement of fathers rather than the consent of all persons that established commonwealths by institution. Hobbes said precisely this in two passages that have been overlooked by all of his comentators, both seventeenth-century and modern, who have perceived a fundamental conflict between the family and the state of nature. In justifying the authority over their offspring that fathers have in society, Hobbes said:

> [It must be remembered] that originally the Father of every man was also his Soveraign Lord, with power over him of Life and Death; and that *the Fathers of families, when by instituting a Common-wealth*, they resigned that absolute Power, yet it was never intended, they should lose the honour due unto them [from their children] for their education. For to relinquish such right, was not necessary to the Institution of Soveraign Power.[56]

Similarly, Hobbes wrote that "the Parent ought to have the honour of a Soveraign, (*though he have surrendered his Power to the Civill Law,*) because he had it originally by Nature."[57]

[54] *Ibid.*, 157, 97, 180, 125.

[55] *De Cive*, vi, 15, note, *E.W.*, II, 84 (emphasis added). A small problem arises in attempting to classify the relations among members of different families, none of whom were patriarchs or independent fathers. They, too, undoubtedly would have faced one another in a state of nature, for there would have been no authority above them. In this case, however, the state of nature would have been due to the individuals' having figuratively stepped out of their respective families. Patriarchs, on the other hand, were in the state of nature because of their very status and inherent condition. In arguing that independent nations faced each other in a state of nature, Hobbes clearly stated that the rights and liberties of that condition accrued to the commonwealths and their representatives and not to the individual residents.

[56] *Leviathan*, 263 (emphasis added).

[57] *Ibid.*, 237 (emphasis added).

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The importance of these statements can be grasped in part by contrasting them with Bishop Bramhall's insistence that Hobbes had erred in attributing the institution of civil society to the actions of naturally free men. He "builds upon a wrong foundation, that all Magistrates at first, were elective," the Bishop charged. "The first Governours were Fathers of Families; And when those petty Princes could not afford competent protection and security to their subjects, many of them did resign their severall and respective interests into the hands of one joint Father of the Country."[58] In the light of Hobbes' statements, there now appears to have been no disagreement between him and Bramhall on this matter. Sir Robert Filmer's criticism of Hobbes—that the subordination of children to their fathers left "little liberty in the subjects of the family to consent to [the] institution of government"—may also be qualified to the extent that dependents were not parties to the contract. On this reading, the Hobbesian doctrine is not far removed from Filmer's own statement in *Patriarcha* that "By the uniting of great families or petty Princedoms, we find the greater monarchies were at first erected. . . ."[59] Thus, both men had far more in common with their contemporaries than is generally acknowledged.[60]

IV

One of the most important results of this interpretation of Hobbes is that it invites a reassessment of certain aspects of his doctrine. In the first place, his state of nature no longer appears to have been altogether individualistic; rather it was composed of familial social units that faced each other as autonomous entities. As Thomas Tenison observed in his criticism of the *Leviathan:*

> It is further to be marked, that one Family, as it stands separated from another, is as one Kingdom divided from the Territories

[58] Bramhall, *Defence*, 100.

[59] Sir Robert Filmer, *Patriarcha: A Defence of the Natural Power of Kings against the Unnatural Liberty of the People* (written ca. 1638, posthumously published in 1680), printed from a manuscript in *Political Works*, 61-62.

[60] On one level, the notion that complex political communities grew out of the association of patriarchally ruled households is a recognizable part of the political philosophy of Aristotle. Separated from its teleological trappings, the anthropological doctrine was an important ingredient in English political thought from the Elizabethan period until well into the eighteenth century. What is more, it was employed by royalists as well as by their critics.

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> of a Neighbouring Monarch. If therefore the state of Nature remaineth in a Family not depending upon another Family, in places where there is no common Government; then all Kingdoms which have not made Leagues with one another, are, at this day, in the same state. . . . I know you esteem all distinct Kingdoms in a state of War in relation to each other, and therefore they have a right; if they have a Power of invading: but he that consult *Grotius*, in his Book *de jure belli & pacis* (designed chiefly to set forth the Rights, not of Domestick, but Forinsick War) will not be much of your opinion.[61]

Independent nations, according to Hobbes, did face one another as in a state of nature:

> For as among masterless men, there is perpetuall war, of every man against his neighbour. . . . So in States, and Common-wealths, not dependent on one another, every Common-wealth, (not every man) has an absolute Libertie, to doe what it shall judge (that is to say, what that Man, or Assemblie that representeth it, shall judge) most conducing to their benefit. But withall, they live in the condition of a perpetuall war, and upon the confines of battel, with their frontiers armed, and canons planted against their neighbours round about.[62]

This description is no less applicable to families in the state of nature than to the relations of sovereign nations. Hobbes in fact did compare the activities of small, primitive families to cities and kingdoms of his own day.[63] The elemental social unit for Hobbes was not the individual but the family, and a characterization such as Bertrand de Jouvenel's that "Hobbes gives a picture of individuals living each man for himself,"[64] cannot be accepted without qualification.

Another consequence of this rereading is the possible revision of the modern estimate of Hobbes' status in relation both to his contemporaries and to traditional modes of thought. That Hobbes was an innovator is not open to serious question. Leo Strauss at one time regarded him as the "originator of modern political philosophy,"[65] and George Sabine has remarked that Hobbes' system

[61] [Tenison], *The Creed of Hobbes*, 135.
[62] *Leviathan*, 164-65.
[63] *Ibid.*, 128-29.
[64] Bertrand de Jouvenel, *Sovereignty: An Inquiry into the Political Good*, trans. J. F. Huntington (Chicago, 1957), 232.
[65] Strauss, xv.

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was "the first wholehearted attempt to treat political philosophy as part of a mechanistic body of scientific knowledge."[66] The justification of absolute, undivided sovereignty with arguments "taken from general principles of psychology and ethics rather than from assertions about Divine Right" was also a new departure,[67] as was the use of consent along with natural freedom and equality as the source of an unlimited rather than a constitutional government. All of these Hobbesian innovations have long been known and are frequently commented upon. What has gone unnoticed, however, is the relation to traditional political patriarchalism of Hobbes' observations on the nature of familial power. In this instance, too, important new ground was broken. Although his identification of primitive paternal authority with political power was in keeping with the practices of many of his contemporaries who considered the question, Hobbes was altogether unique in attempting to derive the father's power over his children from their consent. Buttressing the arguments for original freedom and equality in this manner, he added greater consistency to his doctrine and was not confronted with the need to explain how men who were subjected to their fathers by nature could ever be sufficiently free to agree to a compact of government. And if it is remembered that the child's consent was projected into the future through the fourth law of nature, the law of gratitude, this thesis is no less plausible than anything else about the state of nature.

A more conventional way out of this dilemma was to insist that patriarchal subjugation was distinct from, and in no way prejudiced, man's natural political right. This argument had been used in the past[68] and would be employed again by Locke in his answer to Filmer.[69] Another solution was simply to accept the notion that political society indeed traced its origins to the primitive family and to build an argument on the nature of the familial society. Ultimately, of course, Hobbes did conform to this second pattern, but he avoided thoroughgoing patriarchalism by first validating the proposition that all status is conventional. To this extent, the al-

[66] Sabine, 460.
[67] Peters, 27.
[68] See, for example [Philip Hunton], *A Treatise of Monarchy* (London, 1643), 1.
[69] See John Locke, *Two Treatises of Government* (1690), ed. Peter Laslett (Cambridge, 1960), II, 2, 71, 169, 173, 286.

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leged freedom of mankind was at least *theoretically* preserved. Since this freedom gave way to parental control as soon as the child was born—if only because its physical weakness made it dependent upon others at once[70]—the assertion that the family rather than the individual was the basic social unit for Hobbes is in no way qualified.

The historical reality of the state of nature is yet another question that might be re-examined in light of Hobbes' use of patriarchal political theories. It need not be argued that the condition of "meer Nature" *necessarily* corresponded to a genuine historical situation, but the showing that what recent commentators have regarded as Hobbes' history was potentially compatible with his state of nature does seem to place the entire matter in a new perspective. If the thesis of Leo Strauss and others is correct—that is, if Hobbes believed that actual states grew out of expanding families—and if independent sovereign familial commonwealths existed in the Hobbesian state of nature, it should follow that the state of nature was a representation of true history. Hobbes himself provided further evidence for this view in his very admission that the state of nature was a logical fiction. What is often overlooked about this admission, however—or allowed to stand without comment—is that Hobbes did not say that there had never been a state of nature. He said, "I believe it was never *generally so, over all the world:* but there are many places, where they live so now," and he immediately referred to the American Indians, who "except [for] the government of small Families . . . have no government at all."[71] What seems unmistakably clear is the complexity of the problem and the need for further analysis; an investigation of the relation of Hobbes' two historical works, the *Dialogue* and *Behemoth*, to the political philosophy of the *Leviathan*, *De Cive*, and *De Corpore Politico* would be especially valuable. At all events, prima facie dismissal of the issue is undoubtedly out of place, and it ought not be flatly asserted, to quote Professor de Jouvenel again, that Hobbes "was concerned to build not a historical reconstruction but a social mechanics."[72]

[70] ". . . to man by nature, or as man, that is, as soon as he is born, solitude is an enemy; for infants have need of others to help them to live, and those of riper years to help them to live well." (*De Cive*, i, 2, note, *E.W.*, II, 2.)

[71] *Leviathan*, 97 (emphasis added).

[72] de Jouvenel, 232.

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Book Reviews

When Americans Complain: Governmental Grievance Procedures *by Walter Gellhorn. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1966.—viii, 239 pp. $3.95.*

Ombudsmen and Others: Citizens' Protectors in Nine Countries *by Walter Gellhorn. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1966.—xvi, 448 pp. $6.95.*

Justice Frankfurter often remarked that the quality of a civilization could be judged by the fairness of the procedures in its criminal courts. An equally valid yardstick, it seems to me, is the mechanism through which citizens are enabled to register complaints against governmental authority and secure redress in appropriate cases. These two volumes, by a distinguished author, provide a firm basis for evaluating a particular means of achieving this end—the "ombudsman," a high official who investigates complaints against public servants and acts as watchman over the bureaucracy and administrative practices.

Professor Gellhorn does not blithely assume the need for such an external critic. In *When Americans Complain* he carefully analyzes the familiar problems for which existing channels of complaint are inadequate. Administrative inefficiency, impersonality, and discourtesy, often go undetected and uncorrected. This is true at all levels of government and it affects all classes of the population, but especially in the relationship of the poor man to officialdom. Whether it be housing, welfare, or education, the chances are greatest that the person without influence, spare time, or ready cash will bear the brunt of administrative aberration. There are, of course, many agencies that now act upon complaints: courts, commissioners of investigation (as in New York City), the Administrative Conference (in Washington), and elected legislators (at all

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governmental levels). But each of these potential sources of redress has institutional deficiencies, and these are explored with imagination and in detail.

Not content with comprehensive research into American institutions, Professor Gellhorn also presents the results of his thorough observations, interviews, and researches in nine countries that have turned to unfamiliar means to assuage conflicts between citizen and government. Five of the countries—Sweden, Finland, Norway, Denmark, and New Zealand—rely on ombudsmen, while Japan, Poland, the U.S.S.R., and Yugoslavia employ other versions of citizens' protectors. For example, Japan employs local "administrative counselors," Poland uses journalists and others to investigate complaints, and the Soviet Union assigns a watchdog function to two thousand "procurators."

Accordingly, the case for the ombudsman is made only after a scholarly review of the need in America, its performance elsewhere, and available alternatives. In reaching his conclusion that the ombudsman should be tried here, the author emphasizes that the institution is most likely to succeed in a country like the United States, where "government administration is already reasonably good and when a consensus of expectations already exists about ethical and qualitative standards in the public service" (*When Americans Complain*, p. 225). In such circumstances there is sound reason for introducing a continuing critic of high standard, divorced from politics, with access to official records and files, whose judgments will weigh heavily with the bureaucracy as well as the public. In the absence of foreseeable loss through such an experiment, Professor Gellhorn's balance is tipped heavily in favor of action.

If and when legislators begin drafting a bill there will, of course, be many questions. What exactly will the powers of an ombudsman be? Will he be able to order reform and recompense or will his function be solely advisory? How large a staff will be available, and in a large city or state will there be one or several men with the powers of the office? What will be his relation to existing avenues of redress, such as investigating commissioners and district attorneys? Will there be means to protect the innocent civil servant from publicity attending unwarranted charges by an ombudsman? And is there a danger of permitting the ombudsman to accumulate vast political power through his powerful and protected position as overseer of the governmental structure?

These questions, and there are many others, suggest some of the practical problems involved in actually establishing a new mechanism for the protection of the citizen. Although Professor Gellhorn's research and wisdom persuade me that the effort should be made, I think he would agree that in the last analysis there is no one answer to the age-old prob-

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lem of bureaucratic aberration, and that the ombudsman will have to take his place alongside existing institutions for redress of grievances, adding an additional dimension perhaps but not displacing other means for securing justice and even-handedness in the administrative process.

NORMAN DORSEN
New York University School of Law

Andrew Jackson *by Robert V. Remini. New York, Twayne, 1966. —212 pp. $4.95.*

In this concise and well written biography Robert V. Remini has a more ambitious objective than merely recounting the life of a famous man. Further developing the interpretation introduced in *The Election of Andrew Jackson*, he portrays the President not as a symbol of the age nor a personification of proletarian striving, but as a shrewd and able politician, a pioneer in using the office of the presidency for both national and narrowly partisan purposes. Neither the creature nor the creation of Martin Van Buren or the Kitchen Cabinet, "Old Hickory" emerges as a worthy precursor of Roosevelt, Kennedy, and Johnson.

Remini argues that Jackson's political ambition developed early in his career. While striving for wealth and status in Tennessee society and gaining military glory in frontier exploits, Jackson was at the same time both creating and manipulating incidents which eventually catapulted him into the presidency. "He was driven by ambition—a skilful, hard-headed political operator, enamored of power, and deeply involved in all the ambiguities and oblique maneuvers that are inevitable in the pursuit of power." To substantiate this judgment, Remini surveys Jackson's alternately energetic and cautious roles in the Burr conspiracy, the War of 1812, and the Florida campaign; unaccountably, he does not emphasize his association with the Blount machine in Tennessee, which could have provided further evidence of his thesis.

Central to the view of Jackson as a politician is the discussion of the nullification controversy and the Bank War. Remini emphasizes that Jackson regarded both as pre-eminently political questions, to be solved politically; yet in neither case did Jackson initiate action, Calhoun and Clay, respectively, receiving the onus. Jackson's response to these challenges differed. During the controversy with South Carolina he continually sought compromise; he alternated "between the gestures of conciliation and the menace of retaliation," realizing that "in politics total victory usually means eventual defeat." Calhoun became an enemy, but

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the Union was preserved. In the struggle with Biddle, on the other hand, Jackson saw himself as the spokesman of the people in a battle to the death with an efficient yet powerful and irresponsible corporation. Remini insists that Jackson, not the Kitchen Cabinet, Eastern bankers, or Western politicians, decided that either the Bank must be destroyed or democratic institutions would be irreparably endangered, even though this decision reduced his popular majority in the 1832 election.

Remini concludes that, given the prevailing laissez-faire philosophy, Jackson had no alternative; effective governmental regulation was impossible, so total destruction of the Bank was necessary. The President was protecting the American people, not only against a "monster" which threatened the republic, but against themselves; he realized that his hard-money philosophy ran counter to the entrepreneurial hopes and expectations of many of his supporters, but he was determined to protect their political liberties. Therefore, Remini interprets Jacksonian Democracy as a movement which preached political equality and encouraged mass political participation. This can be criticized as an inordinately narrow view, but in fairness to Remini his focus is continually on the man, not the movement, and from this standpoint he has revealed Jackson in a new dimension.

Perhaps the most interesting corollary of this interpretation is the conscious downgrading of Van Buren, Kendall, Taney, *et al.* It is interesting that Remini, who began by stressing the role of the "Little Magician" in creating the Democratic party, now emphasizes the political leadership of the "Old Hero." His account is persuasive and well documented, although occasionally assertions and argumentation are made to suffice in delineating the pre-presidential years. This brief biography supplements, rather than supplants, the earlier accounts by Bassett and James; nevertheless, Jackson can no longer be dismissed as a colorful historical accident, a president who merely presided over a revolution in American history.

WALTER HUGINS
San Jose State College

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The State and the Mentally Ill: A History of Worcester State Hospital in Massachusetts, 1830-1920 *by Gerald N. Grob. Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1966.—xv, 399 pp. $7.50.*

A winner of the American Association for State and Local History Manuscript Award for 1965, this comprehensive monograph testifies to a growing interest among historians in less conventional and more interdisciplinary themes. Integrated with a detailed chronicle of the often pace-setting Worcester Hospital is an analysis, equally detailed, of state governmental policy toward the mentally ill in Massachusetts and an extensive—possibly too much so—summary of current research in the history of mental illness in the United States. Among the book's specific contributions to the still small body of knowledge in this field are an illuminating discussion of the controversial question of recovery rates and evaluations of the work of the two best known men connected with the hospital, Samuel B. Woodward, the first superintendent, and Adolph Meyer.

Grob's central theme concerns the changing character of the hospital, the decline of a curative approach and the obstacles to its reintroduction. From its opening in 1833 to about 1850, Worcester Hospital operated under the enlightened system, called moral treatment, then current in the United States and Europe. Resembling modern "milieu therapy" in its emphasis on psychological and environmental conditions, moral treatment required an institution small enough so that the medical director could treat each patient as an individual. By mid-century, immigration and state legislation, combined with the effects of industrialization and insufficient financial support, acutely overcrowded the hospital. Moral treatment collapsed, and the pessimism typical of custodial institutions gradually prevailed. Therapeutic methods might have survived, Grob implies, had advocates of moral treatment accepted the idea of a large but decentralized hospital and had not psychiatric professionalization eventually excluded laymen from participation in hospital affairs. The latter assertion, while suggestive, needs substantiation. Grob also argues that Worcester Hospital, under Meyer's leadership in the early twentieth century, missed an opportunity to revive therapeutic practices because physicians retained a somaticism uncongenial to the psychological techniques necessary to such a renewal. He here underrates the significance of class prejudice. Experience indicates that the staff's unsympathetic attitudes toward lower-class patients (the majority) would tend to inhibit effective relationships with them, a problem still waiting resolution.

With respect to state policy, Grob overemphasizes the pioneering role

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of Massachusetts. For example, Samuel Gridley Howe's idea that the insane were wards of the state had been adopted more than fifty years earlier in Virginia with the founding of a mental hospital at Williamsburg. The new element in Massachusetts lay in the supporting arguments. In his proposal for a hospital, Virginia's Governor Fauquier gave humanitarian and therapeutic reasons, within the context of the traditional corporate view that made the community responsible for the helpless. Howe, writing in the eighteen-forties, began with a "psychiatric" theory of etiology that charged society with creating conditions productive of insanity; society must then in all fairness care for those who fell ill and could not afford private hospitals.

These observations should be viewed as an indication that Grob has dealt with significant questions about which, in so unexplored a field, disagreement is inevitable and even desirable. His book, impressively researched and clearly if uneconomically written, resolves many specific points long at issue and takes us further along in understanding other, more complex, problems.

NORMAN DAIN
Rutgers, The State University

Politics, Strategy, and American Diplomacy: Studies in Foreign Policy, 1873-1917 *by John A. S. Grenville and George Berkeley Young. New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1966.—xviii, 352 pp. $7.50, 56 s.*

These somewhat episodic studies span the years from the *Virginius* affair to the declaration of war on Germany. Their primary concern is with the strategic and political aspects of foreign policy, with the Navy, and with party politics in a United States looking outward. Their geographical focus is on the Caribbean, Hawaii, and the Philippines. The structure of the book is described by the authors as "biographical," and so in large degree it is. The various chapters concern themselves with such individuals as Admiral Stephen B. Luce (founder of the Naval War College and inventor of Admiral Mahan); with Grover Cleveland (whose conduct of foreign policy is downgraded); with William Lindsay Scruggs (diplomat, lobbyist for Venezuela, and resuscitator of the Monroe Doctrine); with "The Education of Henry Cabot Lodge" (who is here separated from the jingoes); with William McKinley (who gets high marks); and with Admiral Dewey (in his role of strategic planner between 1900 and 1915). These individuals and their activities are judged against a somewhat Pla-

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tonic set of standards, which seem to assume that foreign policy should be framed "according to reason," and removed from the forum of public debate and the "baneful influence of politics"; and which consequently call for an efficient navy, more attention to strategic than to economic interests, and (unimpeachably) justice for Cubans and Chinese.

Any reader, it may be presumed, will find items of interest here. The authors have worked in a variety of archival collections, of which the Luce, Scruggs, and Lodge papers, the records of the Navy Department and of the Navy's General Board, and the microfilms of captured German archives are perhaps the most important. Yet, throughout, more is promised than is performed. Striking assertions cry out for documentation, but time and agian none is given and locutions such as "need no elaboration," "suggest conclusively," "probably," "undoubtedly," and "certainly" do duty for the citation of source material. At times the biographical approach is misleading: although Dewey gets the title and the first few pages of the final chapter, and is credited with the chief influence on American strategic planning before the First World War, the discussion is principally concerned with the Germans, the British, T.R., and some anonymous "strategists." Despite the tone of reappraisal and discovery which pervades the book, discredited chestnuts recur, as in the assertion (p. 41) that the growth of American imperialism in the first Cleveland administration was "reflected" in the writings of Fiske and Strong. The writing is extraordinarily slipshod, replete with chronological confusion, contradiction, and meaningless statements: an effort to follow the development of Lodge's views on Cuba in the years 1893-96 (pp. 222-31) leads only to total bewilderment. The reference to Washington's "admonition against nonentangling alliances" (p. 238) goes the conventional Washington-Jefferson confusion one better. In a book published by Yale and written by two pupils of S. F. Bemis it is distressing to find the assertion, twice repeated, that that distinguished historian referred to the annexation of the Philippines as a great "aberation" [*sic*] (pp. 267-68). And who, we may ask, was "Arthur T. Mahan" (p. 338)?

JAMES A. FIELD JR.
Swarthmore College

Social Scientists and Farm Politics in the Age of Roosevelt *by Richard S. Kirkendall. Columbia, Mo., University of Missouri Press, 1966.—ix, 358 pp. $7.00.*

This detailed study provides the most authoritative and careful analysis of the agricultural sector of the Rooseveltian New Deal that has yet been

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written. It gives a magnificent picture of the part that "social scientists" —especially M. L. Wilson and Howard Tolley—played in bringing about and carrying through the agricultural sector of the New Deal; how they interested farm organizations and political leaders, especially Roosevelt himself, in their proposals; and finally how their continuing activities to plan for agriculture in a changing and expanding world, and to include Southern Negroes in that world, led to their downfall under the attacks of reactionary congressmen representing the Old South and the conservative farm organizations, especially the Farm Bureau Federation, and to the eventual resignation of Tolley from the domestic scene. My only major criticism of the account is that it somewhat underrates the importance of Henry Wallace himself as a social scientist contributing to the economic and political concepts and developments of the period (see my article on Wallace in the November 1966 issue of the *Journal of Farm Economics*).

The book is effectively cross-indexed, with 108 pages of appendix notes easily accessible, 18 pages of bibliographical references, and 9 pages of index. Also, there are two pages of well-selected photographs—of M. L. Wilson and Howard Tolley, and Rexford Tugwell and Henry A. Wallace, as they were in the mid-thirties—the latter looking like youths in the sumptuous setting of the Secretary of Agriculture's office.

For me, reading this book has been like living over again the most dramatic period in my career, experiencing and feeling again detailed events long since forgotten and understanding fully many developments whose causes were unknown to me at the time. It is not often one has a chance to relive the past. All of us who participated in the agricultural New Deal, and all who wish to understand it, owe a debt of gratitude to Kirkendall for this careful, thoughtful, and sympathetic study.

The evolution of ideas for dealing with "agricultural surpluses" among agricultural economists, especially Wilson and Tolley, are developed in detail (though John D. Black's early contributions to the basic ideas seem rather understated, and the annual reports of the ill-fated Federal Farm Board seem to have been overlooked as a source of information). Also, Henry C. Taylor, in the creation of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics in the early nineteen-twenties and the Department of Agriculture's Graduate School, one of the first in-service training institutions, which helped many younger workers to fill out their professional training in evening sessions, and in his bringing to Washington as consultants and advisers in the early twenties established and imaginative men such as M. L. Wilson, John D. Black, and Spillman, helped develop the background for the agricultural New Deal. Tolley, also, in the early twenties, recruited as youngsters many of those later active in the AAA,

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including Tapp, Hutson, Elliott, O. V. Wells, and me, as staff members of his new Division of Farm Management. But these are only minor omissions in a book which is a vivid re-creation of an important period in our history.

MORDECAI EZEKIEL
Agency for International Development

The Politics of Military Unification: A Study of Conflict and the Policy Process *by Demetrios Caraley. New York and London, Columbia University Press, 1966.—xiii, 345 pp. $8.95.*

Mr. Caraley's study of the contention over military unification which resulted in the establishment of the Department of Defense is an accurate and painstaking narrative of the origins of the concept of unification, the nature and activity of alignments of adversary interests centered, respectively, in the War and Navy Departments, and the resolution of the conflict between them. Full recognition is given to the parts played in the conflict by President Truman and the committees and members of Congress, and to the shift and play of minor forces in the shallows bordering the main struggle in the deep.

With admirable clarity, Mr. Caraley's account records the effort made by the Army to center authority in a single chief of staff with virtual control over the military budget, and that of the Navy to maintain the high prestige and status it had achieved by the end of the Second World War. Two subordinate but significant patterns of interest and maneuver were executed by the Army Air Corps in its drive for an independent Air Force and by the Marine Corps in its push for status guaranteed by legislation. Perhaps because it tried for so much, the Army may be said to have lost most in the eventual compromise in which "unification" was achieved by "multiplication" and combination. An independent Air Force was created and statutory status was accorded the Marines. The concept of the single chief of staff was rejected in favor of the collegial Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Office of the Secretary of Defense was brought into being to preside over the military departments, each of which had its own civilian secretary, and a National Security Council was created to bring diplomatic and other considerations into close association with the military in the determination of national security policy.

Mr. Caraley gives attention to various kinds of influence within the Congress and outside it which were either organized to affect a controversy that was basically a split between the Army and the Navy, or

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which intervened to do so, or which in fact did so for institutional or other circumstantial reasons. Thus there is discussion of the personal policy preferences of congressmen, the admiration for and identification with the various military services that some of them felt, the influence of committee chairmen, the part played by individual experts like James W. Wadsworth of New York on subject matters involved in the unification controversy, and the generally weak salience of party affiliation in the settlement of the struggle. The White House, cabinet officials, and other spokesmen for the executive branch were, naturally, vitally active and, beyond officialdom, groups like the Veterans of Foreign Wars were earnest interveners, as were special service organizations like the Navy League and the Air Power League. The National Cooperative Milk Producers' Federation, which seems to have a variety of non-lacteal concerns, favored War Department proposals.

The first eight chapters (244 pages) provide the narrative of the controversy and an analysis of the group and personal elements in play. The last two chapters (45 pages) attempt generalizations based on the exposition that precedes. In Chapter 9 the theme is that the development of political conflict requires adversary actors with a capacity to influence units of government, actors who are convinced that the possible rewards of struggle are worth the foreseeable risks. Political conflict is settled as soon as one of these conditions—actors, capacity to influence, conviction that risk is worthwhile—disappears. These propositions would seem to be clear and sensible and familiar and commonplace. They are useful and are used as organizing categories for illustrative references drawn from the first eight chapters.

In Chapter 10, however, the author strives for a higher synthesis, one that relates his material to a general conception of the nature of political conflict in the policy process. He suggests that there is a "popular notion that conflict in the policy process represents some serious kind of abnormality" (p. xi) and that it is the "predominant view" that conflict "represents a pathology of the normal policy process" (p. 277). It is never clear with whom the notion is popular nor where the view predominates, but it is presumably among academic political scientists. Inferentially (because the text is inexplicit on the point) it seems that it is believed that the normal policy process consists in the effort, by "some analytical problem-solving techniques," to discover "an optimum solution for promoting the 'public interest' " (p. 276).

Mr. Caraley rejects what he calls the "predominant view," asserts that conflict is normal in policy-making, and says that the unification controversy is an illustration of this truth. Some will disagree with Mr. Caraley's version of the "predominant view," but all must concede that

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the story of unification of the military services is a story of conflict, and that he tells it well.

EARL LATHAM
Amherst College

Freedom and Order: A Commentary on the American Political Scene *by Henry Steele Commager. New York, George Braziller, 1966.—xiv, 320 pp. $6.50.*

This collection of essays ranges over diverse aspects of our political and social behavior, but it is unified by a steady and powerfully stated point of view—"the somewhat unfashionable one which used to be called Jeffersonian liberalism. . . ." And, in fact, it is Professor Commager's Jeffersonian faith (that in a free, pragmatic, and tolerant society the truth will prevail and error be cast out), as well as his general approach to the problem of maintaining such a society, rather than his critiques of our myths, lunacies, and virtues, that merits comment.

There are some fine things in this book: among them a brilliant analysis of the strategies the Supreme Court has evolved in defense (usually) of our civil liberties; several devastating essays on our catastrophic misadventure in Vietnam; a series of pieces on academic freedom, the loyalty "mania," the right to dissent, and the like, many of them written, to Professor Commager's great honor, during the McCarthy plague; and sundry exercises in "applied Jeffersonianism"—open-minded and informed analyses of the real consequences of various principles and policies for the continuing health of the open society.

Yet despite its great virtues—its sanity, its learning—*Freedom and Order* is a disturbing book, in large part because at this moment in our history the Jeffersonian faith, which we cannot abandon, finds little to sustain it, and also because Professor Commager's somewhat traditional prescriptions, suitable for a simpler society than ours, underscore by their inadequacy how formidable our problems have become. Despite his "melancholy" about the war in Vietnam, Professor Commager sticks to his faith "that we have the kind of society and government where an aroused and enlightened public opinion may yet save us. . . ." Perhaps he is right, but one can argue that something has happened to our society, and to our political institutions, that warrants some pessimism. Have Americans become so accustomed to expediency (the dark side of our virtuous pragmatism), so devoted to their well-being, so insulated by their prosperity from the great passions that move the rest of the world,

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that they no longer care enough about truth and justice? Has Tocqueville's fear—that democracy might terminate in a subtle and benevolent despotism in which "an immense and tutelary power" would permit great freedom yet manipulate an increasingly passive and satisfied people and slowly accustom them to the sacrifice of principle for expediency—now become a reality? Professor Commager's approach to the problem of how to enlighten the "democracy" in our age—the age of public relations, managed news, and the "administered" society—seems too narrow. To establish real and fair competition of ideas, we must do more than elaborate institutional and legal guarantees of liberty; these, while indispensable, no longer seem enough. The problem now is not so much to insure that the truth can be freely spoken (consider the vast freedom to dissent we now enjoy, in the midst of war), but to insure that it *will* be spoken, that it will not be distorted by our tremendously complex "system" of communications, that the immense power of our government will respond to it, and that the citizens of this democracy will care about it.

ARTHUR D. KALEDIN
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Party Loyalty Among Congressmen: The Difference Between Democrats and Republicans, 1947-1962 *by David R. Mayhew. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1966.—xvi, 189 pp. $4.50.*

The roll-call votes of the House of Representatives, as analyzed in this book, reveal a fascinating picture of the difference between the two congressional parties in the postwar decades. On farm, city, labor, and regional issues, the Democratic party and its leaders tended to support aid to interested districts and to one another; the Republican party position was to oppose aid to these interests, and Republican minorities from districts of these types failed to coalesce. The Republicans were thus multiply divided. Whether this was a lasting difference between the parties or simply a concomitant of the Republicans' normal minority status in Congress since the New Deal can be examined by an extension of Mayhew's research methods to earlier historical periods.

Mayhew shows these differences by analyzing roll-call votes together with constituency data—both census characteristics and the presidential vote. He also adds to our knowledge of constituency relations and regional differences. His methods are in large part those used by Julius

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Turner in *Party and Constituency,* though his interpretation shows advances in consideration of intraparty factions, party policy and leadership, and the motives and interactions of individual congressmen. He extracts considerable information from roll-call votes by using Rice's indexes of cohesion and likeness, and an index of "party loyalty"—the proportion of a legislator's votes agreeing with his party's position, on a set of roll calls chosen by inspection of their content. Nevertheless, it should be possible to improve these indexes. Mayhew properly deplores a detachment of methodological refinement from historical relevance in legislative studies; but perhaps another generation of students will be able to combine mathematics *and* history in some of their dissertations.

A crucial problem in this connection concerns the definition and measurement of "party loyalty." Like Turner, Mayhew risks confounding congressmen's "party loyalty" with their positions on issues. He is really dealing with two different things that need separate names: (1) the different attitudes, ideologies, and positions on issues that congressmen express in their votes for individual reasons—including but not limited to constituency pressures; and (2) the extra (but rarely completely distinct) contribution made to their votes by the fact that they are members of a social group, the legislative party, which has relations to the national party leader when he is president. Only the second, I think, should be called "party loyalty." Mayhew's index of "party loyalty" measures a combination of these things, varying in its "mix" from issue to issue. His use of the index of cohesion, on the other hand, reflects more directly the policies of legislative parties as to what bills should reach the floor and receive support.

In *U.S. Senators and Their World,* Donald Matthews took a useful step toward separating these two ingredients of roll-call voting; his "index of party effort" is a closer approximation to pure "party loyalty." It is the residual, for each legislator, of the *Congressional Quarterly*'s "party unity index" after the predicted (regression) value based on a liberalism-conservatism index is subtracted. Mayhew is aware of this type of difference, because it appears in his residuals of "party loyalty" from regression lines based on district characteristics, but his terminology does not bring it out clearly.

A further methodological point is that Mayhew's types of district interests—farm, city, labor, the West—might not be just the right categories. How do we know, for example, that some region other than the West did not also benefit from coalitions? Or that labor and city districts did not strongly overlap, as did the corresponding party divisions among Southern Democrats? An empirical search procedure, such as computer programs can provide, might assure us more fully of a valid choice of

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categories. For the period studied, Mayhew is probably largely correct; but to further the historical research that he recommends, we should supplement our fallible judgment about the past with modern data-processing techniques.

DUNCAN MACRAE JR.
University of Chicago

The Dynamics of Modernization: A Study in Comparative History *by C. E. Black. New York, Evanston, and London, Harper and Row, 1966.—207 pp. $5.95.*

In this ambitious little book, Professor Black sets out to try to understand the changes taking place throughout the world today by means of comparative study of the stages of political modernization illustrated by the histories of no fewer than 148 states. He has many wise things to say; in particular, he emphasizes the costs of modernization, psychological as well as material, and effectively disposes of the idea that "development" is or ought to be easy and natural because at some future time it holds out the prospect of a higher standard of living.

Nevertheless, the central achievement of the book—a typology of political modernization—is disappointing. By applying five criteria, Professor Black discerns seven patterns of political modernization. His five criteria are whether transfer of rule to modernizing leaders took place (1) early or late, (2) through internal or external challenge, (3) within a single territorial state or not, (4) with or without colonial rule, and (5) with or without a base in developed institutions.

Among all the mathematically conceivable combinations of these five criteria, Black finds only seven actually to exist. The groupings he comes up with sometimes seem obvious: for example, his fourth pattern of modernization applies solely to the republics of Latin America, and his second embraces only the British dominions and the United States. In other cases, his grouping of states seems unhelpful. What, for example, unites Russia, Japan, China, Iran, Turkey, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, and Thailand? Black's answer is that all of them "modernized without direct outside intervention, but under the indirect influence of societies that modernized earlier" (p. 119). I can only comment that what unites them seems far less significant than what distinguishes them from one another. Even the absence of direct outside intervention upon which Black's classification depends is itself a matter of degree and dubiety. Turkish and Chinese bureaucrats of the nineteenth century, laboring against European extra-

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territoriality, with their commercial policies determined largely by foreign diplomatic pressures, and strangled by indebtedness to foreign bankers, can be said to have modernized "without direct outside intervention" only by giving the phrase a narrowly political meaning and by confining the term "intervention" to full-dress exercise of sovereignty by "outsiders."

This, I think, points to the fundamental weak point of Black's whole approach. After his introductory remarks, he turns to comparative politics, deliberately isolating and insulating political from other aspects of modernization, because, he says, "political developments, relatively easily determined, provide the most readily available framework for analysis, comparison, and periodization" (p. 57). Professor Black is, of course, aware of what he is doing, and apologizes handsomely. But, surely, the price of omitting psychological, sociological, economic, and intellectual aspects of modernization is too high to pay. What remains is a shell—regrettably hollow.

WILLIAM H. MCNEILL
University of Chicago

International Aid: A Summary *by Hugh L. Keenleyside. New York, James H. Heineman, 1966.—xiii, 343 pp. $6.50.*

An air of cautious optimism pervades Hugh Keenleyside's book on *International Aid.* Keenleyside, a seasoned scholar and public official, who was the UN's director general of technical assistance for eight years, appreciates the magnitude of economic progress throughout the world. He praises the tremendous growth in the developed nations' sense of international responsibility for the fate of the less developed ones. At the same time, he recognizes that the barest beginning has been made in international aid when the maximum per capita contribution by any country in the middle sixties is a paltry forty cents per person contributed by Denmark. The corresponding U.S. contribution is eleven cents.

The bulk of the book is devoted to describing the various institutions and programs which have channeled international technical aid to the underdeveloped areas of the globe. A chapter on the history of technical aid chronicles private and public efforts during the twentieth century with emphasis on the sizable League of Nations program and major endeavors like the Colombo Plan and the Point IV program.

> For the first time in history, a central mechanism was set up to develop consistent, formalized, inclusive programmes designed to provide for the trans-

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> mission of knowledge from any part of the world in which it existed to any other part in which it was needed . . . the creation of the new machinery moved the knotted problems of the underdeveloped nations for the first time "to the centre of the world stage" (p. 140).

With the refreshing touch of reality, born of long experience with international aid programs and the people involved in them, the author presents a case study of the rise and fall of TAA, the Technical Assistance Administration. He traces the complex chain of political, technical, and human relationships which spell success or disaster for a project but defy expert efforts at advance prognosis and planning. The three concluding chapters provide a blueprint for the future of planning and executing international technical assistance. Each denotes the obligations of one member of the triad on which a successful international program must rest. The recipient countries must curb their excessive population growth and reform their social and political structure to make effective development possible. The donor countries must increase the quantity and quality of their aid, must give preference to international and private programs over national ones, and must divorce economic aid from military assistance. International agencies must improve their methods of administration and coordination to use available aid for maximum economic development. Difficult as these tasks may seem, the author is convinced that they will be accomplished because they are the only alternative to the world's destruction by war.

For the student interested in surveying the institutional arrangements for dispensing international aid, for the technical expert or administrator about to participate in an aid project, and for the general reader who is baffled by the seeming failures of international and national aid programs, this book is a valuable source of information and encouragement. Clearly, simply, and effectively, it shows that a trail has already been blazed for sharing the world's technical knowledge and resources. Success depends on willingness to use it.

DORIS A. GRABER
University of Illinois, Chicago

Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics *edited by Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1966.—227 pp. $6.25.*

This book contains twelve essays written by the two editors as well as by Hedley Bull, D. M. Mackinnon, G. F. Hudson, and Michael Howard.

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The introductory essay is Martin Wight's already published classic, "Why Is There No International Theory?" Two essays deal with the balance of power, others with the nature of international society, natural law, collective security, diplomacy, war, and disarmament. The papers grew out of discussions among a group of British scholars, diplomats, and journalists called the British Committee on the Theory of International Politics, held at Cambridge since 1959.

The common concern of these essays is the theory of international politics. That much they have in common with what is today the main American academic concern with international relations. But here the similarity ends. For these essays are unabashedly and explicitly traditional in their approach. They refrain from trying to force the empirical raw material, which is history in action, into the Procrustean bed of a preconceived abstract theory. They recognize that international politics must be understood in its own terms, that is to say, as the pursuit of national interests through the instruments of national power, and not by reduction to something else, be it law, economics, or some kind of quantifying theory.

As the editors put it:

> The British have probably been more concerned with the historical than the contemporary, with the normative than the scientific, with the philosophical than the methodological, with principles than policy. . . . Their point of view on the whole has been historical. They have tended to suppose that the continuities in international relations are more important than the innovations; that statecraft is an historical deposit of practical wisdom growing very slowly; that the political, diplomatic, legal, and military writers who might loosely be termed "classical" have not been superseded as a result of recent developments in sociology and psychology, and that it is a useful enterprise to explore the corpus of diplomatic and military experience in order to reformulate its lessons in relation to contemporary needs. . . . The underlying aim of the present collection is to clarify the principles of prudence and moral obligation which have held together the international society of states throughout its history, and still hold it together.

The book is an outstanding success. There is only one standard by which the success of such a book can be established: Does it tell us something in a theoretical manner that is worth knowing? This book tells us indeed a great deal about theoretical principles of international politics worth knowing. I wish every student of international politics, and for that matter every teacher, would put the insights into the nature of international politics to be derived from, say, the two contributions of Martin Wight against the theoretical propositions of any number of volumes on behaviorism, systems analysis, game theory, decision-making, and so forth. Such a comparison would not only put the merits of this book in

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the proper light, but it would also provide a healthy corrective for our present academic priorities.

HANS J. MORGENTHAU
University of Chicago

The United Nations: Peace and Progress *by Alf Ross. Totowa, N.J., The Bedminster Press, 1966.—xi, 443 pp. $8.00.*

This book, by the distinguished professor of law at the University of Copenhagen, seeks to provide an understanding of the United Nations "as a *political* phenomenon." In an earlier study, *The Constitution of the United Nations*, published in 1950, the author undertook a legal analysis of the charter. In his latest work, he reviews the structure and legal principles of the charter, and subjects them to thoughtful analysis and criticism in the light of twenty years of experience. But he is more concerned with the nature of the political environment in which the organization has been required to function, the effect of this environment upon its development, and the extent to which its possibilities of achieving its objectives have been limited and are likely to be influenced by political realities of the modern world. In performing the task that he has set for himself, Professor Ross has not been hesitant to state his personal opinions in a clear and forthright manner. The reader of the book is left in no doubt as to where he stands regarding the future of the United Nations, and his conclusions will not give much encouragement to those who see in the organization the means of quickly assuring a peaceful and prosperous world or those who see in it the means of quickly removing conditions of inequality and social injustice. In fact, on this last point, what is perhaps the most striking feature of the book is the small amount of attention that is given to issues which appear to dominate the concern of the numerous new nations today—the elimination of racial discrimination and assistance to them in their economic and social development.

The author's main concern is with the work of the United Nations in the maintenance of peace and security. He views the United Nations as having been initially soundly conceived as an effort to organize peace on the basis of a concert of the great powers, thereby discarding Wilson's "high-flown idea" of collective security. He views the assumption by the General Assembly of an important responsibility in the maintenance of peace and security, overshadowing that of the Security Council, as an unfortunate development, accentuated by the admission to the organization of a large number of new miniscule states. He regards Ham-

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marskjold's development of the political role of the Secretary-General as excessive, and thinks his defense of the concept of the neutrality of the Secretary-General against Khrushchev's attack was not wholly convincing. He concludes that the prospects for political initiative and leadership on the part of the United Nations for the future are not "very bright, unless the major powers can agree to restore to the Security Council the functions assigned to it under the Charter" (p. 408).

Looking to the more distant future, the author views the development of a world authority as dependent upon machinery enjoying a monopoly of force and the existence of a sense of community. These he sees as coming into being only as the result of a long historical step-by-step development which will take the form of creating institutions to meet needs as they arise, with institutions helping to strengthen and develop supporting ideologies. This is essentially a functionalist approach. In the meantime we must continue to try to preserve peace within a system of political balance of power.

One may not agree with all of the author's diagnoses and conclusions, but one must agree that he makes his own thought clear. By emphasizing the importance of the power factor and the need of taking account of the inequalities of states in the work of the United Nations, Professor Ross has done much to put into better perspective our judgments and expectations regarding the organization. The shortcoming of the book is that in stressing the importance of the power factor it undervalues the role of less material influences such as the purposes and principles of the charter and the general consensus developed and expressed in the organization, notable through the discussions of the Assembly. It can well be argued that the development of the United Nations as a dynamic organization will be as much advanced by constructive initiatives of the Secretary-General and the prodding and encouragement of General Assembly debates and resolutions as by the agreement of the major powers.

LELAND M. GOODRICH
Columbia University

The Psychology of Power *by Ronald V. Sampson. New York, Pantheon Books, 1966.—247 pp. $4.95.*

This is an excellent book with a misleading title. Mr. Sampson says, with entire truth, that the basis of systematic political studies is to be found in psychology. Lord Bryce (not quoted) said the same. Two of the out-

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standing pioneer writers who have developed the theme have been Graham Wallas and W. H. R. Rivers. Since the title theme is "power," one recalls that the great psychoanalytical exponent of the rules of power in social affairs was Alfred Adler, to whose views on this issue Freud, in his later years, grew closer. An entire school has been preoccupied with this theme for the last forty years, of which Lord Russell was a comparatively late exponent (and, in the controversial view of Charles Merriam, a plagiarist). It is little less than an effrontery that there is no single reference to these writers in Mr. Sampson's bibliography and index. The notorious but quite incredible parochialism of British studies is here illustrated.

Instead we get a parade of thé names, not patently relevant to the theme, of A. J. Ayer, the dean of logical analysis, Michael Oakeshott, D. H. Lawrence, Kierkegaard, and Sylvia Pankhurst. Dr. Reinhold Niebuhr is acclaimed as "the doyen of political thought in America," a most surprising statement. It may be argued that this criticism is based on a misunderstanding. Mr. Sampson, after an extensive review of Freud, is really more concerned to analyze the role of power by discussing the tensions in the lives of Elizabeth Barrett Browning, Samuel Butler, Dickens, and such figures of literature. This rebuttal would be effective were it not that Mr. Sampson's professional field happens to be politics, in which subject he is lecturer at Bristol University. He leaves himself without escape.

If all this be true, how then (it may be asked) can Mr. Sampson's book be described as "excellent"? It would not be enough that this could be a good doctoral thesis, which the examiners might refer back for further bibliography. It would not be enough that Mr. Sampson is clearly a nice man, fighting on the side of the angels. It is that he says quite a number of things which need to be said, were they put in a less ambitious context. The late Carl Becker of Cornell stated that "all politics is power politics." Mr. Sampson rightly complains of the current lack of exactitude in the use of terms but does not himself trouble precisely to define politics or power or even equality, of which his use is the popular one. However, he is clearly wedded to Acton's misleading dictum (lack of power can also corrupt); identifies power with domination; and rightly—although it is pretty self-evident—finds domination incompatible with the equality which he finds (unlike Marx) to be the touchstone of a good society. What Mr. Sampson does most properly do is to insist that morals (religious or otherwise) cannot, as some may hold that Jefferson and the U.S. Constitution wrongly supposed, be divorced from politics. He argues this with decisive force. He attacks a once fashionable moral relativism as poisonous. He shows the deplorable effects on society of exclusive thinking in the ambitious "success" terms of "over or under." He criti-

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cizes the state as the final social institution, which yet (as said Gregory VII) rests on the principle of violence.

His contention that what he calls "power," more precisely defined, is incompatible with an equalitarian social justice seems to me less successful. The principle of charity or "love" enjoins fraternity. But Mr. Sampson out-levels what we know of the Levellers. "Equality" may mean the abolition of monarchy. But does it mean a functionless society? Are all born equal (Jefferson added, "and independent") in mathematical or musical gifts? Are the functions of an Einstein and a bootblack of equal importance to civilization? How far are a Spartan equality and excellence compatible? The answers given are pious, enthusiastic but unconvincing. The real discussion has still to begin—perchance by some holder of the Order of the Red Banner or member of the Soviet "Vanguard," which certainly does not accept "the bourgeois idealism" of equality. However, Mr. M. G. Runciman makes a challenging start when he begins his *Relative Deprivation and Social Justice* with the words "all societies are inegalitarian."

GEORGE E. G. CATLIN
London, England

Power and Privilege: A Theory of Social Stratification *by Gerhard E. Lenski. London, Toronto, and New York, McGraw-Hill, 1966. —xiv, 495 pp. $8.50.*

There is reason to be cautious with a theory that purports to synthesize severe theoretical differences and bring them together within a single framework, as Lenski has set out to do in his book. The reason is that the synthesizer either must find a common denominator that levels off the peaks of difference or he must prune and reshape elements from opposing theories in order to make them compatible. Lenski does some of both, although his effort is neither naive nor mechanical.

He begins by pruning the two groups of stratification theories he has identified as the conservative or functional on the one side, and the radical or conflictual on the other, reducing them to sets of primitive postulates about the nature of man, society, and inequality. In these elemental forms, the postulates from opposing theories can be made to fit together because the remaining consequences of each theory have been left out to satisfy the search for common denominators. Hence, the conservative theory's pessimistic view of man's nature as self-seeking can be joined to the radical theory's view of society as a structure of conflict and struggle.

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Lenski then develops additional propositions concerning what he calls "distributive systems," which in turn determine the setting for power, privilege, and prestige; in short, the nature of the stratification system. The two key propositions in this sequence are based upon the survival thesis: (1) men share the products of their labors and cooperate to insure survival; and (2) the surplus produced beyond the minimum is controlled by those who are in power. "Privilege" and "prestige" are functions of power, at least in those societies where there is a substantial surplus. Given these postulates, Lenski arrays and describes five types of societies on the basis of their presumed surplus: hunting and gathering, simple horticultural, advanced horticultural, agrarian, and industrial.

Lenski has not convinced me that his journey back to the so-called basic elements of man, society, and survival has yielded any better explanation of stratification than what we have. At best, his is a possible explanation but by no means an unavoidable one. For one thing, his observations about power in industrial society, say, are not necessary deductions from his primitive postulates; they could have been reached via any number of other theoretical paths. For example, he concludes that there is a "decline in political and economic inequality associated with the emergence of industrial societies," in part because technological complexity forces those in power to be dependent upon subordinates. Not only can this conclusion be reached by straightforward functional theory, but the same reasoning can be equally used to contend that inequality will increase, not decrease, under those conditions.

Another reason to be cautious about this return to essentials is that some of Lenski's conclusions push us even further backward in understanding stratification. For example, his framework makes a shambles of the concept of class, which is at once the core and the dilemma of most theories. Since a class is "an aggregation of persons... [with similar positions regarding] power, privilege, or prestige," it covers *all* dimensions of social stratification. The result is a large number of "classes" that are barely distinguishable one from the other; in the United States an individual could belong to "half a dozen" power classes, more or less.

Perhaps a synthesis of opposing theories is inevitable, as Lenski contends. However, if that is so then it is necessary first to specify the differences between the levels of analysis that the several theories now pursue. The "conservatives" and the "radicals" are not yet in the same house, let alone ready to get into the same bed.

LEONARD REISSMAN
Tulane University

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New Perspectives of Brazil *edited by Eric N. Baklanoff. Nashville, Vanderbilt University Press, 1966.—xvi, 328 pp. $7.50.*

By most standards this volume is a mediocre collection of scholarly papers. That it must be welcomed as a significant contribution to the understanding of Brazil in the United States is a sad commentary on the sparse nature of the English-language social science literature dealing with this sub-continent of ambivalences and ambiguities. Less perceptive and cohesive than Charles Wagley's *An Introduction to Brazil* (1963), its generally conservative orientation is not as glaringly apparent as the distortions introduced by Irving Louis Horowitz' leftist bias in his *Revolution in Brazil* (1964). Since Wagley deals only briefly with economic and political factors, this collection of essays is important to those seeking a background on Brazilian affairs.

Editor Baklanoff's contribution has been a minimal one, and he thus bears major responsibility for the volume's shortcomings. His introduction strives to impose a unity which the contributions lack and misstates the scope of the volume by asserting that they contain interim assessments of the Castelo Branco regime when in fact most chapters have cut off at mid-1964, a bare three months after the revolution. Baklanoff's own chapter on "Foreign Private Investment and Industrialization in Brazil" is distinguished chiefly by its length, and his postscript in lieu of conclusions more closely approximates a weak afterthought than a reasoned attempt to answer the question it poses: Whither Brazil? John W. F. Dulles' historical treatment of Brazil in the postwar period can best be termed a major disappointment. From a professional point of view its faults emerge clearly through comparison with Rollie E. Poppino's chapter on post-Vargas Brazil included in the recently published translation of José Maria Bello's *Historia da República* (1966). Large portions of the Dulles work are pitched at the high school or women's club level. Moreover, imprecise and ambiguous generalizations alternate with marginally relevant detail in this uneven description of events, based all too often on not only secondary, but second-rate sources.

Several of the contributions stand well above the general level of the book, particularly Werner Baer's essay on "Socio-economic Imbalances in Brazil" and Juarez R. Brandão Lopes' paper treating "Some Basic Developments in Brazilian Politics and Society." The study of Brazilian foreign policy by Vladimir Reisky de Dubnic and Emilio Willems' article on "Religious Mass Movements and Social Change in Brazil" also contain interesting interpretations. But the analytic chapters by Baer, Lopes, and Reisky together take up less space than Dulles' superficial narrative. Demographic trends, so important to an understanding of Brazil's develop-

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mental problems, are treated adequately, if somewhat narrowly, by Roland E. Chardon, while John F. Santos explores with moderate success some aspects of national character and interpersonal behavior in his "A Psychologist Reflects on Brazil and Brazilians." Less well integrated into the volume are a study by Armin K. Ludwig on "The Planning and Creation of Brasilia" and Earl Thomas' paper dealing with "Emerging Patterns of the Brazilian Language." The former helps explain the rationality as well as rationale behind the construction of Brazil's new capital, which has often been written off in the United States as the product of ex-President Kubitschek's mania for monument building. The latter provides a useful briefing on the basic features of the language for the would-be student or prospective visitor to Brazil.

RONALD M. SCHNEIDER
Columbia University

Colonialism and Christian Missions *by Stephen Neill. New York, Toronto, and London, McGraw-Hill, 1966.—445 pp. $7.95.*

Bishop Neill has laudably attempted to analyze the often contradictory role of Christian missions in the history of colonialism. In chapters on early Hispanic America, India, China, Indonesia, the Pacific, Japanese colonialism, and Africa (by far the longest), he surveys both the impact of colonial rule on indigenous peoples and the different responses of the missionary church to this profound challenge. A few lone voices condemned colonialism in all its forms, writes Bishop Neill, and some at the other extreme positively encouraged its propagation. But most missionaries, he believes, were men who wanted to do good by their "flock," but who in many cases either knew not how, were too timid, or truly felt that their parishioners would benefit by subordination for a time to Europeans and an exposure to Western ways.

There were a number of great individuals who spoke out vigorously in opposition to the actions of their own governments vis-à-vis non Europeans. "Where the Amerindian or the Negro had a friend," writes Bishop Neill, "in almost every case that friend was a churchman." Bartolome dé Las Casas in Hispaniola, Charles Freer Andrews in India, and John Philip, John Mackenzie, David Clement Scott, John Fell, J. W. Arthur, and Joseph H. Oldham—all of whom immediately come to mind in connection with Africa—were men of this stamp. But it is still difficult to avoid the conclusion that these men were exceptions among a host of less visionary servants of the missionary idea. Although it can

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certainly be said that missionaries were usually actuated throughout by the welfare of the peoples whom they had come to serve, they nevertheless (as Bishop Neill says) "kept silent when they should have spoken" and "sometimes spoke when it would have been more prudent to keep silent." In Indonesia the church was compromised by its direct alliance with the Dutch colonial government. Everywhere, particularly during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, there was a reluctance to share responsibilities with the indigenous Christians. In India "many of the most promising in the younger generation of Christians were lost to the Church . . . and found careers in other walks of life which would offer to them that independence of action which the missionaries seemed determined to deny to them for ever and a day." In Africa, disgruntled catechumens and trained evangelists often began their own separatist churches in order to express a deeply felt dissatisfaction with the leadership of missionaries. In most areas missionaries abhorred the rise of nationalism because of its presumed threat to their own way of life. In India, where Bishop Neill served before he joined the World Council of Churches, missionaries tended to regard every agitator as "an enemy of the Gospel, and any progress towards Indian independence as regress into a state in which the very existence of the Christian church might be menaced." They were, in sum, almost always and everywhere shortsighted.

Bishop Neill relies almost wholly upon standard sources, some of which have led him into error. His summaries of the impact of colonialism are, therefore, not always correct in detail. These deficiencies are most glaring with respect to Africa. He has greatly overemphasized the historic importance of the Arab-initiated slave trade; he wrongly assumes that it approached the intensity of the branch of the same trade which was carried in European-owned ships. He misunderstands the nature of the scramble for Africa and especially misconstrues the motives for British, French, and German expansion. He omits any discussion of schismatic churches and their reactions to missionary colonialism. Bishop Neill also makes the surprising assertion that nothing will be gained by questioning the sincerity of missionaries during the heyday of imperialism. Even if they are acquitted of any charges, the question must be raised in the otherwise free and generous spirit of inquiry of the bulk of this rewarding book.

ROBERT I. ROTBERG
Harvard University

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The Transformation of East Africa *edited by Stanley Diamond and Fred G. Burke. New York and London, Basic Books, 1966.—ix, 623 pp. $16.50.*

Except for Mozambique, still precariously held by Portugal, and Ethiopia, which (apart from Italy's brief occupation in the nineteen-thirties) was never colonized by a European power, all of the eight East African countries discussed in this book have won independence from colonial rule during the past dozen years or so. Accordingly, nearly all of the sixteen essays presented here are about colonialism, or some aspect of it, and its aftermath. They were originally prepared for a seminar on "problems of nation-building in East Africa," and at least half of the contributors are or have been associated with Syracuse University, where the seminar was held. It may be said right away that some of the essays are of a high standard, and that the book will be useful to all students of modern Africa.

But, that said, a major criticism must be made. The sixteen essays which make up the volume reflect a wide range of topics, approaches, and viewpoints. If the editors had provided a reasonably full introduction (or conclusion) relating the various themes discussed, and assessing the combined significance of the several lines of research here brought under one cover, the book would have been a good deal more useful than it is. Professor Diamond's short introductory chapter makes no attempt to do this. Though he has some shrewd things to say, he devotes most of the limited space he has allowed himself to a somewhat naive typology of traditional African polities, a discussion of one or two of them, and a few pious (though no doubt valid) platitudes on Africa's future.

The book has three parts. The first consists of the Introduction and two other essays (the second of which really belongs in Part III), the second contains more detailed accounts of political development in eight East African countries, and the third comprises six essays on specific regional topics. In the second chapter Professor George J. Moutafakis usefully summarizes the colonial records of Portugal, France, and Britain, and shows that, different though these were, all were fundamentally exploitative and shared (though not in quite the same degree) one common character, "the use of forced labor for private enterprise and public works." Chapter 3 is a long and careful analysis by Elizabeth Hopkins of the role of racial minorities in British East Africa. Naturally she is mostly concerned with European-African relations, and she amply demonstrates that where large European vested interests existed, as in Kenya, these profoundly influenced administrative policy. She says a good deal about the "stand-offishness" of British officials in all three East African territories,

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but at least in the nineteen-forties attempts by some young government officials "to extend multiracial cordiality" were rather more frequent than she thinks.

Part II begins with a competent essay by Professor Marvin Harris on Mozambique, effectively castigating Portuguese policy in that unhappy country and the "rococo opacity of mind" with which the authorities sustain their anachronistic system of government. In the next chapter the co-editor, Professor Fred Burke, gives quite a fair account of political evolution in Kenya, though his essay contains some minor but tiresome spelling mistakes (Batio should read Babito; Kapengeusia should read Kapenguria). Chapter 6 very competently analyzes political development in Tanganyika; Professor William H. Friedland interestingly shows how this development took place outside, not within, the framework of the native authority system, hopefully constructed by Sir Donald Cameron as a model of indirect rule and sustained throughout the period of British administration.

Professor George W. Shepherd's account of "Modernization in Uganda" (Chapter 7) is an altogether more superficial affair, showing limited understanding of the processes he describes and containing several errors (the Bataka did not provide "the rulers and future *kabakas*," and the Lost Counties dispute concerned Bunyoro, not Busoga) and misspellings. This author's ideas about the role of Buganda and its king in the new Uganda have been sadly falsified by events, though, of course, he could not have anticipated this. In Chapter 8 Professor Robert I. Rotberg gives a brief and somewhat cursory account of the emergence of modern Malawi and Zambia, in which the familiar theme of exploitation recurs. Chapter 9, by Professor Robert O. Collins, is a scholarly study of the history of British administration in the Sudan and, in particular, of that administration's well-intentioned but in the end disastrous policy of anglicizing and Christianizing the southern Sudan before handing it over, without adequate safeguards, to the far from tender mercies of the Islamic north. This is an excellent essay, and would be judged to be so even if the author had not seen fit, in a concluding note, to tell us how erudite and intelligent he is.

Ethiopia is indeed "a special case," as Francis A. J. Ianni tells us in Chapter 10. Indeed Mr. Ianni is odd man out among his fellow-contributors, for he thinks that colonialism is not after all such a bad thing, and he argues that Ethiopia's present political backwardness is due to its never having experienced it. He has a point, but your reviewer at least would have got more from his brief but perceptive essay if he had devoted less space to colonialism and more to what actually goes on in Ethiopia.

In Part III we move on to consider some special topics. First, Gordon

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M. Wilson tells us how he designed questionnaires and carried out surveys with the aim of identifying an East African elite and eliciting its political (and other) values and attitudes. This is a worthwhile though still (as the author says) uncompleted task, and it is useful to have an interim report on it. In Chapter 12 Professor A. W. Southall, an expert on urbanization in East Africa, conscientiously but a little amorphously discusses the growth and character of urban society in the three East African territories. Professor Carol Fisher perceptively considers some of the results of imposing a British-type educational system on traditional African societies; these included increased differentiation between race and race, between religion and religion, and, especially, between an educated elite and the uneducated masses. But imperfect though the system was, it at least educated enough people to make a peaceful transition from European to African rule, at very short notice, a practical possibility.

In Chapter 14 Professor Charles E. Fuller discusses, mainly in the context of Portuguese influence in southeast Africa, what he takes to be the nature of African religion and the results of the imposition upon it of Christianity. He rightly concludes that what emerges is almost always some form of syncretism, but he would have understood traditional African religious beliefs better if instead of examining "the earliest records available" he had taken a look at some recent intensive field studies by social anthropologists of African religions in action. Chapter 15, by K.G.V. Krishna, very competently reviews the contemporary economic scene in East Africa and comes up with some sound practical recommendations for planning in that area. Lastly, in a neat paper, Anthony H. Rweyemamu and Brack E.S. Brown describe the development of the idea of a federated East Africa, strongly supported by Tanzania in the first years of independence, and its gradual abandonment owing to Uganda's, and later Kenya's, reluctance.

There is, then, evidently no lack of variety in the topics considered in this symposium, but insofar as a common theme can be said to run through most of them, it is the decline and fall of colonialism in East Africa. In most of the territories discussed, similar patterns recur again and again. First there is exploitation, however disguised; few Europeans went to Africa for their health, though the motives of the early empire builders and their successors were often mixed and not always discreditable. Inevitably economic exploitation involved more or less discrimination, expressed formally through the differential provision of educational and economic opportunity and informally through derogatory stereotypes of "the native," the color bar, and so on. Eventually protest movements began, becoming increasingly articulate as the slow pace of African education increased; where, as sometimes happened, the ineffectiveness

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of such protest led to violence, this was ruthlessly suppressed. And finally, at least in the British-administered territories, it came to be recognized that change was inevitable, and the transfer of power was hurriedly prepared for and effected.

It is right that the cruelties, injustices, and hypocrisies of colonialism should be understood, and this book expounds them fairly. No European powers have much reason to look back on their African record with complacency. But it is worth remembering that over a wide range of social and public services the colonial legacy had its positive side. When the British left (and most of the essays in the volume under review are about ex-British territories) they did not, like some ex-colonial powers, leave behind them political chaos; instead they left a group of states led by men, most of them educated in mission schools, who may be judged not to have coped too badly with the formidable problems of independence. As some of the contributors to this book recognize, colonialism is a complex phenomenon, and there are entries to be made on the credit as well as on the debit side. Anyway, in the conditions of nineteenth-century Europe and the "opening up" of Africa there were no practical alternatives to it. The question was not whether the continent should be exploited by European powers; that was inevitable. It was, rather, how, and by which powers? And such evidence as there is does not suggest that East Africa's lot would be any happier today if, at the end of the last century, Britain had opted out of the scramble for Africa.

JOHN BEATTIE
Oxford University

The First Industrial Revolution *by Phyllis Deane. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1965.—viii, 295 pp. $8.00.*

Phyllis Deane is well known for her work on the quantitative aspects of British economic growth. She also teaches economic history at Cambridge University, and in this book presents us with the published version of her course lecture notes on the Industrial Revolution in Great Britain. The result is a very good textbook for undergraduates. Although Miss Deane lacks the elegance of Ashton and the passion of Mantoux, her book has its own valuable features when compared to these classic works. First of all, the presentation is extremely well balanced, clear, and judicious. The standard subjects are all dealt with (sometimes in insufficient detail as in the case of cotton-textile technology), the major controversies are

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fairly described, and the final judgments are generally rather neutral—all desirable qualities in a text. In the second place, and this is one of Miss Deane's strongest points, the book is written in a language familiar and congenial to economists concerned with modern economic growth. Her discussion of Britain's Industrial Revolution uses concepts like national income, growth rates, capital formation proportions, labor supply, and the like. These concepts are always fully explained—it seemed to me that at times the discussion was almost too elementary—and they help render the presentation of a much-studied subject fresh and timely. Lastly, Miss Deane's book has the considerable advantage of being up to date, and it incorporates many historical revisions of the past twenty-five years. Ashton and Mantoux are especially persuasive on points where they have recently been found to be in error—for example, on the role of the rate of interest and enclosures—and it is therefore valuable to have available a "correct" version for the classroom. No doubt this version also will need replacement in a few decades.

The First Industrial Revolution concerns Great Britain from 1750 to 1850. It begins with chapters on four "revolutions": demographic, agricultural, commercial, and transport. This is followed by chapters on major industries (cotton and iron) and technological innovation. The last half of the book examines the role of selected strategic factors: labor, capital, banks, government, foreign trade policy, and cyclical fluctuations. There is also a chapter on the changing standard of living. It is all there, and perhaps it is a pity that there emerges no real theory concerning Britain's growth pattern. The result would have been more one-sided, but the beginner might retain more for future use.

So much for the student clientele. Is there anything here for the professional economic historian? No new research results are contained in this book, and that is perfectly understandable. But the economic historian will find—here and there—valuable *obiter dicta*. To take just one example, in discussing regions in eighteenth-century Britain, Miss Deane says: "The effect of these regional variations in economic conditions is that statistics relating to a particular area may give no indication of the comparable movements for the nation as a whole and that the national aggregate may obscure the trends for regions in which the significant changes are taking place" (pp. 17-18). How simple, how true, and how often misunderstood, especially by historians! Finally, I wonder how many other economic historians will share my reaction concerning two other characteristics of this volume. Why is Miss Deane so concerned with what Rostow has had to say about British growth? Other and equally qualified experts receive far less attention. And why is there such a conscious effort to suppress systematic presentation of quantitative in-

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formation? Many of the chapters would have been strengthened by the addition of tables.

HENRY ROSOVSKY
Harvard University

A Decade of the Commonwealth, 1955-1964 *edited by W. B. Hamilton, Kenneth Robinson, and C. D. W. Goodwin. Durham, Duke University Press for the Duke University Commonwealth-Studies Center, 1966.—xx, 567 pp. $12.50.*

This volume represents a sort of celebration of the first ten years of the activities of the Commonwealth-Studies Center of Duke University. The authors of the book's twenty-four papers are mostly members of the Duke staff or other scholars who have lectured at Duke during the last decade. The papers were actually given at a conference in the summer of 1964 which was held in Bellagio, Italy, and which was organized jointly by the Duke Center and by the University of London Institute of Commonwealth-Studies. The authors come from seven Commonwealth countries and from the United States.

The decade covered in the book has been a period in which the winds of change have been blowing with great force. It begins with the traumatic experience of Suez and ends with the Rhodesian crisis which has become worse since these papers were written. It begins with the Commonwealth functioning primarily as a cozy club of white member-states who have common parliamentary traditions. It ends with a new association of more than twenty members who make up a cross-section of the modern world, an association that becomes more and more like the United Nations, except that all its members have emerged out of the nineteenth-century British empire. There are deep divisions between the haves and the have-nots, between the white and the colored communities, between those who are committed to the anti-Communist alliance in NATO or SEATO and those who are nonaligned.

Most important change of all, the Commonwealth is now an association in which Britain, the traditional leader, no longer has the power nor the wealth nor the dynamic energy to make her the unquestioned leader. The new Commonwealth secretariat, an institution against which Canada fought for years in the era of Laurier and King, has a Canadian in charge of it; and it was set up because of the enthusiasm of the new Asian and African states for the idea. In the old days, when Commonwealth get-togethers were sentimental old-boys' reunions, the British were keen for

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a secretariat which they would of course dominate. The virtue of the present secretariat, in the eyes of those who were keen for it, is that it is an instrument to ensure that the British will no longer be in control of policy-making. They are embarking on an experiment in "participatory democracy" in which their share in decision-making will be the controlling one, since they make up the majority.

Has such an association a future? The contributors to this volume seem to agree that it has. Their chapters are mostly devoted to explaining and discussing the great variety of activities that now go on under Commonwealth auspices. "If the Commonwealth did not exist you could not invent it." But, as Professor Hamilton puts it, the new Commonwealth can just as well be the beginning of something as the end of something. In terms of political institutions, Professor Morris-Jones asks, Is there not more in common between two new states, one of which is a Commonwealth member and the other not, than between two Commonwealth states, one of which is a new state and the other not? But the answer seems to be that what makes a going concern out of this strange new association is the fact that a more realistic admission of the limits of the association is accompanied by a more positive action within those limits.

Altogether this collection of essays on all aspects of the Commonwealth is a very impressive performance. Perhaps one of the most remarkable features in the history of the Commonwealth during the past decade has been the growth of this Commonwealth-Studies Center in the Southern United States.

FRANK H. UNDERHILL
Ottawa, Canada

The Enlightenment: An Interpretation—The Rise of Modern Paganism *by Peter Gay. New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1966.—xviii, 555, xv pp. $8.95.*

This is an exuberant account of the anti-religious polemics of the eighteenth-century philosophes. Mr. Gay's bellicose heroes are Voltaire, Diderot, Gibbon, and Hume, but although other members of the "family" serve only illustrative purposes, all play their part in this excellent collective portrait. For all shared an enthusiasm for "classicism and science," as well as such less precise attitudes as moral realism, disenchantment, libertinism, eclecticism, and a generally critical outlook, especially toward "mythopoeic" tendencies. Of science we hear almost nothing here. Classicism, or neo-paganism, was apparently *the* family passion. Not that Mr. Gay ignores differences. He notes Hume's distaste for the intolerant

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spite of the French philosophes and Gibbon's disdain for their frivolous view of scholarship. Nevertheless, the family likeness is made to stick out like the Hapsburg chin, because it is there; shared hatred of Christianity created a wide range of common preoccupations and attitudes. And presently this generated so pervasive a spiritual climate that even the clergy succumbed to its lure, as Mr. Gay shows.

There are difficulties, to be sure. Was the intensity of pagan sentiment a sign of intellectual security? One might well argue that Hobbes and Locke could afford to forget antiquity because they were already fully liberated from the immediate past. When Hume had shaken off the shadow of the kirk he could see the "unnatural" violence of pagan politics. Again, the mature Montesquieu (whom together with Kant Mr. Gay treats superficially) could give up his dream of Rome in favor of a reasoned acceptance of "Europe." And a totally new form of Hellenism came to haunt the German romantics in their dismal season. Certainly this was no sign of classical serenity. Indeed, Mr. Gay is perfectly aware of the layers of anxiety under all that wit, but he does not develop his insights. Why, after all, did everyone panic over Rousseau? Surely not just because his occasional solitudes suggested Christian eremitism. Had he not woundingly noted that the philosophes were not healthy pagans at all, but merely another sect bent upon replacing the Jesuits? And he was right. Ex- and anti-Christians are not pagans. What exactly, then, was their relationship to antiquity? Did the "strategy of affinity" require more than using their schoolboy lessons as weapons against their old Jesuit teachers? Certainly no philosophe could hold a candle to Vico or Bentley, their contemporaries, in originality or profundity of classical learning. Mr. Gay, perhaps prudently, never even names the former and mentions the latter only in passing. Yet he begins by claiming a deep and sound classism for this aggressive "family," even though at the end he abandons these pretensions. This uncertainty is, in fact, part of his inability to decide whether the philosophes expressed new "modern," or merely revived, forms of thought. Does it really matter? Unfortunately, Mr. Gay thinks the issue vital, for in his efforts to place his "family" intellectually and historically he comes to grief. He is right in reminding us of the discontinuities and novelties within the evolution of European intellectual history, but surely we need not be confused in confronting incoherence. Thus, in order first to show the philosophes' closeness to Augustan Rome and then their unique modernity, he provides endless, derivative, and unnecessary thumbnail sketches of virtually every significant intellectual figure since Plato. Occasionally these seem to suggest a theory of recurrent enlightenments against the prevalent mythopoeic mentality. At other times it appears that rationality is the European norm

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which was merely interrupted by a millennium of Christian "transvaluation of all values." Neither theory is seriously presented and neither justifies all those pages of potted history.

The bibliography, although ample, is too arch, too personal, and too chaotic to be useful. All these faults are especially aggravating because without them this would have been a splendid book and a great contribution to the living spirit of the Enlightenment.

JUDITH N. SHKLAR
Harvard University

Parades & Politics at Vichy: The French Officer Corps Under Marshall Pétain *by Robert O. Paxton. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1966.—xi, 472 pp. $9.00.*

Robert O. Paxton's admirably stylish and fair-minded study of the Vichy armistice army appears most opportunely. The current Gaullist "pause" in French politics, whatever its disadvantages, creates an environment for less partisan viewings of the past. Time, too, has wrought its own effect on our judgment. And it is possible today, if not tomorrow, to speak of the French Army—at least this one, with its képis, oak leaves, and sabers—in the aorist tense. In happy conjuncture with these circumstances an important *tranche de vie militaire* has found a historian who could combine scholarship, nuance, dispassion, and sympathy in persuasive harmonies.

The spectacle of the army of a great power (reported by German intelligence until virtually the eve of the debacle as the most formidable in Europe) rapidly vanquished and disarmed, morally and tactically, in the midst of a general war in whose laurels it, transmogrified, will miraculously come to share almost strains the credit of memory and history. Its analogue is, of course, in the Prussia of Stein and Scharnhorst, a souvenir not lost on the Reichswehr commanders who wanted a more stringent reckoning with beaten France than Hitler was politically willing to undertake. Yet, even here, the cases diverge. For in 1940, by dint of a man who placed himself "hors de toutes les séries," there are two Frances —those of June 18 and of June 25—and, by dint of geography, there is a colonial empire, used by the one France (together with its navy) as a critical bargaining tool and by the other as an indispensable attribute of its legitimacy. These facts would not only settle the fate of the post-armistice army but would shape its political reflexes for many bitter years to

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come. Doing full justice to the multiple tensions of tradition, authority, and class consciousness that informed the events, Paxton exposes the backstage and tiring house where politics prepared the dramatic "Franco-French confrontation" of November 1942.

This review can only begin to suggest the interwoven plot of military Vichy: the masochism, the blame-shifting, the pronounced Anglophobia (curiously salted with pro-Americanism), the pained grasping for a *rapprochement armée-nation* through educational channels temporarily denied to the lycean Left, the many-sided diplomacy, the *attente*, the frequent deeds of honor, the abstract casuistry, the infighting, the general ineptitude for subversion, the resistance to polarization and total-war politics. Rarely does the author drop a stitch in this tapestry, which he has stretched over a frame containing the vital dimensions of the past. Moreover, his creativity absorbs the solid, never obtrusive guidance of wide research in primary documents and participant interviews.

Here are some points that stand out in this reviewer's mind: Paxton's excellent treatment of the "Free France" phenomenon from the perspective of the professional military psychology; his coverage of Darlan's *petite guerre* waged against the ground generals; his shrewd observation that, if intensely hostile, de Gaulle and the Pétainists shared many reflexes toward their difficult environment; his demonstration of the continuity not only with the past but with the future, best shown perhaps in the career of de Lattre. Indeed, there are very many insights which, in Paxton's hands, qualify as explanations. My own minor reticences are these: Would slightly more selective biography—for example, one always remembers that de Gaulle's very Catholic father was also a Dreyfusard—have been fruitful? Does the author quite do justice to the admittedly malnourished Resistance impulse among these officers? General Huntziger's double game was dangerous and not pointless; quite a number of regulars fell with General Delestraint. Do the precious German documents (which I have not examined) reveal a certain amount of intra-Nazi bickering over Vichy that affects objectivity? Do we not see too little of the Army of Africa and of Weygand? Is there quite enough emphasis on the irony of being in a certain place at a certain time? *Vide* the tragedy of General Dentz.

In sum, the reader must be boldly struck by the caliber of contributions Paxton has made not only to his chosen area (now his fief) but to our grasp of French military tradition and especially to our understanding of the French Army of decolonization, whose officers, for a second time, were ground up in the alternance of Marianne and de Gaulle. This superb book will be an essential piece to any future French Army puzzle. One must also compliment the photographs: in an age where the word, pos-

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sibly soon to be replaced by the digit, usurps our sense of the true, these pictorial evocations of a *temps perdu* seem especially meaningful.

GEORGE ARMSTRONG KELLY
Harvard University

Army, Industry, and Labor in Germany, 1914-1918 *by Gerald D. Feldman. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1966.—xvi, 572 pp. $12.50.*

The book under review takes the Hindenburg Program of 1916 as the event dividing the war economy into two periods. In the first phase, conservative militarists tried to select an economic policy according to objective military goals, but got thereby involved in an interest conflict with heavy industry. In the second phase, radical militarists pursued an ill-conceived total mobilization for the attainment of irrational goals. "Ludendorff undermined the strength of the army, promoted economic instability, created administrative chaos, and set loose an orgy of interest politics" (p. 150).

Impressed by the opportunity to promote private interests in wartime, the author believes that there was "an alliance between certain elements of the army and the leaders of heavy industry" as well as "an alliance between important elements of the army and the leaders of organized labor throughout the war" (p. viii). How far does the evidence presented substantiate this dual thesis?

In regard to labor, increased demand for laborers raised wages and shifted the interest conflict to labor turnover. Employers suggested to the state a new form of interest collaboration; firms would accept war contracts if the state would prevent the turnover of workers. In contrast, unions demanded conciliation agencies or war boards which would grant the right to leave a job under certain conditions. After some hesitation, the War Ministry decided against compulsion because it would lead to strikes, while war boards and a rise in the lowest wage rates would increase productivity. The result was an interest parallelism, not an alliance, since War Ministry and unions supported the war boards for quite different reasons.

In regard to business, the Hindenburg Program is supposed to be the main evidence for an alliance. Actually, the huge munitions program was proposed on the basis of merely military calculations irrespective of cost. This indifference to cost provided the basis for an implicit alliance: pro-

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ducers will be permitted to raise their prices and profits if they increase their production of war materials. The alliance did not need to be extended to war goals, since the radical militarists and steel industrialists had—for different intentions—arrived at the same policy of extensive annexation. Both groups belonged ideologically to the same war party. Nor could the alliance be applied to the supply of laborers, since Ludendorff failed in his promise to provide sufficient workers compulsorily. By letting the government work out the auxiliary service bill and in insisting that the *Reichstag* promulgate the bill into law, Ludendorff had unwittingly given the unions an opportunity to get certain concessions from the government, thereby reducing the managerial prerogative of employers. Yet to call the auxiliary service law a "Triumph of Labor" (Chap. IV) is certainly an overstatement.

The main accomplishment of the author is to show successfully that public and private interests were realized simultaneously, that the former will be accepted provided the latter are also recognized. My objection to his interpretation of the facts is limited to his attempt to permit only one interrelationship between military and economic interests, the alliance. The other interest configurations or the intricate relationship between interests and ideologies are not properly investigated. Of course, the political sociology of Max Weber would have been very helpful to do justice to these neglected problems.

ARTHUR SCHWEITZER
Indiana University

The Germans and Their Modern History *by Fritz Ernst, translated from the German by Charles M. Prugh. New York and London, Columbia University Press, 1966.—xiii, 164 pp. $4.50.*

German historical scholarship suffered a grievous loss in December 1963 when Professor Fritz Ernst of Heidelberg University died at the age of only 58. He was known in the United States through his visiting professorship at the University of Wisconsin in 1955 and as the author of perspicacious criticism in his own journal, the highly respected *Die Welt als Geschichte*, of American works dealing with the most recent period of German history. His immaculate scholarship, strong liberal convictions, personal charm, and elegant style of presenting his views and in representing his university as rector (1961-63), had made him an outstanding figure among the West German historians. His public lectures during the winter of 1961-62, published in 1963 under the title *Die Deutschen*

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und ihre Geschichte, with the telling subtitle (omitted in the English edition) *Beobachtungen und Bemerkungen zum deutschen Schicksal der letzten fünfzig Jahre (1911-1961)*, became an immediate hit with his audience and, after publication, with the German public. The personal engagement, the frankness and courage in expressing uncommon or even unpopular views without hesitation, but always with a modesty and moderation inspired by a deep sense of objectivity and responsibility, revealed the first-class scholar as a first-class popularizer. He did not shrink from coming to grips with such controversial and divisive issues of German public opinion as the war guilt questions (of both world wars), the theory of the 1918 "stab in the back," reparations, the factors which contributed to the rise of Hitler, German Nazification and de-Nazification, and the like. The lectures were a highly personal, frank testimony of a man of greatest moral integrity who had traveled widely abroad, was familiar with foreign judgments and prejudices about the Germans and their history, and knew how to evaluate foreign opinions, counter errors, and dispel legends. Before expressing his often severe judgments from hindsight, he was meticulous in trying to explain contemporary German attitudes under the conditions of the empire, the Weimar Republic, and the dictatorship.

This reviewer regrets to say that a careful comparison of the German and English texts has convinced him that the translation is substandard and unacceptable for scholarly purposes. Ample proof could be adduced that the translator was not sufficiently equipped for the challenging task. He is unfamiliar with German administrative terminology and many inaccurate translations divulge a deplorable lack of historical knowledge. Even more disturbing is the fact that most of Ernst's penetrating critical evaluations of pertinent sources and literature in the section "Notes" have been omitted by the translator who (erroneously) thinks that they are of interest only to German students. The opportunity to bring them up to date and to add some hints to the rich relevant American literature of recent years on modern German history has been missed. Inaccuracies in the editor's own notes are abundant. Thus a unique chance of making the publication of Professor Ernst's lectures a valuable contribution to American as well as German historical scholarship has, unfortunately, been missed.

FRITZ T. EPSTEIN
Indiana University

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The Birth of the Austrian Republic, 1918-1921 *by Karl R. Stadler. Leyden, A. W. Sijthoff, 1966.—207 pp. 19.50 Dfl.*

Here finally is a comprehensive account in English of the enormous difficulties faced, and partly overcome, by the Social Democratic makers of independent Austria. Renner, Bauer, *et al.*, although emotionally tied to the nascent German republic, were perfectly willing and able to engage in a separate Austrian course. The Treaty of St. Germain prevented them from creating a truly viable state. For even if the provisions of the treaty were no harsher than the *fait accompli* with which the "victorious" Central European states had presented the peacemakers, the great powers failed grievously in their task. Their territorial arrangements, the author argues, bore no relation to justice and were slightly favorable to Austria only when the interests of a great power (Italy, in the case of Carinthia) happened to coincide with those of Austria. Furthermore, the peacemakers committed a psychological blunder when they forced the Austro-Germans to shoulder the responsibility for a war in which the other peoples of the Hapsburg Monarchy had shared with almost equal enthusiasm or lack of enthusiasm. Finally, by sanctifying the selfish economic policies of Austria's neighbors, the great powers condemned Austrian industry to enslavement. By 1930, ninety-five per cent of Austria's leading industrial enterprises were controlled by foreign capital. If, in all this, the Anglo-Saxon powers sinned by indifference and Italy by selfishness, the major blame must fall on the French who could have but did not create the basis for a "democratic cooperation" in the Danube basin. The author's thesis is debatable, for it is hard to see how reactionary and revisionist Hungary, multinational Czechoslovakia, and democratic Austria could have cooperated successfully, but he is right in proclaiming that Austria's future was jeopardized at the peace negotiations. In general, the argument is lucid and the evidence convincing. A pity that the title of the work should be misleading—for there is almost nothing said on domestic affairs—and that the author should have failed to consult archival sources. For students, this study makes highly recommended reading; scholars will not consider it definitive.

ISTVAN DEAK
Columbia University

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Democratic Parties in the Low Countries and Germany *by Willem Verkade. Leiden, Universitaire Pers Leiden, 1965.—331 pp. 40 Dfl.*

Revolutionary Hamburg: Labor Politics in the Early Weimar Republic *by Richard A. Comfort. Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1966.—x, 226 pp. $6.00.*

Die deutsche Zentrumspartei, 1917-1923 *by Rudolf Morsey, Düsseldorf, Droste, 1966.—651 pp.*

The politics of democratic party compromise are now more than a century old in some continental countries. Wars, savagely civil or globally nationalist, almost ruined parliamentary government and suspended civil liberties in bloody intervals. The involved observer is torn between marveling at its survival and despairing about its precariousness. The mechanisms of democratic government seem as sensitive as a clockwork that is easily affected, or brought to a complete standstill, by outside disturbances.

In one way or another, Morsey, Comfort, and Verkade deal with the fortunes of democratic coalition politics. However, theirs are case studies, which leave most of the wider implications to the reader. Morsey's massive and well-researched study continues Karl Bachem's nine-volume history of the German Catholic Center party, which dealt mostly with the Imperial era, and parallels some of Klaus Epstein's book on Matthias Erzberger. Morsey's *Habilitation* treats the same time-span, as does Comfort's Ph.D. dissertation on labor politics in Hamburg, which successfully responds to the scholarly demand for regional and city studies of the European labor movement. Verkade, participant and observer in politics for more than three decades, presents a patient compilation of the history of democratic parties and their adversaries in the Low Countries and Germany; he hopes to continue with a sociological and comparative study that would transcend the purely descriptive level of the present volume.

What are some of the lessons for the politics of democratic compromise that can be drawn from the three works? Firstly, the studies illustrate the manner in which ideologically opposed movements may gradually become part of a pluralist "system" (like the "Weimar System," as it was labeled, and hated, by the Nazis). Secondly, if this happens, intransigent forces tend to split off or to coalesce. Thirdly, external conditions tip the scales in favor of friend or foe of pluralist democracy, largely irrespective of the degree of internal viability. Neither the bitter language conflict in Belgium nor the deep religious cleavage in the Netherlands vitiated the politics of compromise, but the destructive impact of the First

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World War and its aftermath, with its cumulative political and economic pressures on the polity, proved too much for the Weimar Republic.

Liberalism, socialism, and political Catholicism in the three countries sooner or later had to forego the claim and the hope that they would be carried to supremacy through "progress," the "iron laws" of capitalist development, or the "organic" reconstitution of society. Verkade's synopsis shows how in the Low Countries and Germany these movements congealed into a relatively balanced system of coalition politics, which emerged at the end of the older European power balance and survived, with sharp interruptions, into the era of the international balance of terror. Morsey and Comfort describe how sections of the Catholic and Socialist movements rejected the politics of compromise, preferring to remain pure in spirit, splendid in isolation, and entranced by the vision of total victory. However, their studies focus on the strengths and weaknesses of Social Democracy and *Zentrum* as defenders of the Republic.

Fortunately, the success of coalition politics does not depend on the mutual liking of the partners; coalition governments are usually strained marriages of convenience, if not of necessity. The Center party was a willing partner for negative as well as positive reasons. Despite its religious formula, the party was very heterogeneous, and this permitted and required a high degree of adaptability. Since the party was committed only to an abstract theory of natural law and the defense of Catholic education, it could buttress the Republic in spite of its own conservative forces. Under the Protestant empire the party had been a highly successful pressure group, with veto rights and claims to benefices vis-à-vis the Prussian and Imperial administration; for this reason it did not favor parliamentary government until the last days of the war. Many voters remained as aloof from the "Weimar System" as they had from Prussia's monarchic constitutionalism. The party leaders justified their compromise policies after 1918 as sacrifices and examples of courage in adversity. Like their Social Democratic partners, they took pride in their sense of "national" responsibility, after decades of public suspicion about their loyalty. Both in 1919 and in the great crisis of 1923 the party did a great deal to preserve the Reich in the face of Bavarian and Rhenish separatism; Morsey correctly considers this a major political accomplishment, if one takes territorial unity as a political value at all. However, achievements such as Erzberger's financial reform and Wirth's foreign policy of accepting the crushing burdens of the Versailles Treaty could not be chalked up as credits because they were performed in collaboration with the Social Democrats and were unpopular with many Catholic voters.

Moreover, as in the case of the Social Democrats, the leadership had trouble with the rising political generation that was formed by the trench

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warfare and the deprivations of the postwar period; both parties were led by men who had grown up and proved themselves in the empire. The Catholic youth movement of the nineteen-twenties was for a "people's state" and strongly anti-capitalist. A great deal of idealism went together with a weakness for ultimately anti-democratic appeals. The young opposed the authoritarian habits of their elders, yet they favored the dominance of a leader and his following. Even though the Center party was the first German mass party, it remained an association of bourgeois notables, seemingly outdated in comparison with "modern" bureaucratic and charismatic mass parties. However, what has sometimes appeared as the failings merely of superannuity and ossification can also be looked at quite differently, especially since the rise of the Christian Democratic Union after the second war; under the dominance of an octogenarian Center leader, the party, still an organization of *honoratiores*, this time was more successful—because external conditions had changed decisively, and perhaps even because some historical lessons had been learned the hard way.

Comfort's study of Protestant Hamburg before and after 1918 also deals with rules by notables, whether bourgeois patricians or labor aristocrats. As a survival of the medieval city states and one of the three city members of Imperial Germany, Hamburg retained its patrician form of government until the end of the First World War. Industrialization came late, in the eighteen-nineties, in the wake of the ambitious expansion of the merchant marine and navy. A large industrial workforce flocked to the city, suddenly changing its social structure and challenging the notables of the century-old Senate and the *Bürgerschaft* (city parliament) with the issue of working-class integration into the polity. The same process that took decades in making itself felt politically in larger industrializing states took only a few years in Hamburg, where the Social Democrats rapidly built up the party, the unions, and the cooperatives.

After 1918 this Social Democratic subculture became a constitutive part of the Republic, but as the leaders stressed the priorities of public order and economic recovery in the face of the national crises, the dock workers turned to the young Communist organizers who, like their Nazi counterparts, were mainly drifters alienated from the vocational and political demands of civilian everyday life. The CP had expressive value for dissatisfied unskilled workers, but its political ineffectiveness and marginality made it easy for Moscow to gain control over it and turn it into a bureaucratic appendage of the Third International. In contrast to today's CP in Italy, for example, which has considerable resources of its own, the CP in Hamburg had no trade-union and cooperative support, and the city was the headquarters of the cooperative movement.

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The inability of the Social Democrats to integrate the unskilled masses and the Center's failure to attract the Protestant electorate became contributing causes of the Republic's catastrophe, which eventually also overcame its neighbors. It took a *deus ex machina* to put the clock together again; history granted a reprieve. At the end of 1966, more than twenty years after the destruction of Nazism and more than thirty-five years after the last Weimar coalition, the German Social Democrats followed their Belgian and Dutch peers again into a national government, beginning another test of the efficacy of democratic coalition politics.

GUENTHER ROTH
University of California, Davis

Diary of the Sinai Campaign *by Major-General Moshe Dayan. Jerusalem, Steimatzky, 1966.—236 pp. $5.95.*

On July 26, 1956, Egypt's President Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal Company. The British regarded his action as irrefutable proof of Cairo's determination to weaken and ultimately destroy what remained of their Imperial Defense System in the Middle East. The French government, frustrated by its inability to deal with the Algerian insurrection, was hoping that the elimination of Nasser would help "solve" the North African problem.

The Anglo-French decision to reoccupy the Suez Canal and, in the process, to do away with the "Egyptian Hitler" provided Israel with a unique opportunity to achieve three vital objectives. First, occupation of the Cairo-controlled southern tip of the Sinai peninsula would guarantee freedom of navigation in the Straits of Tiran. Since the Suez Canal was closed to Tel-Aviv's shipping at a time when economic relations with a number of Asian and African countries were growing rapidly, free access to the Indian Ocean had become a matter of urgent necessity. It could be secured only through the Red Sea-Gulf of Akaba route to Israel's southern port of Eilat. Second, occupation of the Gaza Strip would safeguard Israel's frontier from periodic raids by Arab terrorists. Third, the defeat of Egypt would for years neutralize the joint Egyptian-Syrian-Jordanian military command established earlier in 1956. All of these objectives were achieved in a lightning eight-day campaign, undertaken with a minimum of preparation.

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This book is an occasionally technical but candid account of the Sinai campaign based on a diary kept by the then chief of staff of the Israeli army. Unfortunately, it does not contain any new information on diplomatic negotiations *preceding* the outbreak of hostilities, for Ben Gurion who read the manuscript "felt that the time had not yet come for publication of the full record of the developments preceding the Sinai campaign" (p. 1).

In contrast, the story of Israel's diplomatic maneuvers *during* the war and of the campaign itself is told in a very frank manner. For example, the author freely admits to and criticizes mistakes committed by the Israelis as well as the Egyptians. He refutes the allegation that the enemy was totally incompetent and praises his occasional, albeit very rare, determination to fight. He reserves some of his harshest criticism for his subordinates whose blunders occasionally resulted in heavy and unnecessary loss of life. Nevertheless, one is left with the impression that the Egyptians, their modern Soviet arms notwithstanding, did not field a first-rate fighting force. To borrow Hanson Baldwin's phrase: "The strength of the Israelis was the weakness of the Egyptians."

Dayan could not help but contrast the decisive Israeli victory in the Sinai with the cumbersome and ineffective Anglo-French efforts to occupy the Canal. While Tel-Aviv achieved its short-range objectives, the allied campaign miscarried, resulting in the downfall of Prime Minister Eden and contributing to the eventual expiration of the Fourth Republic.

Was the Sinai war really necessary? While some opposition to Ben Gurion's policy was evident in Israel even at the time of the campaign (see Moshe Sharett's views in the Jerusalem *Post*, October 24, 1966), the overwhelming consensus favored decisive action. As noted by Foreign Minister Eban: "Sinai was a turning point in Israel's history. The situation after Sinai is fundamentally different from what prevailed before" (the Jerusalem *Post*, October 31, 1966). Dayan agrees and his *Diary* which expounds this viewpoint is a highly informative and readable book which is recommended for the specialist and the general reader alike.

O. M. Smolansky
Lehigh University

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Dilemmas of Democratic Politics in India *edited by G. S. Halappa. Bombay, Manaktalas, 1966.—xiv, 295 pp. 26.00 Rs.*

This book is a collection of papers and proceedings of a seminar organized under the auspices of the University Grants Commission and the department of political science, Karnatak University. Besides two foreign scholars, the participants include some reputed teachers. The nineteen papers and discussions cover many aspects of Indian political life—historical; the impact of the West; voting behavior; foreign policy; the problems and future of Indian democracy; the role of the Opposition; the rights and privileges of citizens; legislature and judiciary. Each paper is well documented and well written. The treatment of subjects is empirical and comparative. The reader has the benefit of information, if not of deep understanding, on some aspects of contemporary Indian politics. The compilation on "Indian Democracy as assessed by Indians" and "Democracy in India—as seen by Foreign Observers" is particularly useful. Also, Professor Geoffrey Ostergaard's contention—"it is conceivable that the Indian polity could be a responsible democracy at the national and state levels while being, at the same time, a classical democracy at the local level" (p. 215)—is thought provoking, though controversial. After reading the whole book, however, one has no impression of any serious dilemma that Indian democracy faces or is likely to face.

The purpose of the seminar, though seemingly ignored by the participants and organizers, was certainly laudable—"to focus as closely as possible" on the dilemmas of Indian democracy. Professor Halappa stresses the problem on page v and repeats it verbatim on page x—"India is on the horns of a dilemma: two ideologies, liberal-democratic and communist, are competing for supremacy." The word "authoritarian" would have been more appropriate than "communist." In an atmosphere of dilemma the literati have a sober and serious responsibility. The liberal-democratic heritage of generations of freedom-fighters has to be preserved and strengthened. To a social scientist today patriotism means the defense of this heritage. This requires a thorough knowledge of its genesis, meaning, and importance. Liberal-democracy has to be viewed not merely as a partnership between those who are working it, but as an eternal partnership between those who are working it, those who struggled and sacrificed for it, those who established and gave form to it, and those who are yet to carry its torch aloft. The supreme responsibility of the link generation and the new generations is to preserve and sharpen the tools of rationalism, dynamism, and moral standards—the tools which the preceding generations employed to end imperialist bondage and win democracy. With these tools the remnants of medievalism and

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feudalism are yet to be felled before the noble legacy can be considered safe and secure.

The seminar seems to have ignored basic problems. Empirical studies without broad philosophical perspective are likely to be Sisyphean or fruitless mental exercises. Despite this shortcoming the book is valuable for advanced students of contemporary Indian politics.

GANESH PRASHAD
Banaras Hindu University

The Taiping Rebellion: History and Documents, Vol. I: History *by Franz Michael, in collaboration with Chung-li Chang. Seattle and London, University of Washington Press, 1966.—xii, 244 pp. $7.50, 54s.*

A century after the end of the Taiping rebellion, the most devastating war of the nineteenth century, no comprehensive history of the event is available in English, and this in spite of the assiduous collection and publication of all available documents and the scores of monographs produced in Chinese by scholars during the past four decades. For ten years the Modern Chinese History Project of the University of Washington's Far Eastern and Russian Institute has been studying and translating Taiping documents. The volume under review, the first of three, is an analytic history; the next two will present some four hundred documents, translated and annotated. Other general histories of the rebellion in English by veteran Chinese scholars are in the offing. We may expect considerable controversy, for the Taiping movement, like all modern revolutionary wars, is subject to greatly differing interpretations.

Professor Michael's work is surprisingly brief as a general history of a revolutionary movement which lasted nearly two decades. It is concerned primarily with Taiping ideology, leadership, power struggles, and military campaigns. There are fifteen excellent maps. Presumably the documents to come will fortify Professor Michael's theories concerning the initial successes and ultimate failure of the rebellion.

Initial successes are ascribed to the decadence of China's polity by 1850. A twenty-page introduction presents Professor Michael's theories concerning Chinese society: a two-class society made up of gentry and officials on the one hand, and the peasantry on the other. In reading this, one is struck by the disregard for industry, commerce, and urban

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life. Who produced and who purveyed the porcelain, silks, Nankeens, lacquer wares, and metal goods which Europeans and Americans were so eager to buy from a China they described as a vast commercial fair? Who built and navigated the ships which plied China's rivers and canals and ranged the South China seas? In this two-class society, who mined the iron and copper, forged the weapons, built the cities and bridges and guildhalls, and minded the shops?

The rebellion itself is lucidly described; its leaders become vivid personalities. Their "fantastic" ideology, evolving political system, and social reforms—which presaged much that was later absorbed more permanently—are clearly pictured with strict attention to chronological sequence. The Taiping failure is explained by the leaders' lack of ability and by their suicidal power struggles which cost the lives of two of the greatest leaders with thousands of their followers and the desertion of a third with his army. But a deeper explanation is offered: the leaders failed to win the support of the peasants "as a social group." They could not do so because their totalitarian system denied the peasants what they wanted most—private ownership of land and possession of its produce. Is this explanation meant also to be a prediction?

Professor Michael is firm in his assertion that the Taiping movement was not a peasant rebellion, thus countering mainland China dogma. He also discounts the role played by Western military power in the rebellion's suppression. On this issue there will be dispute. The two sides were so nearly balanced in the eighteen-fifties that outside help to one could tip the scales decisively. Professor Michael shifts the emphasis from foreign involvement to the organizational ability and far-sighted strategy of Tseng Kuo-fan and other loyalist leaders. Thus he underemphasizes "Imperialism" and glorifies its "lackeys." What will Marxian historians do with this aberrancy? I believe Professor Michael is justified in his conclusion and that he is also correct in asserting that the military system these loyalists created led directly—though not by design—into the regional militarism which plagued China until 1950.

This is a richly interesting book, laden with theory, and will become a target for historical controversy.

C. Martin Wilbur
Columbia University

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The Communist Conquest of China: A History of the Civil War, 1945-1949 *by Lionel Max Chassin, translated from the French by Timothy Osato and Louis Gelas. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1965.—xiii, 264 pp. $5.95.*

Published in France in 1952, this is one of the first books dealing wholly, or largely, with the civil war in China from 1945 to 1949. It is based on the reports, messages, and telegrams from the French military intelligence service in China to which the author had ready access as vice-chief of staff for national defense in France from 1946 to 1949. His account of the military and political events is, in its general outline, substantially the same as that given by the State Department's White Paper on China published in mid-1949. The organization of the book into five parts, each covering one year, obscures the major shifts in strategy and tactics made by both sides in the civil war. The author has given us, however, a more detailed description of some of the military operations that have other works in English. Here and there he makes some interesting observations. For example, he writes: "Even now, in this era of materialism and mechanization, spirit is predominant, and it is morale that wins battles. Superiority in man power and material means little if men make no use of their weapons . . . the potential of man is enormous. . . . But he will not become a hero unless he is inculcated with a faith, a belief, in a doctrine for which he will gladly give his life." If a high-ranking French officer in the air force, the most modern and mechanized of all the three services, has come to this conclusion in his study of the Chinese civil war, is it surprising that Mao has developed his doctrine of the importance of men over weapons and that Lin Piao considers ideological factors as the most important determinant in shaping the political relationship among men?

Since the book was first published in France, Peking has released Volume IV of the *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung* which covers the period 1945-49. From mainland China and Hong Kong have come many memoirs and accounts of the civil war. The Nationalists on Taiwan have made very frank and detailed appraisals of their mistakes in military strategy and tactics in works some of which have been declassified and are available in the Hoover Library. All these new sources should enable enterprising scholars to reconstruct the strategy of both sides in different phases of the civil war and to write a detailed military history of the period. In this endeavor, the information contained in this book would be very useful. If the American government and the Nationalist regime should make the relevant documents available to the scholars, a definitive

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history could then be written which would contribute to our understanding of one of the most significant events in world history.

TANG TSOU
University of Chicago

The First Years of Yangyi Commune *by Isabel and David Crook. New York, Humanities Press, 1966.—xiv, 288 pp. $6.75.*

The First Years of Yangyi Commune is an account of the genesis, growth, and reform of a people's commune in Hopei Province. The authors are a British couple resident in China. They have long been familiar with the area in which this commune is located, for in 1947 they witnessed land reform in one of the villages that in 1958 became part of Yangyi Commune and wrote a book about it, *Revolution in a Chinese Village: Ten Mile Inn* (1959).

The authors write from a pro-Communist viewpoint. Their book is premised on the thesis that the Communist-organized changes in the system of rural property ownership—from land reform to the mutual-aid teams in the early nineteen-fifties, to the collective farms of 1956, to the people's communes of 1958—were wholly rational and entirely necessary responses to the needs of the Chinese peasants and represent the only path to prosperity and modernization. Even the sections dealing with the retreat from the large commune and the heights of collectivism attained in 1958, the year of the Great Leap Forward, exude the same aura of bland reasonableness so often found in the Chinese official literature.

Yet this book is much more than a rationalization of Communist policies. Readers willing to disregard the book's tone and willing to penetrate beneath the jargon can find a great deal of useful information about Chinese villages under Communist rule. In some respects it is a richer and more revealing picture than the one that emerges from Jan Myrdal's highly publicized *Report from a Chinese Village*. The reader is told, for example, that class background, not ability, is the first criterion for leadership selection (pp. 217-18) or in a footnote (p. 24) that locally-compiled statistics on crop yields are not reliable. The ceaseless experimentation and innovation of the Leap Forward are described in detail, as are the problems of managing so huge and diversified an organization as Yangyi Commune, which in 1958 consisted of thirty-three former collective farms and ten thousand families. Centralized distribution, for

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example, gave rise to acute conflicts of interest between richer and poorer villages. These and other conflicts and problems were resolved on the one hand by tightening political controls in the form of "rectification campaigns" and revived class struggle. On the other hand they were resolved by retreat and compromise, by returning a large measure of control to sub-units (first to brigades, later to teams) and by the division of the Yangyi Commune into four small ones.

Despite these retreats the authors assert that the Yangyi Commune of 1962 was an advance over the collective farms of 1957. They also claim that it was the commune and commune-sponsored conservation measures that enabled the Yangyi peasants to weather the natural calamities of 1960. Even if the reader accepts this claim, however, he is bound to be struck by the enormous exertion of wasted and misdirected effort that characterized the first years of Yangyi Commune. The impression this book leaves is that in 1958 the peasants of Yangyi were willing to innovate in the hope that a solution to their chronic poverty was at hand. Such a breakthrough did not occur, and even if communization in Yangyi did not, as in other parts of China, cause a severe crisis, one may legitimately doubt whether the leaders of Yangyi will again be able to arouse comparable enthusiasm and hope among the peasants.

THOMAS P. BERNSTEIN
Indiana University

Guidelines, Informal Controls, and the Market Place *edited by George P. Schultz and Robert Z. Aliber. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1966.—xi, 357 pp. $5.00.*

This is a volume composed of the papers and discussions prepared for a guidelines conference held in Chicago under the auspices of the University of Chicago in April 1966. The contents, though somewhat miscellaneous, are extremely useful to students of recent American efforts to persuade large corporations to refrain from price increases, large unions to content themselves with gains no greater than average per capita productivity improvements (the famous 3.2 per cent figure), and American investors abroad to slow the rate of increase in their capital shifts from the United States to other countries. The historical papers trace the attempts of other countries, notably Britain, the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, France, and West Germany, to moderate price and wage increases by various combinations of persuasion and legislation. There is reasonable agreement that nowhere has success been complete and in no country has even

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temporary success lasted very long. The lawyers, notably Philip Kurland of the University of Chicago Law School, rather tentatively identify some incipient issues of due process in the somewhat chancy applications of the guidelines by two presidents. Their concern is echoed by John Dunlop, Harvard's distinguished expert in labor economics and labor mediation.

To economists the most attractive portion of the volume is the theoretical discussion. Here a sharp confrontation occurs between M.I.T.'s Robert Solow, a temperate defender of the guidelines, and Chicago's Milton Friedman, by all odds his profession's most talented and versatile defender of free market economics. At some cost to the subtlety of argument on both sides, it is possible to summarize the two positions very briefly. Solow is convinced that a large area of discretionary pricing and wage negotiating power exists in the American economy. How this power will be used can be influenced, not when recession exists (for then price and wage increases are difficult or impossible), not when inflation is already apparent (for then price increases feed wage demands and wage increases feed price increases), but when prices are reasonably stable and demand is reasonably high. Solow identifies a certain amount of evidence which suggests that the guidelines have in fact acted to slow price and wage increases since 1962, the year of their enunciation by the Council of Economic Advisers. Friedman is convinced that in the long run guideposts are unworkable and that in the short run what they do, insofar as they operate at all, is seriously to misallocate economic resources and impede the beneficent operations of free markets. For him inflation is basically a matter of monetary expansion and this in turn is within the control of any effective government. The skeptic may conclude that neither disputant convincingly establishes his own case or completely demolishes his opponent's position.

As an appendix, the volume also includes a handy collection of government documents and statements.

ROBERT LEKACHMAN
State University of New York, Stony Brook

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The Labor Arbitration Process *by R. W. Fleming. Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 1965.—233 pp. $5.00.*

This book outlines the history of the labor arbitration process, discusses some important criticisms of that process and makes suggestions for meeting those criticisms; it is devoted mainly to a discussion of some important problems facing arbitration, especially increasing costs, unnecessary time lags in getting final decisions from an arbitrator, and excessive legalisms. Fleming suggests many ways costs can be lowered and the process speeded up, but notes that the question of excessive "legalisms" raises some fundamental questions. Some lawyers feel that arbitrators permit the parties to introduce too much irrelevant material which tends to delay the proceeding unnecessarily. Other arbitrators accept almost all evidence because they consider it to have "therapeutic" value for the parties to "get things off their chests." Formal rules of evidence are designed to protect lay juries from being unduly influenced by unscrupulous attorneys. Since the arbitrator is not a layman he is, at least in theory, not likely to be hoodwinked by irrelevant evidence. Under most circumstances, moreover, the arbitrator is likely to accept some irrelevancies at the outset of a hearing because he is not permitted to know enough about the case beforehand to rule on what is relevant. The author's suggestion that pre-hearing briefs be filed therefore would help facilitate the orderliness of the hearing.

There are a number of problems of procedural regularity which Fleming discusses in some detail and about which he lays down some very useful guidelines. He deals at length with such problems as: access to information to be used in arbitration, the right to confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses, the privilege against self-incrimination, search and seizure, wiretapping, and the use of lie detectors.

There is also a discussion of conflict between individual rights and collective rights, which has been a problem of some concern, particularly in cases of racial discrimination. The problem arises because the federal goverment—through the Railway Labor and National Labor Relation acts—gives labor organizations power which they could use to discriminate against individual members of bargaining units unless the courts imposed some safeguards. The courts therefore have imposed upon the bargaining agent the duty to represent all members of the unit fairly. A question arose over administration enforcement of this duty in 1964 when, in the *Hughes Tool* case, the NLRB ruled that the duty of fair representation was an unfair labor practice and therefore was enforceable by the board. However, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, in the *Miranda* decision, did not agree with the NLRB. Some doubt therefore surrounds this doctrine, even though the board continues to use it in spite of *Miranda*.

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In one of his most interesting chapters, the author argues that the outcome of ordinary arbitration cases is fairly predictable and that, by studying the arbitrator's past awards, the parties can acquire a good indication of how he will decide a particular case.

This book is a valuable addition to the literature on arbitration. It is written very clearly and has summaries at the end of each chapter or section. But the most valuable features of the book are the thoughtful discussions of the important problems confronting arbitration and the author's suggestions for dealing with these problems. Fleming is a well known arbitrator and authority on labor relations in this country and abroad. His suggestions reflect his wide experiences and deserve careful attention by all of those concerned with or about the arbitration process.

RAY MARSHALL
University of Texas

The Élite in the Welfare State *by Piet Thoenes, translated from the Dutch by J. E. Bingham, edited by J. A. Banks. New York, The Free Press, 1966.—236 pp. $6.95*

"Élite" is a concept open to various interpretations. In Part I of this book Professor Thoenes critically examines some of them, in particular those of Mosca, Pareto, Mannheim, and Geiger, and offers his own. In Part II he discusses the nature of the welfare state and then, all too briefly, tackles the subject defined in the title of the book. He concludes with a plea for an independent, critical, and "open" sociology, broad enough to allow for conflict and argument within itself, which would interact legitimately and fruitfully with the "functionary élite" of experts who now occupy a key position within the governmental machine. Thoenes' book is preceded by a sympathetic and helpful picture of Dutch sociology by the editor, who has rewritten the first introductory chapter on the study of elites for the benefit of the English reader and also, with the same object in view, added new material "here and there" in the text of the book itself, unfortunately without specifying what these additions are.

Thoenes' thinking is based on the idea that an elite operates in the area of tension between what is and what ought to be. Medieval Christian society accepted the world as imperfect and imperfectible, and the role of the elite was therefore a conservative one. But there also appeared from

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time to time revolutionary, perfectionist sects, like the Anabaptists, who claimed to carry a message received by revelation. The modern phase begins when the message is derived from a scientific understanding of social development and the possibilities of social change. This theme is elaborated in an interesting and imaginative way in Part I.

The term "welfare state," for Thoenes, refers to a society which is democratic in its political, and capitalist in its economic aspect, and whose structure and growth are shaped and guided by political action directed toward the maximization of general welfare. His contention is that there is a consensus about the principles of this society so complete that current issues are concerned with means rather than ends, and are therefore administrative rather than political. Consequently the politicians are subordinated to control by the scientific experts—economists, statisticians, sociologists—within the governmental machine, who alone have all the skills, knowledge, and information needed to understand how such a society must be run. They constitute the new "functionary élite."

To the British sociologist this analysis will appear basically sound but seriously exaggerated at many points. The issues that arise over the means to the agreed end are often intensely political, and the officials, therefore, cannot reduce the politicians to impotence. Nor are these officials quite as consistently scientific as he makes out, and they certainly do not enjoy anything like a monopoly of scientific expertise. It may well be that Thoenes was moved to write this book by the wish to substantiate the thesis set out in the final chapter, that the protection of democracy against destruction by a scientific bureaucracy requires the help of an "open" sociology. If so, he should be receptive to the evidence that the social sciences (not just sociology) are already playing this part in British life, by both collaborating with and criticizing the "mandarins" while making their own original contributions to the knowledge and understanding of the problems with which governments must deal.

T. H. Marshall
Cambridge, England

Hannibal's Legacy: The Hannibalic War's Effects on Roman Life *by Arnold J. Toynbee. London, New York, and Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1965; Vol. I: xii, 643 pp.; Vol. II: x, 752 pp.; $40.35.*

This enormous book is essentially an *exemplum*, an illustrative story where an historical (or fictional) event serves to point a moral. The moral

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is that "war posthumously avenges . . . the vanquished on the victors." The *exemplum* used to prove this lesson is the Second Punic (Hannibalic) War (218-01 B.C.), which, according to the author, produced the Roman Revolution and the fall of the Roman Republic. The lesson would be more impressive if we could forget that, despite the revolution, Rome has remained the eternal city and that even the Roman Senate existed as late as the beginning of the seventh century A.D., while only fifty-five years after the Hannibalic War Carthage was literally blotted out by the Romans so that the archeologists are unable to find the remains of Hannibal's city. It seems that Nemesis, whom Mr. Toynbee likes to mention for the sake of his moral, rather sided with the larger battalions.

The moral aside, the first volume deals with Rome and her neighbors before the First Punic War, and the second volume describes the (alleged) consequences of the Hannibalic War. The method of Mr. Toynbee is simple: to ascribe every difference between the situation before and any time after the Punic Wars to the impact of these wars on Roman social structure and psychology. This applies equally to the (alleged) "deracination of Italian peasantry," to transhumance, to the corruption of the Roman nobility, etc. One is reminded of the old man in Plautus' *Trinummus* who, some years after the Hannibalic War, complains of the corruption of the *mores maiorum*. Only Plautus wrote a farce.

Being a classical scholar and a very learned man, Mr. Toynbee read the sources and numerous excurses of his work often collect important information or offer fresh and imaginative points of view, for instance on acclimatization of new plants in Italy. But in his historical narrative he gladly quotes and eclectically follows an assemblage of modern, more or less authoritative, authorities, choosing the views which agree with his moralist outlook. Knowledgeable readers would certainly profit by consulting his work. (The admirable indexes, made by Mrs. Toynbee, facilitate the use of these bulky volumes.) But the general reader can only be misled by Mr. Toynbee. The postulate on which his work is based is preposterous: that a war which occurred in the last two decades of the third century B.C. is a necessary and sufficient cause of changes which happened over a period of nearly two centuries afterward. Will Mr. Toynbee write another book to explain the English Revolution after the Second World War and the disintegration of the British empire after 1945 by Wellington's victory at Waterloo in 1815?

E. J. BICKERMAN
Columbia University

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Book Notes

After five years of observation of psychiatric investigators at work in a research hospital, Stewart E. Perry concludes in *The Human Nature of Science: Researchers at Work in Psychiatry* (New York, The Free Press, 1966; xxii, 289 pp., $6.50) that the social context of research affects its design, implementation, and results. Perry examines three problems in detail: (1) the ways in which conflict between therapeutic and research goals altered one study of depersonalization using LSD, (2) how interaction with other behavioral scientists shaped psychiatrists' conceptions of their own science, and (3) the effects of social organization on the treatment unit upon the formation of theories explaining one patient's symptoms. In the first study, which occupies more than half the book, Perry focuses on changes in research design and procedures generated by a subject's LSD-induced anxiety. These changes are interpreted as maneuvers to resolve conflict between research requirements and needs of the patient-subject. More interesting is his account of how alternative theories of the source of another patient's pathology proposed by nurses and therapists were affected by their respective social statuses and served to support the social system of the research organization. Perry's analysis of these two cases and of psychiatrists' views of science is plausible enough, but its generalizability to other sciences remains moot, to say the least. This, of course, is one of the principal limitations of the case-study method. Does the social setting have similar consequences for research in sciences with more rigorous standards for theory and method? Are there conflicts parallel to the research-therapy dilemma in those sciences which do not use living subjects? More generally, under what conditions is the social setting apt to affect research procedures and outcomes? In the final chapter, Perry maintains that communication of scientific knowledge is, at best, an attempt by one scientist to transfer his

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experience to others and that this experience is shaped by individual history and the social milieu; consequently, he argues, the doctrine of the genetic fallacy is itself fallacious. This is not the place to dispute the claim which attributes both too much and too little to that fallacy. Perry has shown, however, that case studies of this kind begin to move toward more systematic examination of the relations between science and its social context.—HARRIET ZUCKERMAN, *Columbia University.*

The results of a survey of the attitudes on intergroup relations of students in some Munich public schools are reported by Werner J. Cahnman in *Völker und Rassen im Urteil der Jugend* (Munch, Günter Olzog, 1965; 115 pp., 9,80 DM). The author, himself born in Munich, came to the United States after a period in Dachau concentration camp, and now teaches sociology at Rutgers and the New School for Social Research. The survey was conducted at the request of the Munich school authorities and is reviewed not only in terms of a statistical presentation of the author's findings, but by a detailed account of his conversations and discussions with students and teachers. As a result, we can see these children for what they are: open-minded, prejudiced, friendly, strongly influenced by the views of parents and teachers. Particularly striking is the extent to which television provides one of the students' main sources of information about the Third Reich, and the extent to which television coverage of racial troubles in the United States has suggested a form of rationalization for Germany's treatment of the Jews. It is also characteristic of the persistence of stereotypes that the youngsters' open-minded attitude toward Israel often has not the slightest impact on their image of the Jews. The author concludes with some specific recommendations for the Munich authorities and with excerpts from his conversations.—GERHARD L. WEINBERG, *University of Michigan.*

A comparative international analysis of election studies—*Empirische Wahlforschung: Konzeptionen und Methoden im internationalen Vergleich* (Cologne, Westdeutscher, 1965; xii, 240 pp., 24.50 DM) by Nils Diederich—provides a comprehensive view of approaches to the study of elections. Because of their recent origins, election studies still lack validated theories and uniform methods of inquiry. The chapters on individual countries—France, the United States, England, and Germany—reflect diverse orientations. These divergent but interesting approaches

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are related to the nature of electoral systems, differences in political structures, and particular traditions. While most election studies do not transcend the bounds of raw empiricism, the final summary chapter of Diederich's book shows where progress has been made and how comparative analysis of election data provides general insights in voting behavior. The well balanced presentation of the great variety of voting studies in the United States is so instructive as to rate inclusion in a comprehensive anthology of the developments of the social sciences in this country. On the other hand, the author should have devoted more space to the limitations inherent in applications and interpretations of the correlation coefficients that appear so frequently in election studies. He also should have said more about fallacious interpretations of election data that are based on unwarranted assumptions. The extensive references to impressionistic descriptions of election campaigns do not belong with the analysis of voting behavior and well might have been deleted. The book as a whole, however, is one which historians, political scientists, and sociologists should find to be a most timely contribution, bringing order and purpose to the study of election data in particular and political behavior in general.—WALTER B. SIMON, *Western Reserve University.*

Recognized since its first edition in 1934 as the indispensable point of departure for all subsequent studies on the topic—*Church and State in Latin America: A History of Politico-Ecclesiastical Relations* (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1966; xii, 465 pp., $8.50) by J. Lloyd Mecham—this classic study has now appeared in revised form. If the conclusions and analyses seem to lack the impact they once conveyed, it is in part because in the course of some thirty years they have come to be familiar to and largely accepted by students of the Latin American scene, a fact which constitutes a high accolade indeed to the book. Mecham's interpretations of issues that have long been bombastically debated are universally free from bias, even though there are passages in which the reader might wish the approach had departed from legalistic considerations and accorded greater heed to social and intellectual factors. In the new edition, treatment of post-1934 events has been added to each of those chapters dealing with specific countries or areas, and the concluding chapter, a penetrating summation of preceding material, has been substantially rewritten. The bibliography has been considerably revised so as to include recent works. The findings of newer publications, however, are not always incorporated into the text. In up-

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dating the original book and carrying the treatment to 1965, there are times when Mecham, Professor Emeritus of Government at the University of Texas, does not refer as consistently as might have been desired to Spanish-language sources, relying instead on relatively inconsequential English works. If some may feel that the material which updates the book is not on the same high level as the original publication, students and scholars should be happy that the work through which a generation of Latin Americanists, to which this reviewer feels privileged to belong, commenced its education on church-state relations is once again readily available. A new breed of political scientists dismisses as outmoded the terms church and state, preferring to talk about religion and politics. Perhaps in the future they will produce a work as substantial as Mecham's.—FREDRICK B. PIKE, *University of Pennsylvania.*

Seeking "to examine the realities of the relationship between British diplomacy and American imperialism during and immediately after the Spanish-American War" and to distinguish "Britain's actual diplomatic policies" from "what public opinion thought they were or should be" (pp. v-vi), R. G. Neale's *Great Britain and United States Expansion: 1898-1900* (East Lansing, Michigan State University Press, 1966; xxii, 230 pp., $6.00) covers familiar ground. The four main chapters discuss Europe's efforts to prevent the war, British neutrality during the conflict, England's relation to the peace settlement, and the Open Door notes. Exploiting fully the British archives and the Salisbury Papers—open to investigators for a decade—the Australian author has described better than anyone else how England shaped her neutrality policy to accommodate the United States and how Lord Charles Beresford designed his much publicized visit to China to advance his own career. But on many matters, especially those pertaining to the American scene, Neale wastes time flogging dead horses and disputing interpretations historians no longer accept. His research is incomplete in some places; his scholarship out of date in others. Although the preface is dated 1963, the footnotes and bibliography cite only one secondary work later than Charles S. Campbell's infinitely superior *Anglo-American Understanding, 1898-1903* (1957). Apparently Neale did not use Ernest R. May's multiarchival study, *Imperial Democracy* (1961), which explores more deeply European diplomacy, or the spate of recent works on the McKinley administration. Neither those contributions nor the latest textbooks support the myths this author is so eager to dispel.—RICHARD W. LEOPOLD, *Northwestern University.*

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In Memoriam

ROBERT LIVINGSTON SCHUYLER

Readers of history will remember Robert Livingston Schuyler (1883-1966) for three of his books: *The Constitution of the United States* (1923), a remarkable study written under the invigorating influence of Charles A. Beard; *Parliament and the British Empire* (1929), a collection of ingenious essays that reflected the impact of Maitland's pastmindedness; and *The Fall of the Old Colonial System* (1945), a work of mature scholarship that summed up one era in British imperial historiography and provided the starting point for some fruitful controversies in recent years.

For all their admiration of Professor Schuyler's scholarship, however, his students, colleagues, and friends will remember him for certain of his personal qualities: his fair-mindedness not only as a scholar but as a human being; his vigorous sense of justice; his compassion; his feeling for underdogs; his scorn of snobbism; his readiness to doubt himself and to laugh at himself; his refreshing wit; his loyalty; and his love of Columbia University and of its history department.

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